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Crazy Clown Time shouldn't work and yet somehow it does. 
‘Writing a song is much the same as writing a film’, he explains. ‘It's all about chasing ideas; about 
telling a story or letting the story tell you’. And this, it turns out, is about as far as he is prepared to go 
in discussing his working method. ‘Because none of the things are yourself, not really. The ideas come 
from someplace else. 
It's like fish’, he says. 
What's like fish? 
‘The ideas’, says Lynch. ‘You didn't make the fish. You caught the fish. Now you can cook it in a good 
way or a bad way, but that's as far as it goes. The fish came from someplace else. 
And sometimes …’ His eyes take on a faraway look. 
‘Sometimes it talks back to you. Tells you how it wants to be cooked.’ 
 
David Lynch, interview in 2011, The Guardian  
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RESUMO 
A sociedade globalizada enfrenta problemas complexos que colocam desafios à sua capacidade de 
adaptação. No entanto, é precisamente a natureza desses problemas, gerados pelos humanos, que 
fornece evidências suficientes para mostrar que a capacidade de adaptação pode nem sempre 
conduzir a um caminho resiliente. Esta tese explora a ambiguidade da ideia de adaptação (e a sua 
prática) e ilustra as formas em que a adaptabilidade pode contribuir para aumentar a resiliência dos 
sistemas sócio-ecológicos. A tese combina estudo de caso com a abordagem da teoria fundamentada 
nos dados e propõe um novo quadro analítico para estudar a adaptabilidade das organizações de 
utilizadores de recursos: de que fatores depende a adaptabilidade e quais são os principais desafios 
para a gestão dos recursos e para resiliência do sistema. Nesta tese é abordado o caso específico 
das organizações de produtores de peixe (OP) em Portugal. 
Os resultados obtidos sugerem que, apesar do contexto ecológico e de mercado, incluindo o tipo de 
crise, poder influenciar o tipo de adaptação dos pescadores dentro das OP (antecipatória, reativa e 
não-adaptativa), ele não é determinante. Em vez disso, o contexto torna ainda mais crucial a agência 
(ou seja, a liderança, confiança e percepção dos agentes em termos de seu impacto sobre a 
motivação dos pescadores para aprender uns com os outros). Em suma, verificou-se que a 
adaptação interna pode melhorar o contributo das OP para gestão das pescas e para aumentar a sua 
resiliência, mas não é uma panaceia e pode, em alguns casos, contribuir para aumentar a 
vulnerabilidade do sistema. A contínua dificuldade de adaptação das OP portuguesas aponta para um 
problema institucional básico (o regime de mercado do peixe), reduzindo claramente a resiliência da 
pesca, uma vez que promove a sobrepesca. No entanto, esta mudança estrutural pode não ser 
suficiente para ultrapassar outras barreiras para a adaptabilidade dos pescadores portugueses 
(membros das OP), como a história (memória coletiva) e as auto-percepções problemáticas 
associadas. Os agentes (pessoas envolvidas nas estruturas e nas práticas) também precisam mudar. 
Em que medida e como é que a mudança institucional e os agentes se influenciam mutuamente (por 
exemplo, através comparação de governação das pescas em Portugal e noutros países da União 
Europeia ) é um tema a ser explorado em pesquisas futuras. 
 
Palavras-chave: pescadores, adaptabilidade, resiliência sócio- ecológica, organizações de 
produtores de peixe, instituições. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Complex problems of globalized society challenge its adaptive capacity. However, it is precisely the 
nature of these human-induced problems that provide enough evidence to show that adaptability may 
not be on a resilient path. This thesis explores the ambiguity of the idea of adaptation (and its practice) 
and illustrates the ways in which adaptability contributes to resilience of social-ecological systems. 
The thesis combines a case study and grounded theory approach and develops an analytical 
framework to study adaptability in resource users’ organizations: from what it depends on and what 
the key challenges are for resource management and system resilience. It does so for the specific 
case of fish producers’ organizations (POs) in Portugal. 
The findings suggest that while ecological and market context, including the type of crisis, may 
influence the character of fishers’ adaptation within POs (i.e. anticipatory, maladaptive and reactively 
adaptive), it does not determine it. Instead, it makes agency even more crucial (i.e. leadership, trust 
and agent’s perceptions in terms of their impact on fishers’ motivation to learn from each other). In 
sum, it was found that internal adaptation can improve POs’ contribution to fishery management and 
resilience, but it is not a panacea and may, in some cases, increase system vulnerability to change. 
Continuous maladaptation of some Portuguese POs points at a basic institutional problem (fish market 
regime), which clearly reduces fisheries resilience as it promotes overfishing. However, structural 
change may not be sufficient to address other barriers to Portuguese fishers’ (PO members) 
adaptability, such as history (collective memory) and associated problematic self-perceptions. The 
agency (people involved in structures and practices) also needs to change. What and how institutional 
change and agency change build on one another (e.g. comparison of fisheries governance in Portugal 
and other EU countries) is a topic to be explored in further research.  
 
Key words: fishers, adaptability, social-ecological resilience, fish producers’ organizations, institutions 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘There is science of simple things and art of complex ones.  
What is simple is always fictitious.  
What is not simple is useless.’ 
Paul Valery 1 
 
                                                     
1 Freely translated from French by Garcia and Charles (2008). ‘‘Il y a science des choses simples et art des 
choses compliqueées’’. Valéry. P. Tel quel. Gallimard 1996: 495 pp. ‘‘Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui 
ne l’est pas est inutilisable.’’ Valéry, P. «Mauvaises pensées et autres» (1941). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY  
Humanity and nature are not just linked, but truly integrated (Folke et al. 2007) within the extended 
family of the Earth (Vandana Shiva2). Their coevolution implies that at any time (change of) each 
determinates the other (Norgaard 1994). Human activity depends on Earth’s life-support goods and 
services (e.g. Daily 1997) and influences ecosystems in all scales (e.g. Vitousek 1994); nature reacts 
to human actions in a non-linear and unpredictable manner (Holling 2001).   
In the era of the Anthropocene, in which we currently live (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), humans 
dominate all Earth system processes from local to global scales (e.g. Foley et al. 2005, Steffen et al. 
2007). The Earth as transformed by humans assumes an ongoing transition and acceleration of 
human-induced pressures (e.g. Turner 1990, Kowalski et al. 2012). Due to globalization, these 
pressures, even if local in origin, are of worldwide concern (e.g. Young et al. 2006). The major crises 
they generate, such as climate change, loss of ecosystem services and financial crisis, are all 
interlinked in their complexity (e.g. Adger et al. 2009, Walker et al 2009), which may likely worsen their 
impacts (e.g. Biggs et al. 2011).  
Moreover, the modern world has become commercially integrated and therefore culturally and 
spiritually fragmented, which caused humans’ mental separation from nature and disrespect of 
essential spiritual link between humans and nature that provides life for humans (Berkes and Folke 
1994, Vandana Shiva3).  
In consequence, the risk of long-term damage to Earth systems that support humanity is increasing 
(Rockström et al. 2009, Hughes et al. 2013). The challenges, posed by human population, such as 
hyper consumption, economic growth, water use, biodiversity loss, overfishing, atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, etc. should worry us all and demand the very best of science and collective action of 
humankind (e.g. Turner et al. 1994, Gerst et al. 2014). However, over-emphasizing human powers 
should also worry us, as it may result in the so-called the ‘Anthropocebo Effect’, a rather pessimist 
cultural frame of accepting human destruction as inevitable (Jacquet in Brockman et al. 2013). 
Instead, acknowledging humans as dominant drivers of environmental change should draw explicit 
attention to the responsibility humans have as stewards of Mother Nature (Crutzen and Schwagerel 
2011, Steffen et al. 2011).  
How we as humans use our mistakes, experience and intellect to sustain this relationship, adapt to 
changes and learn from them is a decisive factor in natural resource management and our life on 
Earth. 
                                                     
2 Vandana Shiva, interview for RTP2, Portugal, 2012, available online: http://vimeo.com/45069821 
3 same as above  
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1.2 OUTSET 
1.2.1 Human adaptation and resilience in social-ecological systems  
This realization calls for an understanding of resource management in terms of resilience of social-
ecological systems (SESs). SESs, as defined by Berkes and Folke (1998) mean co-evolving systems 
of nature and humans, which is a continuation of the co-evolutionary perspective suggested by 
Norgaard (1994). At the core, dynamics in SESs is generated through interaction between the system 
agents (e.g. plants, animals, humans), each with a different degree of information processing capacity, 
the actions of agents, and the effects of those actions on other agents and the environment (Anderies 
et al. 2006).  
At the centre of the SES debate is resilience – the capacity of a system to absorb change, reorganize 
and continue to develop (e.g. Walker et al. 2004, Folke et al. 2010). Rooted in ecology and complexity 
science, the term ‘resilience’ originates from Holling’s (1973) notion of resilience as a measure of 
ecological systems ability to absorb disturbance and still persist. This explanation entails two ideas 
that are essential for resilience thinking. The first one is ‘acceptance of disturbance’. The world is not 
adequately described by concentrating on equilibrium, and conditions near it, as these provide little 
insight into the complex systems dynamics, where the unexpected is most likely. If disturbances are 
not allowed to enter the system, they will accumulate and come back later with a much greater force 
and on a much broader scale (Holling et al. 1995). A management approach based on resilience, thus, 
embraces change and complexity rather than focusing on the need to control the natural system, 
manage it for security and keep it in a certain steady state in a command-and-control fashion, e.g. 
fixed maximum yield approach (Folke et al. 2003). In other words, due to nature’s complex behaviour, 
natural resource management is more of an art than a science (Anderies et al. 2006): science 
prescriptions cannot ‘instruct’ someone (e.g. resource users) on how to manage natural resources, but 
serve only to complement contextual knowledge based on the feedback from nature and from the 
community (Folke et al. 2005). Withstanding disturbances also assumes using such an event to 
catalyse renewal and innovation, acknowledged as ‘turning crisis into opportunity’ (e.g. Folke et al. 
2010).  
This ‘persistence despite change’, a second idea from Holling’s work, is enabled through ‘persistence 
of relationships’ within the system, which build system capacity to absorb change without dramatically 
altering it. System flexibility and fluctuations are essential features that maintain persistence. Hence, a 
system can be very resilient and still fluctuate (change) greatly, i.e. have low stability. The more 
resilient the system, the larger disturbance it can absorb before shifting into an alternative regime, 
known as regime shift (e.g. Scheffer et al. 2001). In ecological systems, resilience is sustained through 
diversity, such as genetic diversity, biodiversity and the heterogeneity of landscape mosaics (Peterson 
et al. 1998, Carpenter et al. 2001).  
For social resilience, defined as the ability of individuals, groups, organizations or communities to cope 
with external stresses and disturbances in the face of change (Adger 2000, Hall and Lamont 2012), 
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adaptability – i.e. the capacity to adapt as a response to external change (Berkes et al. 2003, Walker 
et al. 2006) is crucial. Besides economic resources, institutional and cultural resources can be 
understood as the social sources of resilience, embodied in social organizations, social networks and 
collective imaginaries4 (Hall and Lamont 2012).   
Humans are ‘sense-making’ creatures (Gunderson and Holling 2002): their ability to seek and create 
meanings through ‘structures of signification’ (communication, language, symbols), together with 
‘structures of legitimation’ (norms, rules, routines and procedures) and ‘structures of domination’ 
(power, resources and authority) (Giddens 1979) permits high levels of self-organization, crucial to 
deal with change. Hence, to a large extent, adaptability implies responding to change – the capacity of 
actors to adjust a system by adjusting their actions in response to change (Berkes et al. 2003, Adger 
et al. 2005a).  
Moreover, instead of merely reacting to change, humans are able to consciously reflect on their past 
experience and learn new ways of coping. Thus, another aspect of social adaptability and resilience is 
the added ability of individuals as well as communities to learn reflexively, anticipate and plan for the 
future – i.e. as more than a mere extrapolation of past practices (e.g. Gunderson and Holling 2002, 
Adger et al. 2005). As a result, both adaptability and transformability are essential for SES resilience 
(Folke et al. 2010). However, the kinds of social mechanisms at work behind these processes need to 
be further investigated and better understood. This thesis takes up this challenge.   
Besides the role of individual agency - the choices of individuals within the system, their knowledge, 
values, identity and attitudes (e.g. Giddens 1984, Folke et al. 2005), the ways in which humans 
organize themselves to extract resources drive environmental change and affect the resilience of 
SESs (Hardin 1967, Dietz et al. 2003). The research presented here thus pays attention to adaptability 
in agency and institutional contexts.  
Human institutions shape human interactions and behaviour (North 1990, Ostrom 1990). Over the 
course of human history, institutions have been ‘managed’ by their environments (Ludwig et al. 1993) 
to fit to ecosystem dynamics and improve stewardship of natural resources for human well-being and 
sustainability (Folke et al. 1998b, 2007). This possible convergence of adapting institutions with 
system resilience (Boyd and Folke 2011) might be particularly relevant in the context of local resource 
regimes - resource users’ capacity to adapt to changes affecting resource condition is crucial if they 
are to remain viable (e.g. Marschal and Stoke 2014).   
 
1.2.2 Adaptability in resource users’ organizations 
It is in this context that the thesis approaches adaptability in resource users’ organizations. It does so 
for two reasons. First, interdependence of ecological and social systems is especially evident in the 
                                                     
4 Hall and Lamont (2012) understand ‘collective imaginary’ as a form of social connectedness, which often stands 
in mutually reinforcing relationship with social organizations and policies that contribute to social resilience. In 
brief, collective imaginaries embody narratives about the past and the future of the community who belongs to it. 
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context of natural resources management (e.g. Berkes et al. 2003). Natural resources management is, 
by its very nature, complex (e.g. Levin 1999, Cilliers et al. 2013); to practice it more sustainably, we 
need to be aware of what Galaz (2011) frames as ‘double complexity’ - complex systems (biophysical 
subsystems and additional complexity of organizational and social side) and complex (rapid and 
unexpected) changes within them. Resource users are encouraged to take care of resources as they 
are strongly affected by both nature dynamics and their own management failures (Ostrom 1990). 
Nonetheless, it has become increasingly clear that it is precisely this limited predictability of natural 
systems (Costanza et al. 1993) that increases the importance of resource users’ flexibility and 
adaptability to change (e.g. Olsson and Folke 2001). Indeed, the literature on common-pool resources 
has repeatedly demonstrated how resource users self-organize, learn and through collective action 
develop capacity to adapt to environmental surprises and manage resources sustainably and how 
they do this faster than centralized agency (Berkes 1989, Ostrom 1990).  
Second, resource users’ adaptability (with intent) (or lack of it) impacts nature as our commons – 
common-pool resources. Common-pool resources are resources from which it is difficult to exclude 
other people; however, as they generate finite quantities of resource units, the use by one actor 
subtracts or reduces other’s opportunities for use (e.g. Ostrom et al. 1994), which may lead to the 
commons’ dilemma (Hardin 1968). As commons are traditionally at risk of exploitation, these 
problems, which concern us are also our commons (Zizek 2013). Herewith, though organizations 
associated with natural resources are viewed as key elements for their successful management 
(Ostrom 1990), they often need to defend themselves from the accusations that they have the biggest 
blame for the overuse of commons. The question of asking who is responsible and how that 
responsibility is distributed is necessary when attempting to address any commons’ dilemma (Jacquet 
et al. 2013). From this perspective, adaptation and management pose new problems of 
unprecedented scale at the local level (e.g. Young et al. 2006). In other words, adaptability in resource 
users' organizations can not only improve their management practices, but also provide them with a 
new knowledge base for reinterpretation of problems they face, which might be of a structural nature 
(e.g. Ternstrom 2011), embedded within the system. 
 
 
1.3  CONTEXT 
1.3.1  Fisheries: complex problematic  
A typical example of commons is fishery. Globally, fisheries are in crisis (e.g. Pauly et al. 1998, 2002, 
Worm et al. 2009), induced by overfishing, climate change, changes in market and regulations. 
Pressures are all interlinked, which acknowledges the complexity of fisheries systems (Garcia and 
Charles 2008).  
Increasing human appetite for seafood is at the root of the fishery crisis (Jacquet 2009), affirmed by 
Hilborn (2012) as: ‘first, foremost, and always: there is no free lunch’ (Worm 2013 review of Hilborn 
2012). The erosion of resilience of many marine systems is associated precisely with the attempt to 
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maintain supply of global market demands (Hughes et al. 2005). The three world major seafood 
markets are the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States of America (USA), which are all 
largely dependent on seafood sources well beyond their domestic waters (Swartz et al. 2010).  
This results in overfishing, which gives rise to both ecological (e.g. depletion of fish stocks) and socio-
economic problems (e.g. lower fish prices). Ecologically, overfishing generates ecosystem 
modification, changes that are ‘gradual and for most of us difficult to see’ (Worm 2006, pp. 1546), e.g. 
fishing-down-the-food-webs phenomenon (Pauly et al., 1998). This is unsustainable and can create 
sudden and catastrophic shifts in a marine ecosystems (Scheffer and Carpenter 2003), already 
identified as ecologically vulnerable (Worm et al. 2006).  
Furthermore, in globalized fisheries, specialized industry fisheries from developed countries fish in the 
waters of developing countries (Swartz et al. 2010). As a result, the least developed countries whose 
inhabitants are largely reliant on fish for their diet and whose fisheries produce 20% of the world’s fish 
exports are most vulnerable to climate change (e.g. Allison et al. 2009).  
Besides overfishing, market and climate change, there is also a growing consensus that today’s crisis 
in fisheries is partly related to institutional failure (e.g. Jentoft 2004). Due to deficient regulation and 
lack of enforcement capacity, resource users are able to practice globally a large amount of illegal and 
unreported fishing (Agnew et al. 2009). Another part of institutional failure is based on the premise that 
fishers’ contribution to fisheries crisis is not equal (e.g. Castilla and Defeo 2005, Coulthard et al., 
2011). In this context, small-scale fisheries face big barriers in terms of fishery resources and market 
access when compared with overcapitalised, subsidy and fuel- ridden large-scale industrial fishing 
vessels (Jacquet and Pauly 2008).  
In Europe, Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has failed to achieve its ecological and social goals (e.g. 
Osterblom et al. 2012). As a result, European fisheries suffer from low profitability; 88 % of assessed 
European stocks are overfished (30% of these stocks may not be able to replenish) (CFP 2009), 
compared to the global average of 30 % in 2009 (FAO 2009). 
 
1.3.2  The art of managing fisheries 
The described complexity of fishery systems has significant consequences for their management and 
sustainability (Garcia and Charles 2008). While some might argue that this is bound to lead to a 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), others have pointed to strategies to pre-empt this. Among the 
most influential is the work of Ostrom, saying that social organization can overcome the problem of 
tragedy of the commons by cooperative action (Ostrom 1990) and work on co-management that 
typically manifests sharing power and responsibility between the State and resource users (e.g. 
Pinkerton 1989, Berkes et al. 1991). It has since been broadened into other related forms of 
institutions, such as adaptive co-management, which combines co-management with adaptive 
management (Holling 1978, Walters 1986). In adaptive co-management, policy and practice are 
revised in a ‘learning-by-doing’ process (experiential and experimental) to accommodate new 
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ecological knowledge and collective judgment of different stakeholders (Carllson and Berkes 2005, 
Armitage et al. 2009).  
In fisheries, the need for collective management and policy endorsement is exceptionally important 
given the ‘wicked’ nature of problems confronting fisheries governance (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 
2009) and the unpredictable nature of marine fish resources (Coulthard et al. 2011). Moreover, its 
common pool characteristics (subtractability and associated difficulty of exclusion) require legitimacy 
of institutions and governance (Berkes 1989, Ostrom 1990, 1999, Dietz et al. 2003), including ‘rules of 
the game’ (North 1990) to balance individual and collective interest (rationality).     
The creation of incentives for fishers through market measures is increasingly recognized as a 
possible tool for rebuilding fisheries (e.g. Hughes et al. 2005, Beddington et al. 2007). Fishing for 
maximum profit is perceived to require less fishing pressure and hence overlap with conservation 
objectives (e.g. Worm 2013 review of Hilborn 2012). In other words, fisheries designed to be 
sustainable may also be profitable (Pauly et al. 2002).  
Yet, institutions imply much more than rules and resources (e.g. Jentoft et al. 1998, 2004, 
Chuenpagdee and Song 2012). Over the past three decades, a variety of neo-institutionalists have 
emphasized a wider and more dynamic approach to institutions: institutions also include societal and 
informal institutions, and of special importance to adaptability - may also be seen as dependent 
variables (Lowndes 2010). This, more inclusive, notion of institutions is of particular relevance to our 
work.  
The intrinsic uncertainty in fisheries also emphasizes the importance of individual agency and 
organizations that implement fisheries policies and programs (e.g. Ludwig et al. 1993, Lam and Pauly 
2010). As a result, research on fishers' behaviour, attitudes and perceptions (e.g. Pita et al. 2010, 
2013) has surged as relevant because it reduces the uncertainty associated with human response to 
regulation (Wilen et al. 2002, Fulton et al. 2011a). Nonetheless, our current understanding of this 
issue, including how fishers’ communities respond to environmental and economic challenges still 
remains incomplete (e.g. Coulthard 2011).  
This thesis builds on the above mentioned social science research developed in the context of 
fisheries and uses the framework of resilience thinking to the stewardship of natural resources to 
explore fishers’ adaptive capacity to changes facing their livelihoods. The basic premise of this 
research follows the argument that fishers and their actions form the very basis for rebuilding global 
fisheries (e.g. Jentoft 2000a, Mora et al. 2009, Grafton and Kompas 2014). What is more, 
interconnectedness and unpredictability of problems that beset fisheries explicitly challenge fishers' 
adaptability - the way they ‘manage’ themselves in response to changing environment - to secure their 
livelihoods and increase fisheries system resilience to deal with change and surprise.  
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1.4 CASE STUDY 
1.4.1 Fish Producers’ Organizations 
This is explored in the case of fish Producers Organizations (POs). In many EU member states, 
fishers’ responses to evolution of the CFP have included self-organization and cooperation in the form 
of producers groups, known as fish POs. POs are formal organizations that arise out of larger 
institutional arrangement of the Common Market Organization (COM)5. Apart from POs, COM uses 
three other tools to ensure market stability, such as common marketing standards, price support 
scheme setting (known as withdrawal price, fixed annually by the Council of Ministers and used by 
POs) and rules on trade with non-EU countries. The recognition criteria and conditions to be satisfied 
by POs are laid down by the official legislation6, i.e. members must sell their fish solely through the 
organization.   
In a nutshell, POs aim to regulate the market, e.g. stabilize first-sale price, through planning of fish 
production (an annual operational program that includes a catch plan and a marketing strategy). 
Hereby, POs bring obvious market advantages for fishers. The most relevant are POs capacity to 
negotiate direct sale contracts and to finance the withdrawing of production surplus and its 
reintroduction later on in the market, when the price is more reasonable. Moreover, assessments of 
POs across the EU have shown that POs may increase rule compliance amongst fishers, encouraging 
them to fish less, and can act as an informative feedback channel to Government on experiences with 
regulations (e.g. Young et al. 1996, Hatcher 1997, Gibbs 1994, Nielsen and Vedsman 1997).  
However, the management of POs is not an easy task, as becomes clear from e.g. Jentoft and Davis 
(1993) and Phillipson (1999), who question POs’ concern with stock management and contribution to 
market stability. Under the new reform of the CFP, POs will gradually lose financial aid for 
withdrawing, considered unsustainable because it failed to solve the problem of overfishing.  
To respond to these challenges as well as to fluctuations in fish stocks, POs need to adapt to changes 
and learn from them. We define adaptability in POs as a learning process of dealing with pressures 
through adjusting management routines (productive and marketing activities), internal structures and 
membership behaviour to secure their livelihoods for the long term (e.g. Berkes and Jolly 2001, 
Berkes et al. 2003). The research presented in this thesis aims to understand how adaptation to 
environmental and market changes among fish POs relates to their capacities (or failures) to manage 
production and market demand, what are the key organizational features and external conditions that 
enhance or weaken organizational adaptive response and how it contributes to the overall fisheries 
resilience.  
 
                                                     
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common organization of the markets in 
fishery and aquaculture products 
6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2318/2001 of 29 November 2001 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 as regards the recognition of producer organizations and associations of 
producer organizations in the fishery and aquaculture sector 
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1.4.2 Fish POs in Portugal: a historical perspective 
It does so for the case study of fish POs from continental Portugal. Historically, interdependency of 
two major issues combined to shape the backdrop for the performance of Portuguese fish POs. First, 
despite the geographical potential of the Portuguese fisheries (e.g. Pitta e Cunha 2011), the national 
fishers’ community has traditionally demonstrated a low capacity to self-organize (information 
extracted from the interviews with people working in the sector, personal communications in 2010). 
Low level of self-organization contributed to fishers’ weak role in influencing fish price. Second, and 
interrelated with the first, Portuguese fisheries have never operated in free-market conditions, passing 
through a variety of regimes. Both problems date back to Oliveira Salazar’s dictatorship regime (1933-
1974), the ‘New State’. According to Garrido (2004), Salazar’s politics of economic recovery 
(economic growth focused on the primary sector7), which was employed early on during his regime, 
acted as a prime driver for the modernization of fisheries.   
Sector economic recovery was based on two axioms: first it concerned the ‘cod campaign’ (‘campanha 
do bacalhau’); the second axis was related to the export of canned fish (sardine and tuna), ensuring a 
positive trade balance and economic stability (Leal 1984). In effect, fisheries were highly protected and 
controlled by the state (Garrido 2003, 2004). The intervention of the state in the market was 
established through trade control (e.g. the export of canned fish), and a fixed price table (minimum 
and maximum prices) for domestic producers (Leal 1984).   
A regime made of three parties (Navy Ministry, Ministry of Economy and Corporate Fishery 
Organization), controls fishery administration, policy making and market development. The most 
important actor in this institutional arrangement is undoubtedly the Corporate Fishery Organization, 
directly controlled and managed by ‘fishery boss’ Henrique Tenreiro (Garrido 2009). Under his 
leadership, corporate structure developed into the sort of power subsystem inside the New State 
system, ‘imperial fishery structure’ of numerous organizations and private companies. The main 
feature of the Corporate Fishery Organization were Associations of Vessel-owners (Grémios de 
Armadores das Pescas), formed in 1934-39 period for major fisheries (i.e. cod, trawlers and sardine). 
Grémios were directly controlled by the state through the government delegate; other centralized 
bodies involved in economic coordination are the Regulatory Commission for the cod market 
(Comissão Reguladora do Comércio do Bacalhau) and the Portuguese Institute of canned fish 
(Instituto Português de Conservas de Peixe). People working in the sector are organized in 
Syndicates, and regional Fishermen Associations (Casas dos Pescadores), grouped in Central Boards 
(Junta Central das Casas dos Pescadores), directly supervised by the government and without any 
active role in market organization (Leal 1984). Besides Grémios, all other forms of fishers’ 
organizations had mainly a symbolical / social role; their functioning was supported by the state, giving 
                                                     
7 In the previous regime Portugal had difficulties in enabling sufficient proteins for its population. Salazar observed 
this phenomenon at the University, which resulted in writing the thesis - ‘Dictatorship of the food’, having in mind 
that the food is a very important element for the country stability. Accordingly, upon his entrance into the 
government, agriculture and fisheries received the utmost attention (information received from João Reis, 
Docapesca, personal communication in 2010) 
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an illusion of ‘the system of the social progress, where those who pay are those who have more and 
those who receive are those who need the most’ (freely translated by the author).8 
As Garrido (2004) reflects, this regime uses ideology and tradition in a highly pragmatic manner, e.g. 
promotes fish diet, i.e. ‘cod campaign’, as a ‘cheap diet’, parallel to cheap bread, cheap rice, etc. to 
assure food supply to a poorly paid working force. Fisheries and fishers are perceived as a part of 
local folklore. Political ideology additionally fosters the sector modernization and development: the 
vision ‘Portuguese return to the sea’, ‘the economic renascence of the fisheries’ is promoted by the 
New State official discourse in a highly pragmatic way, providing legitimacy to ‘the great fisheries’ 
project (Garrido 2006). 
With the 1974 revolution, the sector lost its corporative organizational structure, and the state’s 
economic protection (Garrido 2009). Moreover, the end of the empire (‘Sea = New State empire’) 
implied the end of the interest for the sea issues (‘Sea = the past’) (Pitta e Cunha, 2011:23). Perceived 
as a strategic sector (symbolically and economically) of the previous regime, corporate fisheries 
became a ‘land of no one’ (‘terra de ninquem’ - Henrique Souto, personal communication in 2010) and 
were restructured and lost in the bureaucracy net. Most of corporate private companies were 
nationalized and managed by several entities that imposed different policies with frequently 
overlapping responsibilities. In addition, there exists no link between public administration and 
economic entities, or people working in the sector (fishers, vessel-owners, commercials, industry 
representatives) (Leal 1984, Garrido 2009). In the previous regime this link had to be institutionalized 
and conditioned by the corporate fishery organization.  
Externally, the EEZ establishment in 1977, second oil crisis in 1979, and market liberalization in 1981, 
as global development trends have deeply influenced the sector. Furthermore, Souto (2007) raises the 
issue of the wars for independence in the colonies as an important factor that deeply shaped the 
sector’s performance. Massive military recruitment resulted in a significant decrease of the labour 
force in the sector as a vast number of fishers were either mobilized, or many of them left the country 
illegally, trying to escape military service. When the wars for independence ended, soldiers started to 
claim salaries they did not receive during the war and this was reflected as an increase in production 
costs for the entire sector. Faced with these transitions and being overprotected for decades, the 
sector lacks a proactive approach; national fisheries do not have the capacity to deal with external 
competition due to lack of appropriate management; blocking behaviour of the national market regime 
on the one hand, and increasing impact of imports on the other hand further promotes instability of 
prices and producers income (Leal 1984).    
Europeanization brought additional concerns for national fisheries. Subsequent to 1986 (Portuguese 
entrance into the European community), the idea of Portugal ‘as a land where the sea begins’, was 
substituted with the idea of Portugal ‘as a land where Europe ends’ (Pitta e Cunha, 2011:11), thus 
trading the national cult of sea with the cult of the EU. Fisheries started to adapt to a continuous 
                                                     
8 ‘ …e instituído um sistema de progresso social, para o qual pagam mais os que mais podem e recebem mais os 
que mais precisam’, Boletim Nacional: Organização Corporativa da Pesca Lisboa 1961.   
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decline of resources, restrictive community policies and new market rules. Murteira (1997) also argues 
that union is predominantly regional and Iberian, thus competitiveness with Spain as a stronger fishery 
state became a significant drawback for the national fisheries. As a result, adaptation at the beginning 
more resemblance to a sector crisis: from 1986 to 1996, national fisheries lost one third of fishers and 
27% of production (INE 1998). Coelho (1998) frames the problem around the economic misfit to new 
market conditions, i.e. the COM in the fishery products. Even though expectations in regard to the 
COM were largely positive, the Portuguese market was not able to adjust easily to the increased 
competition from the community and the international market. Many doubts were raised purposely in 
relation to the PO, such as scepticism regarding the ability of fishers to respect common rules and 
policies for production and commercialization; fishers’ lack of organizational capacity, as well as 
having in mind large diversity in the sector including variety of species and landing spots. Moreover, 
vulnerability of the POs was raised as a concern, above all, in front of big buyers (commercials), as 
well as fishers who do not want to become members of the POs.  
Most of the POs from Portugal were formed around 1986, following accession to the European 
Community. Currently, there are 15 POs: twelve in continental Portugal, two in the Autonomous 
Region of the Azores and one in the Autonomous Region of Madeira (for a more detailed explanation 
see Chapter IV). While some of them persisted and adapted to changing environments, others failed 
to do so. This work explores the nature of this adaptability. To achieve this, we identify trends and 
changes (e.g. environmental and market changes) POs face and then analyze reasons behind their 
different adaptive response.  
 
 
1.5 THESIS SCOPE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
This thesis is a study on human and organizational adaptability - how people respond to changes 
facing their livelihoods and the options they have to respond. Its purpose is to investigate and illustrate 
the ways in which adaptive organizations contribute to the resilience of socio-ecological systems in 
which they operate, with a particular focus on adaptability in resource users’ organizations.  
Thus, the main question that the research aims to answer is:  
How does adaptability contribute to social-ecological system resilience? 
The main research question is answered by the following sub-questions, through a reflection on the 
findings in Chapters 3 through 5.   
rq#1 - how can we conceptualize adaptability of  resource users’ organizations?  
rq#2 - what can we learn from cases of such organizations and the degree to which, and how,  
factors from our framework influence (enable or undermine) organizational adaptability? 
rq#3 - how may organizational adaptability contribute to improving social resilience?  
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rq#4 - what are the challenges for adaptability - when and why may organizational adaptability 
fail as a social source of  resilience?   
To answer these questions, the thesis employs an exploratory case study approach (Yin 2003) and 
develops an analytical framework to study organizational adaptability, based on various strands of 
literature.  
Hopefully, this thesis contributes to an improved understanding of the societal dimension of resilience. 
Lessons learned from the case study serve to identify key reasons under which adaptability in 
resource users’ organizations occurs and provide ideas on how it can be fostered and sustained. 
While the thesis provides context dependent case knowledge that is hardly transferable, it explains the 
process or the structure (framework) that can help us think about the connection between contextual 
conditions, ‘inside’ agency features, types of change, risks associated, different degrees of adaptability 
and system resilience. Practically, our work directly considers fishers learning within POs – it aims to 
contribute to fishers understanding on how (through strategies, changes in structure and processes) 
their organization may behave or act in different contexts to translate the idea of adaptability into their 
management practices, and thereby improve them. Furthermore, it can support fishers discovering the 
structural problems underneath their practices. Hence, the knowledge acquired also has policy 
implications for the local and national institutional context of fisheries governance. 
 
Figure 1-1 – Research framing: general objectives 
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided in three parts. The first part provides the research background, scope and 
research questions (Chapter I) and explains the research approach and design, along with its 
methodologies (Chapter II). The second part (Chapters III-V) provides results of the empirical work 
with the fish POs from Portugal and consists of three research papers. In third part, Chapter VI 
discusses results in terms of adaptability contribution to system resilience, identifies the flipside of the 
idea of adaptation and explores societal limits to adaptation and change. The concluding chapter 
(Chapter VII) briefly reviews the findings and their relationship; reflects on what they may imply for PO 
design and national fisheries (policy implications) and for human and institutional capacity to deal with 
change (further research). 
Table 1-1 – Structure of the thesis 
Parts of a research Objective Methods Results
Conclusions and 
reflections
What are implications of these 
findings for human and 
organizational adaptability to 
change? 
Reflection on findings/ 
further research
Beyond adaptability: institutional 
and individual change
Additional conditions to achieve 
/  inhibit social learning and 
adaptability - exploration and 
further development of theory 
developed in Paper I and II 
Discussion Reflection on findings in 
Paper I-III/theory 
development
Analytical framework for 
studying organizational 
adaptability; 
Application to one PO case 
provides insights on crucial 
factors that foster adaptability; 
Specific ecological context of a 
PO required further analysis
What are the main factors that 
influence (enable or undermine) 
organizational adaptability?
Deeper analysis of factors 
described in Paper I;
Analysis of how adaptability as a 
management strategy impact POs 
management practices 
How individual fishers’ perceptions 
influence organizational 
adaptability?
Adaptability defined as a layered 
process; 
Deeper discussion of limits to 
adaptation at institutional, 
cultural (historical) and individual 
level
What are challenges for 
adaptability?
Identification of situations where PO 
adaptability fail as a social source 
of resilience
Identification of key conditions 
behind different modes of 
adaptability among POs– 
exploration of theory developed 
in Paper I; evidence of the 
importance of agency for 
achieving adaptability 
(e.g.perceptions and attitudes)
Paper I - Chapter 3 How to conceptualize organizational 
adaptability? Analysis and 
illustration of the ways in which 
adaptability of resource users’ 
organizations contributes to social-
ecological system resilience
Case study/ theory 
development and 
exploration
Paper II - Chapter 4 Case study / theory 
exploration and 
development
Paper III - Chapter V In-depth case study 
and grounded theory 
approach/theory 
development 
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METHODS 
 
A central issue of this research is to understand how resource users’ organizations perceive and adapt 
to pressures their livelihoods are facing and how this adaptability contributes to social-ecological 
resilience. Thus, besides literature research, the focus of research has been on employment of 
methods that enable the researcher to understand, assess and learn from resource users’ practices 
(what they are already doing in their contexts to adapt) and on interaction with practitioners involved in 
resource management.  
This chapter explains the research approach and research design employed in this thesis, including 
methodological techniques for data collection and analysis.  
 
2.1 CASE STUDY APPROACH   
This thesis has used a case study approach, found as useful when a how or why question is being 
asked about a phenomenon, which is hardly distinguished from the context and over which the 
researcher has little or no control (Yin 2003). Instead of generalizing to other cases, case knowledge 
enables an understanding of conditions under which specified outcomes occur and the mechanisms 
through which they occur (George and Bennett 2005). Hence, a particular set of results might be 
generalized to some broader theory (Yin 2003) or used as a pool of insights that readers themselves 
are invited to interpret in the context of their own experiences and research (Stake 1995). Either way, 
case knowledge is central to human learning; the researcher’s continued proximity to the studied 
reality allows meaningful understanding of human behaviour and enables learning through feedback 
from those under study (Flyberg 2004). Both these features of case study approach were essential for 
our empirical work.   
This research is exploratory in nature, based on the case study of fish POs. Examined POs participate 
in market and stock management where their capacity to cope and adapt to pressures from 
overfishing, market changes, regulatory measures, etc. is crucial for their performance. Therefore, the 
case of POs is a promising field for studies on the importance of adaptability in resource users’ 
organizations. The empirical work relied on both single and multiple-cases of POs. There is a growing 
consensus in the literature that the best way of investigating phenomenon from case studies is the use 
of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research 
program (although single-case studies also play a role in theoretical development) (George and 
Bennett 2005). We chose not to limit the research to single cases due to wide contextual diversity 
amongst Portuguese POs (e.g. ecological contexts, market conditions, geography, culture, etc.). 
These ‘interesting contrasts’ allow for a holistic study of the PO phenomenon and the possibility of 
drawing cross-case conclusions and applying them to broader theories is also greater (Yin 2003).  
While observations in case study research are theory-led, they are not theory-determinate, thus they 
can also serve to generate new theories that can be further tested (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989, George and 
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Bennet 2005). From this perspective, an exploratory case study approach may be developed in line 
with another approach, that of grounded theory, which essentially implies the discovery of theory from 
data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Research presented in this thesis assumes this iterative process of 
travelling back and forth between the theory and the evidence (Bryman and Burgess 1994). Initial 
deductive approach to case study design (research questions integrated in the analytical framework, 
based on the literature, and explored in the context of cases in Paper I and II) (e.g. Yin 2003) overlaps 
with the more inductive case-oriented process, tightly linked to data (Eisenhardt 1989) (essentially 
Paper III), in which insights and propositions emerge from the data collection (Strauss 1987).  
 
Figure 2-1: Schematic depiction of research approach 
  
 
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN   
Overall, we investigated a total of twelve cases of POs during a period of four years (2009-2013), with 
different degrees of intensity.   
The empirical research started with a historical analysis of transitions in the Portuguese fisheries 
(information partly included in the Introduction, Paper I and Almeida et al. forthcoming, co-authored 
paper). The aim was to clarify the wider contextual background (landscape trends) and the 
management problematic of national fisheries. This phase of the research was an essential 
component of the main researcher’s learning process (due to lack of educational background and 
working experience in fisheries), establishing contacts and participating in fisheries networks. This 
phase also resulted in the selection of the case study (PO corresponds to ‘embedded unit of analysis’ 
(Yin 2004) within the broader national experience of ‘organization of fishers’) and the decision to focus 
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on the idea of ‘adaptation’ as a crucial aptitude for PO performance and contribution to fisheries 
management.  
Paper I analyzes and illustrates the ways in which organizational adaptability is important to the 
resilience of social-ecological systems. An analysis starts with a theoretical framework for studying 
organizational adaptability, which brings together, on the basis of resilience and organizational 
literature, the various factors that tend to influence organizational adaptability and identifies the 
questions by which to ‘measure’ these factors. ArtesanalPesca PO (Sesimbra) was used to empirically 
explore the relative weight of these factors and explain how their interaction plays a role in 
organizational change. Empirical work was based on participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews with ArtesanalPesca administration and leadership, guided by questions from the 
framework. The case provided an interesting example of organizational response to market crisis 
through adaptation as well as evidence of transformation of official market regime via internal 
adaptation. Moreover, it delivered lessons on how an organization might translate the idea of 
adaptability into their practices (strategies for adaptation). However, it fell short of presenting diverse 
realities amongst Portuguese POs due to its specific ecological context (monopoly over a black 
scabbard fish in continental Portugal).  
In order to further understand how different contexts impact adaptability in fish POs – the study 
required more empirical data than it was possible to obtain through a single case. As a result, in Paper 
II, semi-structured questions from the framework were asked across multiple cases of twelve 
Portuguese POs. The method of structured and focused comparison was used because questions 
from the framework guided interviews and because comparisons dealt only with certain aspects of the 
cases examined (e.g. George and Bennett 2005). Comparative analysis of POs clarified the key 
factors behind different degrees of adaptability among fish POs (induced by differences in contexts, 
structures, type of crisis and response). The application of the framework to additional case studies 
also revealed the importance of agency and subjective attitude or motivations (e.g. perceptions, 
attitude and behaviour, i.e. egoism, self-interest, defensiveness, etc.). Consequently, the framework 
was expanded to include these aspects, which emerged from the results. 
Once we found the importance of agency, we explored its weight for organizational adaptability on a 
specific case of Propeixe PO, Matosinhos (Paper III). Unlike ArtesanalPesca, case study evidence in 
Propeixe (Matosinhos) covered two different levels of analysis – a main unit (‘case’ of PO) and a 
subunit (PO membership, ‘embedded’ within the ‘case’). The main methodological challenge was to 
connect the findings between these two levels of analysis as part of the same case study (Yin 2004). 
The fieldwork started with semi-structured interviews with fishers (PO membership), guided by the 
framework and the findings from the previous cases. Immediate fishers’ reaction to these questions 
(i.e. misunderstanding, irritation, impatience) made us question conceptual ideas and the utility of the 
analytical framework for exploring fishers’ opinion. In addition, preliminary analysis or ‘open coding’ of 
data (Strauss 1987) resulted in search for additional field evidence on the particular topics, such as 
‘perceptions’ (of PO membership experience) and ‘ learning’ (already indicated by the framework in 
Paper I). Two concepts emerged from the data as important determinants of fishers’ adaptive 
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response to change and for collective engagement in resource management. Accordingly - how 
fishers (PO members) perceive their membership experience, what they (collectively) learn from it and 
how this impacts their capacity to adapt – surged as a set of interlinked questions in Paper III. To 
explore PO capacity to foster learning amongst its membership, the principal author returned to theory 
and examined the following: new theoretical insights on fishers’ attitude and ‘social learning’, which 
helped study of perceptions and ‘zooming in’ on the learning processes within the initial framework. A 
new set of interview questions focused on perceptions was designed and once again tested in the field 
with the Propeixe membership. Based on the social learning literature a social learning analytical 
framework was developed to analyze final data (perceptions), so-called ‘axial coding’ in grounded 
theory, or putting back the data together in new ways, by making connections between categories 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990). To connect the findings between the PO and its membership the deeper 
causes and outcomes behind (lack of) learning at both levels of analysis were clarified, while 
indicating how the ‘case’ of PO may nourish membership learning. The social learning framework 
further served to generalize from the case study findings in relation to the thesis objective: how social 
learning amongst fishers impacts PO adaptability. Finally, insights from the case studies in Papers I-III 
were used as data for a theoretical discussion and concluding reflections on societal dimension of 
resilience (Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION 
Qualitative, phenomenological and hermeneutic research methods (Yanow 2000) were used to collect 
data for this thesis. Data were obtained and triangulated from different sources, such as literature 
review, documents (e.g. legislation, governmental reports concerning fisheries, reports from NGOs, 
newspapers articles), interviews and participant observation.  
In the following section, the purpose and forms of the interviews as well as the use of participant 
observation for our fieldwork is explained in more detail.  
 
2.3.1 Interviews 
Interviews are more adequate when the number of informants is smaller, and the insights of 
informants, rather than factual knowledge, are sought (Kvale 2007). The purpose of the interviews for 
this thesis altered throughout research phases and depended on specific research questions (see 
papers for a detailed explanation).   
To comprehend the realities and challenges faced by national fisheries, the existing literature, official 
reports, legislation and archival documents related to the sector were examined. In addition, semi-
structured interviews were employed with key persons from the sector, i.e. professionals, scientists 
and activists (NGOs).  Part of the analytical framework on organizational adaptability was based on 
focused questions, used to guide the data collection process as well as to organize the data collected 
for single case study (Paper I) and multiple case studies (Paper II). In both papers, the initial phase of 
interviews aimed to contextualize the PO work (structural and functional profile; awareness of 
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environmental and market trends). In the later phase of the interview process, upon acquiring sound 
knowledge of the subject matter, a narrative form of interviewing (Mischler 1986) was employed. The 
irreducible quality of good case narratives is essential for case knowledge contribution to learning 
(Flyberg 2004). Also, certain phenomena are best understood narratively. A narrative communicates 
the meaning of a series of events (rather than describing a state of affairs) through the use of 
evaluative statements and through the temporal configuration of events (Elliott 2005). In Paper I and 
Paper II, the narrative is employed in order to focus on the way in which individuals (PO leaders) make 
sense of their experience, e.g. how PO adapts and copes with resource/market trend or crisis. In this 
context, narrative can be understood as a communication tool in which a PO leader can externalize, 
give meaning and indicate which elements (factors) of communicated (adaptive or maladaptive) 
experience are most significant. These interviews were the units of observation. They explore both 
topics that are common for all POs as well as main distinctions between POs in terms of how they 
deal with their contexts. 
In Paper III, interview format went from semi-structured - to more informal, ‘conversational’ mode of 
interviewing (Yin 2004) - to new semi-structured format based on new literature on fishers’ behaviour 
and social learning. The specific interview format, covering both PO leadership and membership 
(some with double membership experience) provided a rich data set and detailed personal accounts 
(relevant for the objectives of Paper III).  
In total (n=65) interviews were conducted between March 2010 and July 2013; interviews ranged in 
length from 90 minutes to three hours. 
 
2.3.2 Participant observation  
Participant observation provided additional illustrations of case study evidence (Yin 2004). In the case 
of Paper I, the principal author went fishing with one of the PO vessels. Informal interviews and 
participant observation was used to obtain information about what it means to be a fisher – what 
fishers actually do at work and to understand dynamics between crewmembers.  Due to logistical 
constraints there was no separate time dedicated to participant observation, but it was embedded in 
the entire interview process – before, during or after the interview. Since most POs (ten out of twelve) 
are located in landing ports, visiting PO facilities also provided important information regarding the 
overall dynamics in ports: landing of fish, interaction between fishers (crew members) and ship 
captains, dynamics between buyers and producers at the fish auctions. Discussion of this evidence 
was mainly integrated in the explanation of the case study context as well as used a supporting data 
for contextualizing respondents’ narratives.  
  
2.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and then content analysed by the main author. Unlike 
laboratory research (e.g., defining hypothesis, collecting, presenting, analyzing data and offering 
conclusions), case study analysis can occur at a variety of stages, such as while you are still in the 
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process of collecting data (Yin 2004). In other words, analysis was considered to be a continuous 
process, rather than a distinct phase of research, that is interwoven with other research processes, i.e. 
research design and data collection (Bryman and Burgess 1994). This being said, our work provides 
evidence of a distinct approach to this subject in terms of how soon a researcher engages in data 
analysis.  
The framework on organizational adaptability guided both the data collection and analysis (Paper I 
and II) phases of the research. Data received were extracted and structured around key themes from 
the framework (subsequent to data collection). In Paper II this information was used to compare POs 
and identify different outcomes or modes of adaptation. Factors from the framework are used to 
explain adaptation modes and results are further discussed in terms of key reasons for different 
adaptive response amongst POs. In Paper I, one PO was used to explore the framework elements 
and their multiple interactions; the framework provided the canvas to explain ‘spirit of change’ in the 
PO.  
In Paper III, interpretative analysis (Blaikie 2000) of interviews took place very early on during the data 
collection process. This preliminary analysis was of crucial importance for the overall study objectives 
and conclusions. Overall, analysis was employed in three phases: 1) exploring fishers ‘perceptions’ 
(the most relevant aspects emerged from interviews) 2) inferring ‘social learning’ from perceptions 
(interpreted in the context of social learning framework) and 3) discussing implications for ‘adaptability’ 
in PO (for details see Paper III). 
Significant statements/ excerpts from narrative interviews were included in all papers as ‘fishers’ voice’ 
and used to illustrate organizational adaptive experience or lack thereof.  
  
2.5 ETHICAL ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
‘…how will I explain this…there are things that you know I cannot tell you…’  
PO leader, quote from the interview, 2013 
 
There are few conceptual and practical challenges that the present research had to take into 
consideration. To start with, data collection in this work depends almost exclusively on the input, trust 
and willingness of various persons to reveal facts, opinions and ideas regarding the subject in 
question. Any research involving human subjects requires that the researcher follows an ethical code 
which ensures that no participants are harmed (physically or psychologically), that there is mutual 
respect between researcher and subject and that the latter is respected and treated equally (Murphy 
and Dingwall 2001). 
The principal researcher took every care to ensure that this ethical code was respected and hopes 
that this work will help those under study (POs from Portugal) by providing a deeper analysis that 
enables them to understand their own realities better. Such analysis is based on the concept of 
‘adaptation’, which is, in one way or another, interpreted as a positive societal trait. Herewith, by 
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identifying different modes of adaptation amongst POs and classifying certain POs as ‘maladaptive’ or 
‘problematic’ (Paper II), the reader can jump to the conclusion that these POs do their jobs poorly. 
However, the idea was not to grade anyone, nor to lead to any judgement of ‘who does a better job’. 
What we tried to do was to clarify different facets of fishers’ adaptation in practices and how it 
influences their livelihoods. Nonetheless, possible assumptions that ‘being less adaptive’ means 
‘doing things badly’ and our duty not to harm research participants framed the way we presented 
results in Paper II. Indeed, the anonymity for POs was ensured, providing the reader with the space to 
focus on practices and conditions that led to these practices rather than on the identity of a particular 
PO. This also gave us the opportunity to communicate valuable, but ’public secrets’ disclosed by 
respondents. In order to maintain confidentiality, verbal consent was sought from respondents 
following a brief explanation of the nature and purpose of the research. Interviewees (POs) had an 
opportunity to view the summary of work (papers) before their final submission to journals for 
publication. The main practical limitations were the principal researcher’s lack of educational 
background in fisheries and certain language barriers in the first phase of the empirical research (all 
done in Portuguese).  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses and illustrates the ways in which organizational adaptivity is important to the 
resilience of socio-ecological systems (SESs). Resilience and organizational literature are used as 
theoretical contributions to help understand the nature of adaptive organizations and how changes in 
external structure and in organizational practices may reinforce each other. Building on this literature 
review, we elaborate an analytical framework for studying organizational adaptability. We apply the 
framework to a case study of the ArtesanalPesca fish Producers’ Organization (POs) from Sesimbra in 
Portugal in order to empirically explore the relative weight of the factors contained in the framework 
and the relations between them. The case outlined contains lessons on how adaptivity may help an 
organization to move towards a sustainable business model and how it may be an essential part of 
such a model. 
 
Keywords: socio-ecological resilience; adaptive organizations; organizational learning; fishermen 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
It is widely acknowledged that the problem of ongoing resource depletion cannot be solved by 
considering humankind and nature independently (Walters 1986, Berkes and Folke 1998, Gunderson 
and Holling 2002, Berkes et al. 2003). This realization calls for an understanding of resource 
management in terms of resilience in socio-ecological systems (SESs).  Walker et al. (2004) argued 
that, in order to contribute to system resilience, resource-using organizations essentially need a 
capacity to learn, self-organize, respond to external shocks and restore balance. However, the kinds 
of social mechanisms at work behind these processes are still not very clear. Folke (2003) identified 
four critical factors required by organizations to deal with resource dynamics in complex SESs. They 
are: (1) learning to live with change and uncertainty, (2) nurturing diversity for reorganization and 
renewal, (3) combining different types of knowledge for learning, and (4) creating opportunities for self-
organization. In other words, organizations that contribute to system resilience must be what we will 
call here ‘adaptive organizations’, i.e. organizations that foster adaptability. Hahn et al. (2006) regard 
such organizations as flexible institutions, as they foster an environment that is geared towards 
learning and enables them to accept and deal with constant change and uncertainties. Recent work by 
Ostrom (2009) develops the same themes, providing a multi-level nested framework for analysing 
SESs and focusing in particular on the self-organizing ability of resource users.  
This paper takes these principles as a point of departure and expands on them, drawing on theoretical 
contributions from the fields of resilience and organizational studies to build a framework in which to 
analyse organizational adaptability as a key condition for resilience in a SES. This framework 
comprises both the mechanisms and the conditions for organizational adaptation. We then apply the 
analytical framework to a specific example, in order to explore how it may be used, how its different 
elements may be interrelated, and to identify key issues for further investigation in additional case 
studies. The case chosen here concerns an obvious example of resource users’ self-organization: a 
so-called Producers Organization (PO), created in Portugal under the EU’s common market policy as 
an instrument to regulate the market and plan production. We apply the framework to one particular 
crisis and the post-crisis period, enabling us to investigate how the organization learned to think and 
act differently, and how its structure and environment influenced this process.  
The proposed analytical framework is also relevant and useful for discussions concerning what 
constitutes a sustainable business model, as it transfers the focus from new products, services and 
technologies (e.g. Hall and Kerr 2003; Clark et al. 2003) to the competitive advantage of ‘processes’ 
within an organization - in particular, learning from change and changing throughout the learning 
process.   
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3.2 FRAMING CONCEPTS  
3.2.1 From crisis to resilience 
Resources used by humans are embedded in complex SESs which are composed of subsystems and 
which, in turn, form sets of larger systems. Resilience in complex SESs has been defined in several 
ways (e.g. Folke et al. 2002, Walker et al. 2004). It essentially entails ideas about uncertainty and 
complexity and probing into the unknown and unexpected. Combining several definitions for the 
purposes of this paper, we would suggest that a resilient system is able to buffer or absorb 
disturbance and continue to develop while adapting to changes by means of learning and self-
organizing.  
Essentially, socio-ecological resilience is based on two main postulates. First, referring to the system 
approach and adaptive management (Holling 1978, Walters 1986), it conceives of resource 
management as a complex system involving non-linear relationships and thresholds, in which the 
ecosystem responds to human actions in a non-linear and unpredictable way. Important in this regard 
are notions of feedbacks and thresholds, that is, points at which the system changes from one state to 
another. Resilient systems evolve through time, passing through adaptive cycles and multiple stability 
domains (growth, conservation, reorganization and renewal). Change in resource management rarely 
occurs during the growth or conservation phases. Crises, followed by short periods of rapid change 
(the Schumpeterian «creative destruction»), can serve as a source of system reorganization and 
renewal (Holling 1978, Colding et al. in Berkes et al. 2003).  Adaptive cycles are nested in a hierarchy 
across time and space (Gunderson et al. 1995). This cross-scale (panarchy) depiction helps us to 
understand the interconnectedness of systems, states and dynamics between different scales 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002). To maintain resilience, a SES requires continuous change and 
«acceptance of disturbance» (Holling 1973). The way a system will respond to change depends on its 
elements and their diversity: the greater the «response diversity» to external changes, the greater the 
resilience (Elmqvist et al. 2003). 
The second postulate addresses the particular links and interdependencies between ecological and 
social resilience (e.g. Berkes et al. 2003 and Adger 2000). While natural systems are inherently 
resilient, evolving and changing through adaptive repetitive cycles, social systems are learning 
systems, persisting through time mainly as a result of learning processes9. To understand SESs 
analytically we need to appreciate fundamental features of society such as cultural norms and human 
attitudes and behaviour (Adger 2000). At the same time, human behaviour is framed by wider 
contextual factors which act as drivers for change within SESs, such as the panarchy of contexts, 
long-term socio-historical trends and the regime (e.g. the fisheries sector). These factors – including 
their mutual alignment – constitute the historically evolved structural context of polity, market, civil 
society and innovation system. In the next section, we use organizational literature to understand what 
influences an organization’s capacity to be adaptive.  
 
                                                     
9
 Buzz Holling, interview with the Stockholm Resilience Center, 2010. 
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3.2.2 Organizational learning and change  
Since the 1960s, theoretical perspectives on organizations have changed with the adoption of an open 
system framework (e.g. Katz and Kahn 1966) as well as complex adaptive system (CAS) theory and 
its application to organizations (Gunderson et al. 1995). Accepting open system ideas implies 
recognition of organizations as «responsive systems shaped by environments, as collective actors 
themselves shaping their context, or as component players in larger, more encompassing systems» 
(Scott 2004: 8). The CAS perspective means that organizations are no longer observed solely through 
their actors and processes. Traditional organizational definitions emphasized closed structures, 
planned coordination, fixed boundaries, a clear division of tasks and functions among an 
organization’s members, and a hierarchy of authority and responsibility (Schein 1965). This is the 
‘performance subsystem of the organization’ (Robb 2000), whose purpose is to ensure that the 
organization performs at its best and remains competitive. As Robb argues, a resilient organization, as 
a hybrid entity, also includes another, almost opposite, element: the adaptive subsystem, responsible 
for innovating and adapting to external changes. The characteristics of an organization’s context, the 
organization’s specific structure (rules and guidelines) and its processes form a basis for the 
performance capacity of the organization; the way an organization deals with its specific contexts (by 
adapting its structure and through its internal processes) and eventually changes them is perceived as 
the organization’s adaptive capacity.  Contexts, structure and processes are the basic elements of our 
analytical framework. Among the processes, responses to changes in context are crucial enough to 
warrant separate attention.  
We will conceive of such response processes in terms of organizational learning (Argyris, 1977; 
Argyris and Schön 1978, Bandura 1977). As argued in Grin and Loeber (2007), approaches that 
emphasize the social and embedded nature of organizational learning have produced significant 
insights into the ways in which organizational learning and structural changes in organizational context 
may reinforce each other.  
Faced with a sense of urgency brought on by events such as unexpected failures, successes, or other 
surprises, organizations and their members need to develop a capacity to adapt frequently to external 
changes. This implies not only changing the available means, or tools, for solving problems and 
achieving goals («single-loop» learning) but also stepping back, reflecting on the problem, on the 
goals themselves and on the relationship between them: «double-loop» learning (Argyris 1977), or 
«higher-order» learning (Brown and Vergragt 2008). Learning occurs through feedback stimulus 
mechanisms (trial and error) during the problem solving process.  
Building on Argyis and Schon’s work, Senge (1990) developed the concept of organization itself as a 
learning entity. Learning organizations, because of their learning capacity, are able to understand 
better and faster the consequences of changes in their environment and to respond to these changes 
by altering their own underlying values and assumptions. Influencing change has been identified as 
the essence of leadership in organizational literature (Yukl 2001). Different types of leadership 
encourage different behaviours, interactions and practices and thus exert different influences on 
change processes (Sosik and Dinger 2007).  
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Scott (2004) distinguishes between four interrelated types of organizational change process: changing 
conceptions, changing boundaries, changing strategies and changing power processes.  
Conceptions may change through organizational learning, whereby people re-examine or change their 
initial perspectives on a problem (problem framings). This serves to expand the range of options and 
solutions available (Bardwell 1991, Isendahl 2010).  Organizational learning may also lead to changed 
boundaries. Whereas in the context of traditional hierarchical organizations boundaries were mainly 
perceived as structural divisions between organizations, ‘boundary organizations’ (Guston 2001, Cash 
et al. 2003) serve as a bridge between different domains. This bridging is enabled by ‘learning at the 
boundaries’ and by networking, and leads to changes in the boundary itself. Boundary organizations 
may play an important role in co-managing natural resources, e.g. through improved resource 
management (Miller 2001), empowerment of local communities and establishing of social networks 
(O'Mahony and Bechky 2008), improvements in organizational capacity (Schneider, 2009), and 
enhanced trust and adaptive capacity (Carr and Willkinson 2005). Changed boundaries can imply 
changed strategies, that is, the way organizations relate to their environments (Scott 2004). Strategic 
choice further impacts organizational performance, organizational design and indeed organizational 
structure itself. Such strategies will often include the generation of novelty and creativity (Gunderson in 
Berkes et al. 2003). Organizational innovation can be defined as the adoption of an idea or behaviour 
that is new to the adopting organization (Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 1998), leading to either 
technical innovations and/or social administrative innovations.  
Processes are not only induced by (changes in) context, but may also lead to (or at least contribute to) 
changing the context and changing of power dynamics. As argued in Grin (2010: 282-283; 2011), the 
realization that power is not merely an attribute of agents and their relations per se is crucial. Power is 
also a structural feature. As Arts and van Tatenhove (2005) have argued, in addition to actors’ 
relational power (including money, knowledge and social capital) that determines their strength vis-à-
vis other actors, there is also the power implied in the structural context, which privileges particular 
practices and discourages or complicates others, thus constituting dispositional power. There is thus a 
complex, bi-directional and dialectical relationship between changes in context and the exercise of 
power by agents (Grin and Miltenburg 2009, Avelino 2009, Grin 2011). 
 
 
3.3  FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTABILITY   
Building on this literature, a conceptual framework was developed (Table 3-1) with the aim of (i) 
compiling the internal and external factors thought to influence organizational adaptability and (ii) 
identifying the questions, or criteria, by which to ‘measure’ these factors. The analytical dimensions 
identified in the framework are explored in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
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Table 3-1 Organizational adaptability framework 
DIMENSION HOW to “measure/consider” them?
Identify the main characteristics of the organizational contexts and how they 
interrelate between each other.
How does the organization define the main problems regarding the sector 
and how does it position itself for finding solutions?
Type of crisis, e.g. resource scarcity, economic crisis 
What happened and why?
What is there in terms of infrastructure, installation, storage capacity and 
technology?
How does the organization function (constitutional and operational rules)?  
Who establishes these rules/guidelines?
Do rules tend to be strict or flexible?
How are members’ duties and responsibilities defined? How do members 
participate in the decision making process? 
How easily can the leader be identified? Identify the leadership type.
Evidence of “double-loop” learning: what changes as a result of “double-loop” 
learning? Who facilitates these learning processes and how?
What type of network has the organization developed, and with whom? Why 
were specific actors chosen? Who is the most active in negotiating and 
networking?
Compare conceptions/problem framings before and after the crisis.
How are changes in structures and strategies interrelated? How does 
organizational innovation influence changes in structure?
How do organization members react to organizational change? This also 
includes dealing with problems of resistance and inertia embedded in the 
regime 
How has the organization contributed to, and drawn upon, changes at the 
regime level? 
If the example works well, how to move it further, drawing upon the power 
changes implied in regime change.
Responses to change 
in context are seen as 
a part of processes 
and organizational 
learning 
Changing behaviour and attitudes; feedbacks to 
change and learning; internal resistance and 
inertia
Changing conceptions: problem statement
Changed structure - changed strategy and vice 
versa
Evidence of organizational innovation 
Changed organizational boundaries and 
identities (of both the organization and other 
Changed rules and resource distribution 
Changed power relations
PROCESSES Organizational learning
Capacity for networking and negotiation 
Leadership processes How is the leader leading and how do the members feel about his/her 
leadership? What is the leader’s role in influencing change?
CRISIS Crisis as an opportunity for change 
STRUCTURE Land-based facility 
Rules and guidelines
Defined roles of members 
Strong leadership
WHAT to look for: FACTORS
CONTEXT(s) Variety of contexts, i.e. ecological, socio-
economic, cultural, political, relational, etc.   
Long-term historical trends
Evidence of historical change
How has the organizational environment been evolving through time? Identify 
crucial periods of change: how did the organization react? 
Problem framing (regime) 
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3.3.1 Context(s) or organizational environment 
The behaviour of resource users’ organizations is framed by a variety of contexts: ecological (type of 
species, signs of resource scarcity), socio-economic (community dependence on fishing), cultural 
(norms, attitudes and beliefs, mentality), geographical (location, proximity of large industries), political 
(regime) and relational (competition, group dynamics within the organization and its relationship with 
other organizations). Organizational behavior is also framed by long-term socio-historical trends. The 
way the organization positions itself within the relevant regime (e.g. fisheries sector) and the way it 
defines the main problems and responds to its obligations (e.g. fish commercialization in the context of 
the POs) is essential for defining its adaptive and performance capacity. Among resource users’ 
organizations, this is the dimension that accounts for the maximum degree of variation. 
 
3.3.2 Crisis 
Here, we concur with Gunderson in Berkes et al. (2003), who considers crisis to be a surprise that 
cannot be handled using established management practices or policies. The way in which crises are 
dealt with has a crucial impact on resilience. Folke et al. in Berkes et al. (2003) identify three possible 
responses to a crisis: (1) ‘no effective response’, usually followed by institutional inertia and an attempt 
to maintain the status quo, (2) ‘response without experience’, which may lead to new types of 
arrangements, management institutions (new rules and norms) and social learning, and (3) ‘response 
with experience’, based on institutional learning and a socio-ecological memory of facing crisis in the 
past.  
 
3.3.3 Organizational structure 
Organizational structure is a formal set of rules and guidelines upon which all partners have to agree. 
Questions of interest are: How representative is the organization? What are the organization’s 
objectives, and how were they defined? How were rules and guidelines agreed upon and by whom? 
Were all members involved in the process? Was anyone excluded? How do these rules define roles 
and duties within the organization?   
 
3.3.4 Processes 
In contrast to traditional organizations, where processes are deeply embedded in their structures 
(Schein 1965), a flexible organizational structure is ‘created and recreated’ by its processes (Scott 
2001b:10913). Our particular focus is on learning processes that systematically stimulate the 
generation of new ideas while reflecting on what the organization has learned from past experience. 
An emphasis is also placed on networking, feedback loops and the mechanisms of leadership capable 
of influencing organizational responsiveness and adaptability.   
Responses to change in context are seen as a part of processes and organizational learning. We 
consider these as processes that are distinct insofar as they result from external changes; otherwise, 
39 
 
they can be depicted on the basis of Scott’s four elements discussed above: changing conceptions, 
changing boundaries, changing strategies and changing power processes.  
 
 
3.4 CASE STUDY: ARTESANALPESCA FISH PO 
3.4.1 Motivation and Methodology  
We chose the ArtesanalPesca fish Producers’ Organization (PO) in Sesimbra, Portugal as a case 
study to empirically explore the relative weight of the factors that are believed to influence 
organizational adaptability and the relations between them. The ArtesanalPesca cooperative was 
chosen to test and further develop the framework because as an organization it displays a high degree 
of adaptability: its responsiveness to crisis resulted in a heightened adaptivity to its context (through 
changes introduced in its structure and processes), while there is evidence that this adaptability 
contributed to wider system resilience.   
We obtained and triangulated data from different sources, including a survey of the literature, a 
document analysis, interviews, and observation of the organization’s dynamics and activities. In total, 
12 interviews were conducted with members and with the management of ArtesanalPesca in 2010 
and 2011. This included an interview with the biologist who works on the issue of sustainability and 
quality control. The first set of interviews (February 2010) was semi-structured, based on a short set of 
questions relating to the categories in our analytical framework. In the second cycle of interviews 
(October and November 2010), the focus was on interviewees’ perceptions regarding a particular 
crisis, as well as any other stories they thought were relevant to understanding organizational change. 
In February 2011 the principal author went fishing with one of the ArtesanalPesca vessels, counting 
eleven crew members (six working on land and five on board). Informal interviews and participant 
observation were used to obtain information about the fishing work and to understand the dynamics 
between the crew members. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Following standard 
narrative interviews methodology (Mishler 1986), significant statements/phrases were extracted and 
organized into the themes suggested by the framework.  
 
3.4.2 Background: what are POs? 
As the EU’s common fisheries policy instrument, POs bring together fishermen or fish farmers on a 
voluntary basis with the aim of planning their production and ensuring the best market conditions for 
their products. To accomplish this, the regulation requires that POs prepare an annual operational 
programme and a marketing strategy. Members must sell their fish solely through the organization, 
using mainly fish auction markets or direct sale contracts. POs are allowed to use the benefits of the 
withdrawal price, established on the basis of the guide price fixed by the Council of Ministers. When 
the price of the fish drops below a minimum level (withdrawal price), members receive financial 
compensation from their POs in accordance with the rule: the more fish are withdrawn from the 
market, the lower the intervention paid. In addition, carry-over aid is provided to POs who process and 
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store their fishery products and return them later to the market when prices are more attractive. This 
aid is also limited, so that POs have an incentive to be more active in regulating the market by gaining 
better control over the price of their products.  
To be recognized by the EU member state concerned, POs must fulfill several structural, economic 
and legal requirements. There are currently 15 POs in Portugal at various stages of development. 
Most fishery products are sold on the fish auction market using the descending-bid type of auction, 
also called the Dutch auction (where the auctioneer starts at a higher price and gradually lowers it). 
The problem with this auction system becomes evident when supply is higher than demand, as 
retailers are able to manipulate the price and significantly lower it. Not knowing how much they will 
earn, fishermen fish more to earn more, contributing to resource depletion. Fishing more to earn more 
brings more fish to the auction; more fish on the auction (not articulated with market demand) results 
in a further drop in price (not evident in the final price for the consumer). Most of the POs in Portugal 
were formed around 1986, following accession to the European Community. Whereas some POs have 
maintained the same structure they had in the past, others have changed over time, introducing 
innovation in organizational practices, services, products, technologies and processes. In the following 
section a specific example of such an organization is described.  
 
3.4.3 ArtesanalPesca PO 
ArtesanalPesca fishermen’s cooperative is located in the port of Sesimbra in the district of Setubal, 
central Portugal (Figure 3-1). When the organization was initially created in 1986 its members were 
mainly fishing for white scabbardfish in Morocco. When a bilateral agreement with Morocco expired in 
1999 most of the vessels came back to Sesimbra and started to capture black scabbardfish using the 
artisanal longline technique (adapted to continental waters from the traditional Madeira longline fishing 
gears). Today, the organization has exclusive rights to catch the black scabbardfish on the Portuguese 
continental slope. Of the 43 members (vessel owners) in the organization, 16 are dedicated 
exclusively to harvesting black scabbardfish in four areas along the Portuguese cost (Sesimbra, 
Peniche, Figueira de Foz and Matosinhos). All landings are eventually brought for sale to Sesimbra 
port. According to Bordalo-Machado and Figueiredo (2002), this type of fishery has sustained nearly 
300 families in the region in the last 20 years. Although fishery activities have seen several technical 
improvements in that time, the fleet still displays artisanal features (for a detailed explanation, see 
Bordalo-Machado and Figueiredo 2009). Other species are dogfish, octopus, sardines and mackerel.   
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Figure 3-1: Location of the case study (ArtesanalPesca, Sesimbra) 
 
During the last decade, ArtesanalPesca built an industrial facility (fish processing plant) with a size of 
1600 m2 that employs 40 people. As a result of this, the organization has reorganized its work 
processes and fishery practices as follows. It receives daily orders for black scabbardfish from the 
supermarkets and local markets. The 16 vessels go out fishing 2-3 times/week, depending on the 
market demand. The total fish catch is bought by ArtesanalPesca for the fixed price and is further 
prepared in the fish processing plant. The fish are then sold on at a price including a small margin for 
marketing to maintain the functioning of the (non-profit) organization. The changes mean: no more 
retailers, no more working with the withdrawal price, and a fixed and stable income for ArtesanalPesca 
fishermen (the agreed contract price with ArtesanalPesca is higher than the withdrawal price and the 
average auction price). But how did this change happen? 
The development process went through several phases and is still continuing today. Between 1993 
and 1995, in order to become less dependent on the constant market fluctuations, ArtesanalPesca 
decided to build a storage facility and asked its members to contribute financially. Not everyone 
reacted with enthusiasm. Of the 60 members (based on membership since 1986), only 20 believed in 
the project, invested their money, and remained members of ArtesanalPesca. The first phase of the 
fish processing plant was inaugurated in May 1995; the second phase was finalized in 2003. 
However, the real change happened in December 2004, during the maximum landings of black 
scabbardfish (September – January), when the price on the auction market fell to less than 1 euro/kg. 
All the fishermen dedicated to this species (most of them left the organization during the period 1993-
95) decided to stop fishing, as they were not able to cover their production costs. They also requested 
a meeting with the ArtesanalPesca management, asking if the organization could do anything to 
protect their interests. The board of directors responded immediately: they supported the interruption 
of fishing operations as a temporary solution, but assured the fishermen they would also do something 
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more substantial. Following this, ArtesanalPesca invited all those fishermen who had left the 
organization to join it again. This decision gave rise to conflict: current members were against the 
admission of the new ones, as in the past they had not believed in the joint strategy regarding 
investment in facilities. This conflict was mediated during several meetings until finally, in January 
2005, the majority of vessels became members of ArtesanalPesca. In the same year the organization 
started freezing and packaging its products. Risky investments in internal structures to store, preserve 
and process fish partly resolved the problem identified above of unfair pricing when captures are high. 
It also led to initial contracts between ArtesanalPesca and major supermarkets, assuring periodical 
sale of large quantities of fish at the fixed price, which was higher compared to commercial prices on 
the auction market. In addition, these contracts (the first, in 2005, guaranteeing the purchase of 20-
30% of the fish caught, rising to 50% under the second contract in 2006) propelled ArtesanalPesca 
into the world of relations with the fish buyers. This was the good news.  
The bad news was that the price of the black scabbardfish that stayed on the auction market started to 
increase (the same number of buyers chasing fewer fish). The first reaction of the fishermen was 
revolt: they felt deceived and, surprisingly (or not), started to consider the fish within the contract as a 
‘bad deal’ in comparison to the fish that stayed on the auction market. As a result, many of them 
stopped delivering to the organization what was previously agreed. The ‘bad deal’ with the contract 
quickly became a very good one, though, once there was plenty of fish on the auction market and the 
price there went down as a result. These ups and downs caused a lot of problems for the organization: 
when members were not delivering the agreed quantities, the organization lost money as it had to buy 
the missing quotas on the auction market, paying a higher price compared to the contract. It seemed 
that the organization’s members were unable to recall the overarching objective of dealing with the 
unpredictability of the auction price – which is why they had approached the organization in the first 
place. This internal resistance to organizational strategy also created a bad atmosphere between the 
members who were delivering the agreed amount and those who were undermining the agreement 
and earning more at the expense of the cooperative. ‘We had to decide: all [buying all the fish] or 
nothing10’. Once again, the management organized meetings with its members to resolve the conflicts 
and to explain the problem using real numbers (the difference between average earnings on the 
auction market, with large price fluctuations, compared to earnings within the contract).  
Finally, in September 2007 the organization gathered enough capital to buy the total amount of fish 
caught from its members and to remove their fish from the auction system. Despite having secure 
distribution channels, buying everything was a complex and risky process. One management member 
of ArtesanalPesca recalls this period: ‘When you ‘do change’ (go through change) no one is satisfied. 
But we knew that this was the only direction we should choose for the future. If you go now and speak 
with a fisherman, he will tell you that he is satisfied with the way things are now; he doesn’t want to 
change anything…but, before, initially, it wasn’t like this at all…It took time, but we’ve all learned11’. 
Figure 3-2 summarizes this crisis. 
                                                     
10 Personal interview with Carlos Alexandre Pinto de Oliveira Macedo, Fiscal director, ArtesanalPesca, November 
2010 
11 Personal interview with Manuel José Gomes Pólvora dos Santos, Treasurer, ArtesanalPesca, November 2010 
43 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Crisis period 
INV01 – 1st storage facility; inauguration of the first phase of the fish processing plant; INV02  – 2nd phase of the 
plant finalized; MEET – Both members (4) and other fishermen fishing black scabbardfish asked for a meeting 
with ArtesanalPesca; JOIN – Majority of vessels became members of ArtesanalPesca; INV03 – Start-up of 
freezing and packaging industry; CONTR01 – Contracts with the supermarkets, 20-30% of the first sale through 
contracts, the rest going to auction; CONTR02 – At the beginning of 2006, sales through the contracts increased 
to 50%; RESIST – Fishermen feeling deceived: auction price increase; not delivering agreed amount to 
ArtesanalPesca.   
 
 
3.5 ANALYSIS: TRACKING DOWN ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTABILITY 
In this section, the framework elements and their multiple interactions are used to explain the ‘spirit of 
change’ in ArtesanalPesca as it evolved over time.  
 
3.5.1 Contexts 
The core of the initial problem was that political structural (contextual) factors in particular (the black 
scabbardfish monopoly, rules of the auction system, and the withdrawal price) generated incentives 
that led to both low fishermen incomes and high catch volumes. This in turn gave rise to persistent 
socio-economic and ecological (resource) problems. Working within an unjustified market model has 
been a historical reality for a long time: national fisheries have never operated in free market 
conditions, passing through a variety of regimes, from protected corporate fisheries (supportive of the 
retailers lobby) to the EU subsidy system. This long-term historical trend has resulted in a market-
averse attitude within the fisheries community, making people structurally ‘trapped’ within a traditional 
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definition of their role and contributing little to solving the resultant problems: ‘The main problem in the 
way we work is our mentality. We are used to getting to the shore with the fish, delivering it to 
‘someone else’ for sale, and then coming back and waiting for the earnings. It’s only that every year 
we earn less, and we understood that we need to be sellers of our own product. But most of us do not 
have the time or competence to do this. That’s why we needed an organization’12. 
 
3.5.2 Crisis 
New opportunities arose during an economic crisis that was related to the failure of the market regime. 
Although it was far from unusual, the local fisheries community did not anticipate its magnitude. 
ArtesanalPesca’s responsiveness to the crisis can be classified as ‘response without experience’ 
(Folke et al. in Berkes et al., 2003), based on the idea that it is necessary first to stabilize the 
wholesale price,  ‘as fish is always the same’13.  
The response entailed creating a changed structure, in this case, a fish processing plant. By 
controlling market supply, this facility already solved some of the problems. ArtesanalPesca’s 
monopoly on black scabbardfish was an ecological contextual condition that gave the organization an 
additional competitive advantage compared to other POs and significantly facilitated 
commercialization practices. New practices encouraged changing conceptions and an associated 
change in strategy: instead of looking at daily income (short-term perspective, typical within the 
fisheries community), the organization applied a long-term strategy (calculating the average price in a 
good fishing year and taking this price as a point of reference for the following years, including 
operational costs). Structural change resulted in new forms of rules and guidelines and redefined 
organizational boundaries, implemented through the creation of networks and through negotiations 
with supermarkets that require a regular supply and large quantities. A crucial factor behind the 
processes of response that led to these structural changes, as all those interviewed reported, was the 
principal manager’s capacity for networking, negotiating and managing investments in a credible way. 
This was framed by the leader himself as ‘we have the capacity to structure things so that they work 
out!14’ The processes just discussed were shaped by and led to further changes in organizational 
structure.  
 
3.5.3 Changing the context 
Yet, the market power of retailers, as part of the political structural context, undermined the system 
established by ArtesanalPesca. One immediate response to change made by some of the PO’s 
members was to pursue a traditional solution (selling fish on the auction market) rather than to go 
                                                     
12 Personal interview with Carlos Alexandre Pinto de Oliveira Macedo, Fiscal director, ArtesanalPesca, October 
2010 
13 Personal interview with Manuel José Pinto Alves, President, ArtesanalPesca, November 2010 
14 Personal interview with Manuel José Gomes Pólvora dos Santos, Treasurer, ArtesanalPesca, November 2010 
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along with the solutions proposed by the PO. This led once again to a situation in which high (and 
unplanned) catches led to low (and unpredictable) prices. This internal resistance and inertia, framed 
by one of the members as an ‘addiction to the old way of doing things’, was related to existing power 
relations as well as to the fishermen’s individualism, independence and short-term focus on profit. The 
PO dealt with it by creating an environment for continuous organizational learning, referred to by PO 
management as “the daily battle of explaining, convincing and listening15’. Finally, these issues were 
resolved by another structural change, a rather rapid and risky decision to entirely bypass the auction 
system. Thus the context not only triggered processes of adaptation but was also the object of 
adaptation. A changed market regime resulted in changed rules and resource distribution and 
encouraged further changes of boundaries and identities of various actors within the structural 
(market) context. Although the PO’s capacities and power vis-à-vis others increased there are still 
examples of regime actors’ inertia and fondness of the status-quo. For example, some major retailers 
do not like the fact that ArtesanalPesca is the only agent from whom they can buy the black 
scabbardfish, and so they sign contracts with individual vessels to buy fish from them at a lower price). 
The PO’s remedy for these cases (as well as for the ongoing ‘addiction’ to inertia) consists in 
increasing its ‘response diversity’ through organizational innovation (diversifying its products and 
services) and by remaining aware of continuous change as a learning process.     
 
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FOR SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODELS 
 
The case of ArtesanalPesca outlined above contains lessons on how adaptability may help 
organizations to move towards a novel, more sustainable business model. We focus here on the 
processes resource users’ organizations may employ to translate the idea of adaptability into their 
practices.  
3.6.1 ‘Making sense’ of crisis 
How people choose to deal with crisis appears to either increase or decrease their own resilience and 
thus the resilience of the wider SES of which they are a part (Gunderson in Berkes et al. 2003). Crisis 
and change are essential parts of our lives. When things go wrong, most organizations reach for 
familiar, official rules and past solutions. Yet this can make organizations static and vulnerable to 
unexpected uncertainties. ArtesanalPesca’s experience provides an example of organizational 
improvisation and creativity in response to crisis. Furthermore, it hints at the notion that if and when 
organizations learn to see crises as opportunities – ‘when one door closes, another one opens’ – and 
if and when this risk-taking behaviour – probing into the unknown – results in a success story, 
                                                     
15 Personal interview with Manuel José Gomes Pólvora dos Santos, Treasurer, ArtesanalPesca, November 2010 
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organizations become ‘addicted’ to this form of thinking. By acknowledging their mistakes and learning 
from them, they are inspired to respond dynamically to unexpected disturbances, while also being able 
to deal with other examples of ‘addiction’, i.e. internal/external resistance and inertia. The motto is: do 
not fear a crisis, but make sense of it.  
 
3.6.2  Think differently and plan transitions  
As stated by Bardwell (1991), the ways people understand and frame a problem often discourage and 
frustrate them, rather than motivating them to act. Bardwell reminds us that, according to cognitive 
psychology, people use information from the external environment according to their mental modes, 
which are deeply socio-culturally and psychologically embedded and built up throughout their life 
experience. Thus a successful organization will require the skills to frame a problem so as to question, 
re-examine and adjust their role in solving it. This active way of framing a problem helps organizations 
to think about the future by finding out what is their contribution to the resilience of the system in which 
they are operating. This is evident from the ArtesanalPesca case in two respects: i) their capacity to 
adapt to fluctuations in market demand and catch volumes through the processing plant’s capacity to 
control market supply, and ii) the PO’s capacity to develop market power through redefining market 
structure. 
 
3.6.3  Practising adaptability through learning 
Although they depend on contexts, processes are made, learned and developed. In the proposed 
framework an organization reacts to crisis, or extended difficult periods, by creating and acquiring 
knowledge and adapting its behaviour to respond to this knowledge. The act of removing the fish from 
the auction system, in the case of ArtesanalPesca, is an example of double-learning in the fishermen’s 
behaviour (from a short-term perspective related to individual profit to thinking and acting according to 
long-term/common organizational interests). According to Lozano (2008) collaboration is a crucial 
element in combating points of view that tend to be unconscious, culturally embedded and 
individualistic. The organization itself provided a supportive learning environment that made these 
processes possible: «learning by doing» to solve internal conflicts and resistance; learning and 
sharing from experiences to increase mutual trust and improve relationships; learning how to react – a 
combination of well thought-out rational strategy, creativity and instinctive, snap judgements and 
reactions (when to use what?).  
Finally, the new business model adopted by ArtesanalPesca, acquired through the process of 
adaptation just outlined, can be seen as being more adaptive than its predecessor: it was able to 
respond better to market (demand) fluctuations as well as to fluctuations in catch volume. This 
introduced both socio-economic benefits for the fisherman and ecological benefits in terms of fish 
resources. The case thus contains lessons on how adaptability may be an essential part of a 
sustainable business model. Further application of the framework through additional case studies is 
expected to result in understanding POs different ways of being adaptive: the patterns in the way in 
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which contextual and structural factors shape adaptation and how these interactions are affected by 
organization (nature and quality of leadership; ways of dealing with power differentials). 
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‘If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.’ 
Denis Healey's First law of holes, 1986. 
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ABSTRACT 
To ensure the best market conditions for their fish, vessel owners are incentivized to create fish 
producers organization (PO), with obvious market advantages for fishers. However, the management 
of POs is not an easy task. This paper aims to understand how adaptation to environmental and 
market changes among fish POs relates to their capacities (or failures) to manage production and 
market demand. Drawing on an analytical framework the authors developed, twelve Portuguese POs 
are compared in terms contexts, structures, evidence of crisis and adaptability of response. Results 
revealed three modes of adaptation amongst POs (anticipatory, maladaptation and reactive 
adaptation) and identified key reasons explaining different degrees of adaptability in POs: 1) 
prejudiced market regime, which makes small scale fishers vulnerable and inactive and 2) prevalence 
of the sardine fishery, as contextual conditions; 3) evidence of market crisis; 4) leadership, 5) trust and 
6) perception of self-interest; 7) learning, based on shared experience, and 8) collaboration with 
demand side. Though internal reorganization could improve POs’ contribution to sustainable fishery 
management, adaptation is not a panacea. POs that are not adaptive rather indicate the problems with 
the fishery market whose transformation is the requisite for enabling adaptive governance of national 
fisheries. POs could be used as tools to operationalize this positive change.   
Key words: fish producers' organizations; fishers; adaptability; agency; change; crisis; Portugal 
 
53 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fisheries and the livelihoods that depend on them face threats from overfishing, climate change, 
changes in market and regulations (e.g. Pauly et al. 1998; Jacquet 2009; Kalfagianni and Pattberg 
2013). To respond to these challenges, fishers need to accept and understand the changes that shape 
their lives and work (Folke 2003), learn from their mistakes (Adger 2003) and generate experience of 
dealing with change (Berkes et al. 2003, Paavola and Adger 2006). This adaptability (with intent) is 
fundamental for understanding resilience in social-ecological systems (SESs), their capacity to deal 
with change, which is at the center of SES debate (Walker et al. 2006, Folke et al. 2010). In this 
context, scholars have been interested in strategies for adaptation, to mediate the relationship 
between humans and nature (e.g. Tompkins and Adger 2004, Somers 2009). 
In many EU member states, fishers’ responses to evolution of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
have included self-organization and cooperation in the form of producers groups, known as fish 
producers’ organizations (POs). POs16 aim to regulate the market, e.g. stabilize first-sale price, 
through planning of fish production (annual operational program including catch plan and marketing 
strategy). Herewith, POs bring obvious market advantages for fishers. The most relevant are POs 
capacity to negotiate direct sale contracts and to finance the withdrawing of production surplus and its 
reintroduction later on in the market, when the price is more reasonable. However, the management of 
POs is not an easy task due to numerous structural and contextual constraints (e.g. Jentoft and Davis 
1993, Phllipson 1999). The research presented in this paper aimed to understand how adaptation to 
environmental and market changes among fish POs relates to their capacities (or failures) to manage 
production and market demand. To explore these issues we use the case study of fish POs from 
continental Portugal. 
We define adaptability in POs as a learning process of dealing with pressures through adjusting 
management routines (productive and marketing activities), internal structures and membership 
behavior to secure livelihoods for the long term (Berkes and Jolly 2001, Berkes et al. 2003). To a large 
extent, adaptation is a response to change (e.g. Cooper and Pile 2014), but it may also be anticipatory 
(e.g. Angell and Stokke 2014) in terms of foreseeing conditions in the future and acting based on this 
assessment (Adger et al. 2005). In addition to these two modes of corrective adaptation, there may be 
adaptation to structures that are obviously problematic from the actor’s point of view, so-called 
maladaptation, which accommodates to the existing problems, instead of resolving them (Fleischman 
et al. 2010).  
The inherent question, then, is what are the key factors explaining different degrees of adaptability in 
                                                     
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in 
fishery and aquaculture products 
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fish POs. Understanding why and under which conditions adaptation occurs is necessary to support 
and sustain local level adaptation practices (e.g. Coulthard 2008, Storbjork and Hedrén 2011). By 
drawing upon twelve cases of Portuguese POs, we try to shed light on this subject. Studying 
Portuguese fish POs also provides important insights on an issue underemphasized in literature: the 
relevance of ecological diversity for shaping different modes of local adaptation. Although POs tend to 
have more or less defined structures, i.e. membership, rules, monitoring and sanctions, we are 
primarily interested here in the agency involved: adaptability as a part of management strategy. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows:  drawing on a framework (Section 3), based on 
the literature on adaptability (Section 2) the case study of fish POs in Portugal (Section 4) is analyzed: 
twelve POs are compared in terms of context, structure, evidence of crisis and adaptability of 
response. Different modes of adaptation are identified (Section 5), pointing to key conditions and 
factors that foster or limit PO adaptability (Section 6) and some practical implications of the analysis 
(Section 7).  
 
4.2 ADAPTABILITY IN INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Social actors (individuals, organizations) have inherent capacities to adapt to complex social and 
ecological settings (Adger et al. 2004). The contextual setting affects the entire institutional dynamics 
and plays a critical but identifiable role in co-management success (MacNeil and Cinner 2013). 
Contexts may include resources, market context, policy restrictions and social and cultural context, as 
well as long-term drivers of local change, such as market liberalization or Europeanization.  
Yet, contexts do not determine organizational behavior. Agency usually plays a vital role in achieving 
transformations from less adaptive to more adaptive management and governance (Westly et al. 
2013). People and the organizations they form are able to act on the structures and systems of which 
they are a part (Giddens 1989). In a socio-institutional context, adaptive response in an organization is 
shaped by on organizational position within the social networks and institutional arrangements and on 
internal factors, including organizational structure (e.g. physical, human and social capital) and 
processes (e.g. capacity to network and learning processes) (Folke et al. 2002).  Interplay of both 
external and internal conditions shapes human subjective attitudes to adaptation. Observed in this 
manner, institutional arrangements ‘come with particular strengths that make them suitable for certain 
circumstances’ (Chuenpagdee and Song 2012: 312); they have co-evolved with dominant practices 
(Grin et al. 2010). However, SESs are constantly changing (Holling 1986), shaping the context in 
which organizations are working. Therefore, the challenge for an organization is to strategically act in 
concert with this broader system dynamics (Westly et al. 2013).  
Learning in organizations is particularly important from this ‘evolutionary’ perspective. Organizations 
learn from experience when, faced with a new situation, existing management routines through which 
they operate prove inappropriate or ineffective (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000). However, evidence from 
experience may fail to be recognized as pertinent for changing of routines (Levitt and March, 1988) 
due to mental models humans use to perceive reality around them (Senge 1990).  
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Disturbance or crisis may impact these mental models, shaping the desirability of system change 
(Walker et al. 2006). Crisis can foster adaptation through creating a space for learning and novelty 
(Folke et al. 2010), encouraging collaboration for governance of resources (Osterblom and Folke 
2013) and restructuring power relations among stakeholders (Baral et al. 2010). Schoon and Cox 
(2012) and Fleischman et al. (2010) provide first typologies of disturbances in SESs, found as 
important for understanding institutional change and persistence (Deadlow 2013). 
 
4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS 
4.3.1  Theoretical framework 
To understand adaptive organizations’ contribution to system resilience we have developed (Karadzic 
et al. 2013) an analytical framework (Table 3-1).  
Though resilience and SES literature provide initial frameworks to study SESs from a social science 
perspective (e.g. Anderies et al. 2004, Ostrom 2009), we chose to use this framework as it explicitly 
includes organizational learning theories into resilience concepts. In this framework external (context, 
crisis/disturbance) and internal (structure and processes) factors are supposed to influence 
organizational adaptability; a list of questions enables ‘measuring’ these factors. We assess crisis by 
looking at simple attributes such as speed of change (slow–fast), degree of the disturbance (minor or 
fundamental changes), or whether the disturbance occurred in the social or ecological system 
(Schoon and Cox 2012, Fleischman et al. 2010).   
 
4.3.2 Data Sources 
We used a qualitative research method to collect information. Semi-structured questions from the 
framework were asked across a multi-case study of twelve POs from continental Portugal. We used 
the method of structured and focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005) where the framework 
guided data collection on certain aspects of cases examined. Interviews were conducted with twelve 
key leaders in charge of POs (PO executive presidents or PO administrative officers as informal 
leaders). The initial phase of interviews aimed to contextualize the PO work. After acquiring sound 
knowledge of the PO at hand, we used a narrative form of interviewing (Mischler 1986). Focus was on 
the way in which individuals (PO leaders) make sense of their experience, i.e. POs adaptation to 
resource/market trend or crisis. In this context, narrative was used as a communication tool in which a 
PO leader externalized, gave meaning and indicated which elements (factors) of communicated 
experiences are most significant. These interviews were the units of observation. Supplementary 
information was gathered during semi-structured interviews (n=65) with PO administrative staff, 
fishers-POs members and other key persons from the sector (March 2010 - July 2013).   
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4.3.3 Data analysis 
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and then content analyzed. Data from the interviews were 
extracted and structured around key elements from the framework (Table 3-1). This information was 
used to compare POs in terms of framework categories and identify different modes of adaptation 
response. Factors from the framework were used to explain these modes. To ensure the anonymity of 
respondents, each PO was identified by a letter code (i.e.: A-PO, B-PO, etc.) Excerpts from narratives 
are included to help contextualize adaptive experience (or lack thereof) of the interviewee. Results are 
discussed in terms of key factors that foster or limit PO adaptability.  
Next, we introduce the case study of fish POs in Portugal and describe the environmental and market 
trends that POs face.    
 
4.4 FISH POS IN PORTUGAL – A HIGHLY DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT   
4.4.1 The structure and function of POs  
From a total number of Portuguese licensed vessels (4 653), 33% (1 525) are members of POs (INE, 
2013), accounting for 78% of the total landings at the national level (DGPA- the Directorate General of 
Fishing, personal communication, November 2013). There are currently 15 POs: 12 in continental 
Portugal, two in the Autonomous Region of the Azores and one in the Autonomous Region of Madeira. 
The location of POs is indicated in Figure 4-1. The structural and functional profile of POs is provided 
in Table 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1: Location of fish POs in continental Portugal 
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The majority of POs developed around 1986 (see Table 4-1), following the Portuguese accession to 
the European Community. POs differ significantly regarding membership size: the largest PO, with 
566 members (VianaPesca) is around 40 times the size of the smallest, with 14 members (Sesibal). 
Membership size does not correspond to the mean value of individual member's production, e.g. 
Propeixe with only 21 members adds up to 38% of national sardine production (Almeida et al. 2013). 
Two POs invested in the processing industry; six POs created new structures and diversified their 
activities (improvements of port infrastructures or membership vessels conditions, employment 
opportunities, etc.); the remaining four are structurally at the same level as when they were created 
(small office in the port with maximum two employees).   
 
Table 4-1: Structural and functional profile of fish POs in continental Portugal 
Year No of No of Type of 
founded members fish species 
recognized
fishery arts 
% auction % contracts
Small-scale (534) 
Purse-seine (7), 
Trawl (ganchorra) 
(11)
Small-scale (76)
Purse-seine (12), 
PROPEIXE 1986 21 4 Purse-seine (21) 95,34 4,66 Yes Yes
Small-scale (100)
Purse-seine (10)
Trawl (3)
Drag nets (4)
Small-scale (22) 
Purse-seine (11)
Trawl (2)
Small-scale (135)
Longline (11)
Trawl (8)
Small-scale (56)
Purse-seine (14)
Trawl (27)
Hooks and lines 
(13)
Gill nets (5)
Longline (18)
Traps (24)
SESIBAL 1987 14 6 Purse-seine (14) 88 12 Yes No
BIVALMAR 1992 21 7 Trawl (ganchorra) 
(21) 
0 100 No
BARLAPESCAS 1986 20 29 Purse-seine (20) 84,31 15,69 Yes No
Purse-seine (13)
Traps (37)
Trawl (2)
Gill net (6)
Trawl (ganchorra) 
(58)
Yes NoOLHÃOPESCA 1989 116 63 80,89 19,11
Yes No
ARTESANALPESCA 1988 42 27 6,67 93,33 No Yes
OPCENTRO 1986 115 139 82,31 17,69
Yes No
CAPA 1990 154 66 82,2 17,8 No No
CENTRO LITORAL 2000 35 32 67,3 32,7
No No
APARA 2008 117 39 79,9 20,1 Yes No
APROPESCA 1986 88 71 76,21 23,79
Use of 
withdrawals
Involvement 
in processing:
VIANAPESCA 1989 566 147 47,09 52,91 Yes No
POs Commercialization 
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4.4.2 Resource related opportunities and problems 
The Portuguese fishing fleet is highly diversified with a wide range of vessel types targeting different 
species (STECF 2013). Considering the fishery type, multispecies and multi-gears vessels (small-
scale and coastal artisanal fleets) dominate in terms of catches (46.5%), followed by the purse-seine 
(44 %) and trawl (9.6%) (INE 2013). Ten POs practice purse-seine fishery, grouped in the Anopcerco 
(Portuguese Association of Purse Seine Producer Organizations), launched in 1993. Three of them 
even exclusively focus on purse seine fishery. Though representing a small segment of the national 
fleet, purse seine is one of the key fisheries in Portugal (Stratoudakis and Marçalo, 2002) and the 
most economically important fleet in Portugal (Anderson et al. 2012). Sardine is the main target 
species; approximately 98% of sardine and 85% of chub mackerel landings are carried out by vessels 
associated with POs (INE 2013). The sardine fishery has been under Marine Stewardship Council 
certification (MSC) since 2010. The main management advisory body is ICES (International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea). 
Unpredictability, and strong fluctuations in sardine productivity, is associated with environmental 
conditions, e.g. climatic changes (Borges et al. 2003). In high peak production periods supply exceeds 
demand, which leads to a low fish price and lack of retailers’ interest in the product. This is the main 
reason why purse seine producers made the most of withdrawal aid. PO administration serves as a 
mediator between producers and the sardine can industry, which is the main sardine buyer. With 
regards to resource management, fluctuations in productivity require membership production planning. 
Currently, purse seine POs are actively involved in the management measures for the Atlanto-Iberian 
sardine stock, i.e. an overall limitation in fishing days and a yearly quota for producers (POs and a few 
non-associated vessels). Since 1999, purse seine POs in northern Portugal have voluntarily 
introduced daily landing limits on their vessels to manage the annual quota as a function of local 
market demand.  
In contrast, multispecies vessels (small-scale and coastal artisanal), as the principal segment of 
Portuguese fisheries, is by far less represented by the POs. Approximately 82% of the national fleet is 
classified as small-scale (STECF 2013) and distributed amongst six POs with a diverse membership 
(Table 4-1). Deficient regulation, together with lack of market and resource management incentives is 
the main reason for weak participation of these vessels in POs. First, the official legislation 17 and the 
recognition criterion for POs that the Portuguese state decided to apply limit, or in many cases, hinder 
the possibility of small-scale multispecies vessels to self-organize and congregate sufficient 
membership to create a PO. To create a PO, vessels need to commercialize, ‘at least 15 % by weight 
of the total production in its area’18. Second, multispecies vessels usually have small, but diversified 
                                                     
17 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2318/2001 of 29 November 2001 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 as regards the recognition of producer organisations and associations of 
producer organisations in the fishery and aquaculture sector 
18 Two other recognition conditions are: i) the number of vessels operated by members of the producer 
organisation is at least 20 % of the total number of vessels habitually present in that area, and ii) at least 30 % by 
weight of the total production in a major port or market in its area, the Member State concerned defining what is 
meant by ‘major’ for this purpose. The Member State decide which of the conditions laid down shall apply in their 
territory (it is not possible to apply more then one).  
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catches. Hence, their production falls short of benefits from withdrawal aid. Finally, this type of fleet 
captures a large variety of species and their management is much more complex. Though POs 
administer fish quotas of their membership19 PO leaders recognize their role as merely informative 
rather than steering. One of the PO leaders frames this issue saying that ‘we worry about quotas, but 
we are not giving orders to our vessels’. Unfortunately, this fails to solve the problem of discards and 
illegal sale in cases where quotas are exceeded.  
 
4.4.3 Problems with the fish market model 
In Portugal most fishery products are sold on the fish auction market (20 fish auctions and 33 sale 
sites) using a descending-bid type of auction, also called the Dutch auction (where the auctioneer 
starts at a higher price and gradually lowers it). Dutch auctions may not be appropriate mechanisms 
for fishers to extract the maximum revenue from buyers as they increase competition not between 
buyers, but between sellers (Fluviá et al. 2012). Eight out of the twelve POs are unsatisfied with the 
current market model (information extracted from the interviews with POs leaders, personal 
communications). The problem is especially evident in landing ports with lower nominal catches, which 
corresponds to 13 from 20 auctions in total (INE 2013) where a few retailers are able to manipulate 
the auction price and significantly lower it.  
The current fish market model dates back from the Salazar political regime (1934-1974) when the 
sector was highly controlled by the state. While both internal and international conditions changed, the 
model nevertheless persists, including positions, roles and relationships of actors that operate in the 
system. Docapesca is a case in point as it continues to be the regulating authority responsible for the 
management of fish auctions. Through Docapesca, the Portuguese state ensures control of fishery 
activity (registration of total fish catch and quality control), collects taxes (4% of the value, paid by both 
seller and buyer) and guarantees fishers wages (except in cases of direct sale contracts where 
payments are managed by the PO). In other words, while Docapesca has an important social role and 
provides a sort of ‘financial pillow’ (fishers are paid on a daily/weekly basis), it also charges high taxes 
to ‘finance huge and unnecessary administration and infrastructure’, as framed by one of PO leader.   
Apart from the importance of fish auctions for purse seine fishery, fish auctions are still an essential 
element for first sale of a large variety of species with low market value. Despite large supermarkets’ 
interest in buying the fish through contracts from POs, POs often refuse to do business with them for 
two main reasons. First, supermarkets want specific quantity of certain species. Therefore, a 
significant part of multispecies vessels’ production (fish of lower value) eventually ends up at the 
auction where the price further decreases. Second, supermarkets often delay payments and POs who 
lack financial security and access to bank loans cannot ensure regular payments to their membership. 
                                                     
19 Quotas emanate from the EU through ICES advice with the IPMA (Instituto Português do Mar e da Atmosfera) 
participation 
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As a result, many POs prefer making contracts with smaller retailers who guarantee to buy the entire 
catch and pay on the spot.    
 
 
4.5 AN ANALYSIS OF POS ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: DIFFERENT MODES OF 
ADAPTATION 
A cross-case comparison of twelve POs revealed three distinct modes of POs’ adaptation 
(summarized in Figure 4-2). Though contingent on contexts, adaptation modes depict the key 
agency’s features (structure, processes, individual behavior), including attributes of crisis or change 
that shape the specific mode.     
 
4.5.1 Adapting to the context (when it is ‘convenient’) – ‘easy’ and anticipatory adaptation 
‘Convenient’ contexts imply that both physical system and market share facilitate fishers’ work. Hence, 
adaptation seems natural and ‘easy’. PO administration usually perceives ‘no problems’ or has 
difficulties in identifying problems pertinent to their fisheries. This is the case of northern seine POs, 
i.e. A-PO, B-PO and C-PO, which operate in big landing ports in terms of nominal catches. Significant 
membership production and proper structuring of demand (can and freezing industries) bring high 
revenues for POs and create satisfaction with the fish auctions, as exemplified by one of the leaders: 
‘we have a lot of fish and as many contracts we make, we could never sell everything’. PO 
involvement additionally co-creates market interdependency between producers, retailers and 
industries, framed as: ‘it is well-known that every kilo of sardine sustains at least 5 people here in our 
community.’  
Major market disturbances are caused by the unpredictability of the resource base. To anticipate 
market changes POs are enforcing operational rules that aim to minimize surplus of production and 
stabilize the price. Furthermore, disturbances are anticipated through structural changes. Investments 
in land-based facilities enabled A-PO to increase the value of members’ production, facilitate better 
use of market support funds and employ additional work force. Yet, according to the majority of PO 
leaders, land-based facilities only make sense in the context of POs with high production. Otherwise, 
(irregular) excess of production is stored with PO clients, i.e. industries, which tend to reduce the 
price. Structures on land also require financial security and credit loans, a condition many POs do not 
have.  
In recent years, the Iberian sardine stock has decreased due to environmental conditions, e.g. climate 
change, and some uncertainty regarding sardine stock dynamics (Almeida et al. 2013). Due to 
increased fishing mortality and low biomass, ICES advises that catches in 2014 should be no more 
than 17 000 t, a sharp decrease in comparison to 75 000 t in 2010 and 96 000 t in 2006 (ICES 2013). 
POs specialized or largely dependent on seine fishery are especially problematic in this context. 
Homogenous composition of membership in terms of vessels interest and size is in many ways easier 
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to manage; the downside of this low diversity is that ‘easier to manage’ especially holds for situations 
of abundance; management becomes complicated when resources are scarce. Coulthard (2008) 
found that the least able to adapt are fishers who have become locked into an overly specialized 
fishery.  
Another concern for resources is the ‘domino’ effect of ‘bad’ attitude amongst purse seine producers. 
Exceeding the daily landing limits in 2010, as was the case of C–PO membership, made members of 
other purse seine POs behave in the same manner. The statement of the leader of this particular PO, 
‘without purse seine members, PO doesn’t make sense’ is an added concern. According to this leader, 
even in heterogeneous POs seine producers might be privileged when it concerns the decision-
making process. (‘We have 10 big seine vessels (mine are 5); 30 are little ones, but they do not ‘eat’ a 
lot of time; if they do, I warn them and collect a levy. We want the sector to be stable, but they are 
aware of their place. They are not discriminated; legally they have the same vote like the others, but 
the ones who contribute the most have advantages that they cannot have and this is the type of 
agreement everyone understands and respects’).  
 
4.5.2 Adapting to the context (when it is ‘bad’) – maladaptation  
‘Bad’ contexts imply essential difficulties in the market. This is a typical setting for POs who operate in 
landing ports with lower nominal catches, i.e. D-PO, E-PO, F-PO and G-PO. Low concentration of 
production structures the demand side; fish auctions in these ports have small number of retailers, 
who are able to manipulate and significantly lower the fish price. This encourages illegal sale, known 
as ‘escape from the auction’, additionally facilitated by high taxes to be paid to Docapesca. In this 
context, though price stability should be the main aim of the POs, few manage to achieve this. 
‘Supermarkets underestimate our work’, i.e. delays in payments, demand for particular type and 
quantity of fish. In contrast, in contracts with local retailers, declared price is only half of the price 
offered by the supermarket; the other half is received illegally hence it is free of taxes. According to 
one PO leader, local retailers encourage the practice of illegal sale: ‘to overcome this, we try to make 
more contracts, but retailers organize themselves and offer more money to our members “through the 
back door” than they would receive through the official contract’.    
Maladaptation may also be less intentional as it is driven by regulatory environment. Severe limitations 
to fishery activity are summarized by one of the PO leader as: ‘to comply with the rules of the game, 
means ending with the game’. In 2006, the EU implemented a Recuperation Plan (effective until 2016) 
in order to replenish hake stocks until they reach safe biological limits. Initially, fishers acknowledged 
restrictions, as hake scarcity was noticeable. However, as soon as hake recovered (according to 
fishers perceptions and working experience) they continued to fish ‘as if there were no limits’. This is 
how one PO leader understands the setback of illegal sale using the example of hake fishery: ‘you 
bring the fish to the buyer – he weighs it and only the next day he tells you the price. If he sells well, 
he gives you good money, if not, he gives you bad. Well, he gives whatever he wants. Because he 
knows you can not sell on the auction and you do not have an option...that’s how we learned to get 
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away...If we register everything we catch we are done with our quotas in a month…and then what do 
we do? What is the alternative? What we want is to have work.’ 
 
4.5.3 Transforming the context (when it is ‘bad’) – reactive adaptation (or resistance to 
change) 
Conversely, there are cases of POs, i.e. H-PO, whose capacity to actively cope with a biased market 
model through ecological advantage (species exclusivity), leadership attitude and land-based facilities, 
managed to transform the model itself, as explained in Karadzic et al. (2013). Another example is one 
exclusive to purse seine I–PO, where temporary sardine scarcity and leadership capacity to network 
changed the way producers perceived fish marketing. Earlier PO’s leadership was patronizing big 
member companies whose large captures were exceeding local demand and decreasing fish price. 
This was generating a low level of trust amongst the membership. To regulate supply, the new 
leadership managed to enforce strict operational rules. Collaboration with Docapesca permitted 
temporary change of the market rules and entrance of a new group of retailers interested in fresh fish 
who rapidly joined the auction. Prior to this, two freezing industries were controlling the whole region 
(still present as main buyers). More buyers at the auction market led to an increase of fish price and 
decline of fishery effort. In both POs, leadership capacity to network and negotiate was essential for 
PO reorganization. 
There are, though, cases of POs, whose responsiveness to crisis started to change the context itself, 
and then it stopped, i.e. J-PO, K-PO and the evidence of bad experience with internal reorganization 
in L-PO. In 1996, administration of J-PO had serious difficulty selling their products. To address the 
problem, PO manager (an informal PO leader), ‘in a moment of madness’, decided to try to sell the 
products directly from producer (PO member) to consumer, with the obvious market advantages for 
the membership. He went to Spain, where he found a client interested in the entire PO production: 
‘when I arrived, the director of the industry was not there. It was Friday. So, I spent the weekend 
sleeping at the beach, in a sleeping bag and kept the money I had. On Sunday I went to the city 
market, bought a clean shirt and did business in a half an hour. The man just wanted to know if we 
had the capacity to guarantee the quantity he needed’. As a result of this business deal, PO members 
started to earn more and receive payments on time. This ‘tremendous effort’ ended in the following 
year, when a couple of members ‘started to think that what we are doing is easy’. After finding out 
where and to whom PO sells the product, they offered the same quantity for a lower price. (‘And that 
was it. Never again I would repeat the same experience’.) 
Internal resistance to change and price stability is a sort of ‘intermezzo’ experience amongst POs. In 
the case of contracts for octopus between K-PO and one supermarket, the initial price for octopus was 
based on the average market price. However, the market price soon decreased and for more than a 
year 42 vessels were getting 2 Euros more for their fish than the auction price. The buyer never asked 
for a change in the contract or a decrease in the agreed price. When situation was reversed (due to 
lack of resources market price started to increase) and the auction price for octopus reached only 10 
cents above the contract price, membership started to fail with deliveries. Currently, only 3 vessels 
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continue with contracts. PO leader reflected on this episode by saying that ‘my members do not 
understand stable price. If they earn less through the contract than they would earn at the auction, we 
end up as thieves…no one wants to take responsibility.’  
  
Figure 4-2: Summary: Modes (states) of adaptation and types of change creating the mode 
  
 
4.6 DISCUSSIONS: KEY REASONS FOR DIFFERENT POS ADAPTIVE RESPONSE 
Three modes of adaptation amongst POs were identified (anticipatory, maladaptation and reactive 
adaptation) caused by four types of changes: i) ‘slow’ changes induced by environmental conditions 
and overfishing; ii) unexpected market crisis; iii) wider system transformation via internal adaptation 
and iv) human resistance or inertia to change that inhibits adaptation (Figure 4-2). Next, we discuss 
key contextual conditions, attributes of crisis and agency features that impact POs adaptability.  
 
4.6.1 How contexts matter 
Prejudiced market regime. As evident from our results, an obligatory system of the fish first sale 
‘competes’ with the POs’ idea to a certain extent. While long-term contracts negotiated by POs 
stabilize the price of their membership products, they also increase the price of the fish remaining in 
the auction. Hence, producers every now and then view contracts as a ‘loosing money’ deal. As a 
result, POs do not bother to compel membership to sell their fish through contracts, used merely ‘as a 
plan B to play with the price’ when there is plenty of fish at the auction. Moreover, concentration of 
production is important as it leads to a more or less appropriate structure on the demand side. In 
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landing ports with lower nominal catches, as found in D-PO, E-PO, F-PO, G-PO (maladaptive) and H-
PO, I–PO (reactive), Dutch auctions further sustain the problem as they facilitate retailers manipulation 
of the price. Low fish price creates incentives for overfishing and illegal sale, which further decreases 
the price and creates uncanny relationships between fishers and retailers. 
Silent power of sardine –Another important contextual condition relates to ‘easily’ and anticipatory 
adaptable seine A-PO, B-PO and C-PO. Walker et al. (2006) argue that increasing adaptability (e.g. 
through intervention mechanisms and operational rules) to regular shocks (e.g. fluctuations in sardine 
productivity) may ‘optimize’ the system to this regime of shocks, decreasing its general resilience to 
unexpected shocks (e.g. long-term resource scarcity). This issue becomes very relevant in the light of 
current sardine scarcity and the CFP reform, which plans to gradually end with withdrawing subsidies, 
used essentially by purse seine POs. Moreover, the situation is worrisome due to the traditional 
dependence of the fishery sector in Portugal on seine fishery (DGPA, personal communication, 
November 2013) and (inter) dependence of involved actors. Collaboration among producers, can 
industry, scientists and the government are perceived as crucial to recover MSC certification (MSC, 
2013), following certification suspension in 2011 (ICES 2012). Actors’ interdependence also reduces 
independence (Bodin and Crona, 2009), which could delay the individual PO adaptation response. 
Our results also reveal some indication of superior position of seine vs. multispecies vessels in POs 
with heterogeneous membership due to their higher profit and concentrated production. Multispecies 
fishers’ vulnerability and inactivity is again sustained by the official market regime. Bandura (1977) 
claims that individuals with low self-esteem (or an external locus of control) do not perceive 
themselves as able to act, which directly reflects their adaptation response. 
 
4.6.2 How attributes of crisis matter 
When the market crisis ‘tips over’. POs capacity to adapt to a crisis partly depends on the nature of 
crisis. While long-term dissatisfaction with the market trend is common for both maladaptive and 
reactive POs, D-PO, E-PO, F-PO and G-PO (maladaptive) lack the evidence of market crisis. Market 
crisis occurs when a problematic market trend reaches its threshold and finally ‘tips over’. In H-PO and 
I–PO, adaptive response to ‘tipping over’ of market crisis implied transformation of the market model 
via internal reorganization, which led to restructuring of power relations among actors. Although found 
to trigger PO adaptability, J-PO and K-PO also show that in the long run, attributes of crisis might be 
leveraged by actors' motivations in the reorganization process, also found in Deadlow et al. (2013) and 
further discussed below. 
Delayed response to slow resource change. Other than market crisis, resource scarcity is built slowly 
and steadily. Changes in slow variables are often overlooked hence human learning from experience 
may seem delayed (Carpenter et al. 2001). Slow changes in sardine stock might generate problems 
for A-PO, B-PO and C-PO. As a result, ‘easily’ adaptable might become problematic in the future. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to analyze societal adaptation to environmental problems, as they are 
contested and hard to quantify (Coulthard 2008). In this context, fishers maladaptation (e.g. ‘getting-
by’ practices, i.e. continue to fish and illegal sale) as a response to prolonged resource scarcity and 
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consequent regulation, damages the environment and keeps the resilience of the problematic market 
regime – resilience here defined as persistence despite change (Gunderson and Light 2006). Cooper 
and Pile (2104) term this as ‘resistance’ response since it involves resisting environmental change in 
order to preserve existing activities.  
 
Clearly these two types of changes (market and environmental) may interact, e.g. through the price 
mechanism connecting fish supply and fish demand. Case of I–PO indicates how temporary resource 
scarcity may encourage POs to think differently about fish marketing (‘less fish generate higher and 
stable price’) and (‘more buyers means higher price hence require less fishing’). Accordingly, through 
transformation of the market contexts the I–PO managed to increase its adaptation to resource 
scarcity, reduce fishing effort, thereby giving their local fisheries resilience a chance to increase. This 
is in line with other studies where the perceived scarcity of resources was identified as a reason for 
institutional transformation (e.g. Oldekop et al. 2012). This might also be promising for the current 
context of sardine scarcity.  
 
4.6.3 How agency matters 
While ecological context may influence the character of fishers’ adaptation within POs (e.g. some 
seine PO are ‘easy’ anticipatory PO), it does not determine it (e.g. some seine PO are maladaptive), 
but makes agency even more crucial. Key agency features with direct impact on PO adaptability are 
leadership, trust and perception of self-interest. Communication and learning based on shared 
experience as well as collaboration with the demand side (processes) have a more indirect impact – 
through their effect on leadership, self-interest and trust. Hence, our work confirms the insights about 
the importance of social capital and actors' behavior for natural resource management (Ostrom 1990; 
Gutiérrez et al. 2011). Individuals’ attitudes and perceptions also play a critical role in organizational 
adaptation response (cp. Storbjork and Hedrén 2011). We discuss these factors in more detail. 
Leadership is the decisive factor for PO performance and adaptation response. There is no single 
style of leadership optimal for adaptability and transformability (Walker et al. 2006). Rather, leadership 
needs to be a dynamic process, responsive to prevailing socio-ecological conditions. Nevertheless, 
our results demonstrate that certain personal characteristics of PO leaders enhance fishers’ collective 
capacity to adapt, namely: problem-solving attitude: (‘Minimum sign of weakness is sufficient for them 
to stop believing…because they are already with low level of trust, they were always family 
companies, learned to be on their own’); readiness to assume risks: (‘I never tell them (membership) 
what I will do, but what has been done’); capacity to network and negotiate; communication skills, in 
particular listening capacity; an interest in change and the ability to foresee: (‘...we are slowly changing 
their mentality...if they were all with the vision it would be easy. You need to reach them and convince 
them that what you want is the best for them. But at the same time you need conscience that other 
people are still ‘not there’. These are phases of understanding; as a leader you need to be aware of 
them’).   
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Conversely, the main common attribute of D-PO, E-PO, F-PO and G-PO is ‘complaining’ and a 
defensive type of leadership. As ‘bad’ contexts are persistently problematic leaders lack capacity to 
focus on specific matters pertinent to their fishery; they usually articulate (too) many problems they 
can cope with and offer no practical solutions. Sometimes this occurs as the leader himself is 
specialized in a specific fishery, hence he lacks knowledge in managing other types of fisheries. 
Accordingly, a leader’s capacity to network and negotiate with the demand side is weak, thus failing to 
maximize the value of membership production. Entangled in problems, ‘complaining’ leaders as a rule 
lack support from their membership and, as viewed by one interviewee, ‘a PO that doesn’t recognize a 
leader is completely disoriented’. As a result, members distrust each other and the PO, which inhibit 
their collective actions. 
Trust. This leads us to the issue of trust. Trust influences the capacity to adapt because it reveals 
whether individuals and groups use relationships for their own or collective good (Adger et al. 2004). 
Trust is central to network steering (see e.g. Rhodes 2000), providing the context through which 
community bonds. Herewith, the work of A-PO, B-PO and C-PO contributes to community social 
capital, based on market interdependency. Internal trust in ‘easy’ seine POs is built through what 
Sztompka (1999) has designated as ´virtuous cycles of trust´, i.e. membership experience that others 
obey the rules of ‘when and how much’ fishing and this promotes collective interest (Karadzic et al. 
2014). In systems governed from the bottom up, changing rules are part of the adaptive process 
(Ostrom 1999). However, trust here is based on internal control - ‘I know that others will do the same’, 
hence not on mutual loyalty and confidence in others actions. This is similar to what Lewicki and 
Bunker (1996) call “calculus-based” trust, which is the product of cost-benefit analysis, but 
accompanied by a suspicion of the other. In other cases, we see that trust is more shaped by 
Sztompka´s structures of trust or mistrust. In maladaptive POs, defensive leadership sustains fishers’ 
dissatisfaction and distrust in PO and in each other. By contrast, in reactive POs, the driver for internal 
trust is leadership attitude that manages to encourage fishers to act in their collective interest, defined 
by Paavola and Adger (2006) as social capital.  
Self-interest. In Hardin’s famous essay the tension between group and self-interest is at the core of 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Following Ostrom (1990) we see e.g. in H-PO and I–PO 
as well as in A-PO, B-PO and C-PO how communication and established rules among the subjects in 
the group generate trust and reciprocity, which then reduce overconsumption of commons 
substantially.  
Nevertheless, resistant J-PO and K-PO, including maladaptive D-PO, E-PO, F-PO and G-PO 
demonstrate that even as members of social organizations fishers continue to act out of self-interest 
(cp. Jentoft and Davis 1993). Usually, some individuals forget how mutual trust and collectively agreed 
upon rules were able to solve their problems. Mere aspiration to earn more makes them rely on old 
behavior and reluctant to reflect on reasons that led to a problem in the first place. As a result, PO 
adaptation response (e.g. new market strategy) is perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity. In 
other words, (individual) egoism reduces (individual and collective) capacity to adapt as it impedes 
individuals from learning from their mistakes and from each other. By contrast, in H-PO and I–PO, the 
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ability to fight back the membership resistance and self-interest is a measure of PO adaptability. Also, 
as Hardin argues, people differ in ‘conscience’; hence their contribution to the tragedy of commons is 
asymmetrical (Jacquet et al. 2013). In H-PO and I–PO, self-interest was moderated with collective 
learning on how experimentation with internal reorganization increases POs’ performance and how 
this has collective benefits.  
The main reasons for fishers’ self-interest behavior lie in PO incentive structure, which is critical for 
success of any management scheme (Hilborn et al. 2005). Although PO market strategy directly 
impacts stock management (fishing less to increase the fish price), vessel owners enter the PO 
because, as Hardin puts it, ‘each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain’ (Hardin 1968: 1244). In other 
words, the market base of POs supports both self-interest and competition. Also, PO institutional 
structure lacks rules that indicate who is responsible, which is necessary when attempting to address 
any commons dilemma (Jacquet et al. 2013). As POs depend on membership production, egoist 
members are often left unpunished, which creates general inertia and lack of confidence in the PO. 
While not a part of the initial framework, the issue of attitudes and perceptions, which shape individual 
motivation to adapt, emerged from the results and should, thus, be included in the framework as the 
fifth dimension.  
One way to deal with this problem is through more restrictive PO regulation. PO simple governance 
structure enables so-called direct line of responsibility (Hilborn et al., 2005): PO producers know who 
is in charge, and often, both leadership and members know who makes mistakes. In addition to 
operational rules, this includes a stringent penalty system to ensure individual commitment to PO 
objectives and market strategy (e.g., responsibility towards direct sale contracts, penalties for illegal 
sale practices).   
Besides individual responsibility, to enhance management performance through enhanced 
adaptability, more attention to the relationship between collective and adaptive capacity is required 
(Adger 2003).  
In this context, communication and learning, based on shared experience seems essential. Through 
collective exchange of experiences, i.e. knowledge building about ecological resources (e.g. Bodin 
and Crona 2009) and communication, which produce social learning, groups retain or revise mental 
models that determine their management strategies (Tompkins and Adger 2004, Ostrom 2005). 
Moreover, this helps them to move from ‘calculus-based’ to real trust, such as ‘knowledge-based’ trust 
and ‘relational-based’ or ‘social trust‘, where people have positive expectations about others’ motives, 
abilities and reliability (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Ostrom (2005) further argues that social learning 
occurs mainly when individuals in a group participate with an induced need to increase performance. 
From this perspective, POs are a good setting for nurturing social learning, identified as the core 
strategy for PO adaptability (Karadzic et al. 2014).  
Collaboration. At present, collaboration among POs portrays typical features of fishers’ 
communication: competition, conflicts and distrust, where ‘each house has its own rules’. Co-
management performance is associated with the collaboration capacity among resource users (Marin 
et al. 2012). This study concludes that best performing fishers’ organizations are those with the 
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capacity to collaborate not only amongst each other, but with multiple actors. Experiences of H-PO, I–
PO, A-PO, B-PO and C-PO confirm these findings; they show change of fishers’ mentality in terms of 
growing enthusiasm to network and negotiate with the demand side. The main body responsible for 
encouraging these relationships on behalf of the PO is again a PO leader, a “gatekeeper” of co-
management and the links between fishers and the organizational environment (Marín and Berkes 
2010). Only through collaboration with the demand side are fishers able to solve the problem of low 
fish price and find alternatives to a biased market context. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS  
This cross case analysis of twelve fish POs from Portugal has shown how different degrees of POs 
adaptability to environmental and market changes relate to their capacity to manage production and 
market demand. Thus, we found that internal reorganization and adaptation could improve POs’ 
contribution to fishery management. Different modes of adaptation and types of changes creating 
specific mode were identified in the research. Key factors impacting PO adaptability are 1) prejudiced 
market regime and 2) prevalence of the sardine fishery, as contextual conditions, 3) evidence of 
market crisis, 4) leadership, 5) trust and 6) perception of self-interest, influenced by 7) membership 
mutual learning and 8) collaboration with demand side. However, adaptation is not a panacea. POs 
that are not adaptive rather indicate the problem with the market regime in Portuguese fisheries and 
alert to basic issues, which constitute this problem. The official system of fish first sale not only inhibits 
the PO idea and jeopardize fishers’ interests, but clearly reduces system resilience as it promotes 
overfishing.  
Given our findings, the better way to increase the system flexibility (resilience) is to reduce market 
regime resilience through alternative models of fish commercialization. POs could be used as a tool to 
operationalize this system change, mainly through their job in fish marketing. And under the conditions 
thus created, POs could better promote system resilience.  
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ABSTRACT 
Fish producers’ organizations (POs) bring together fishers or fish farmers on a voluntary basis so as to 
ensure the best market conditions for their fish. How fishers perceive and understand their 
membership experience is crucial to their capacity to learn from each other and adapt when interacting 
with their environment. These issues are explored by using the case of Propeixe, a Portuguese PO of 
purse seine fishers. Fishers ‘perceptions’ of their PO experiences are discussed using an analytical 
framework based on social learning literature. POs appear to stimulate social learning amongst fishers 
through changes in practices, economic and other incentives, rules and trust in leadership. Moreover, 
POs add to a simple market structure the properties of network coordination: interdependency and 
trust as a basis for co-operation. However, POs fail to change modes of interaction and 
communication amongst fishers. Within the PO network there are informal subnetworks, differing in 
terms of interests and influences, and disagreeing on problems (e.g. resource status) and on how to 
deal with them. By enhancing their members’ social learning capacity, POs may increase their 
capacity to learn and cooperate with other actors in the sector. Leadership strategy, to encourage day-
to-day dialogue and deal with power relations, is essential in this respect. 
 
Key words: fishers; organizations; perceptions; social learning; adaptability. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the response of fishers – individual, communities and organizations – to policy has 
been identified as one of the key themes in the field of social sciences work on fisheries management 
and policy related research in Europe (Symes and Phillipson 2009, Symes and Hoefnagel 2010, 
Urquhart et al. 2011). Contributing to this are studies that explore fishers attitudes and perceptions to 
try to understand what motivates their decisions and responses to management measures and how 
this influences fishing strategies (Pita et al. 2013, Brewer 2013). Social science research in fisheries 
policy might expand from resilience theory and adaptive co-management, ‘more closely attuned to the 
needs of resource users’ and ‘more cognizant of learning and adapting’ (Berkes 2009:1698). 
Management instruments are seen as ‘learning by doing’ experiments, designed to continuously 
respond to changes in the ecosystem, using different knowledge about complex socio-ecological 
dynamics (Colding et al. 2003, Olsson et al. 2009, Plummer et al. 2012). Local stewards’ knowledge is 
especially relevant in this theory (e.g. Colding and Folke 2009). Fishers themselves are perceived as a 
memory pool, able to retain the memory of past events and provide adaptive response to future 
challenges (Berkes et al. 2001). Within the scope of learning literature (Grin and Loeber 2007), 
learning is located in communities engaged in practices.  
One important example of how fishery communities have organized themselves is Producers 
Organizations (POs). POs bring together fishers or fish farmers on a voluntary basis with the aim of 
planning their production to ensure the best market conditions for their fish. Members may sell their 
fish solely through the organization, using mainly fish auction markets or direct sale contracts. POs are 
allowed to use the market support funds, which ensure finance of withdrawing the surplus of the 
production and reintroducing it later on the market, when the price is more reasonable. The EU 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) regulation requires that fish POs draw up and implement an annual 
operational programme that includes a marketing strategy and a catch plan for the fisheries exploited 
by their members.  
Evaluations of fish POs during the 1990s from the UK (Young et al. 1996, Phillipson 1999, Hatcher 
1997), the Netherlands (Gibbs et al. 1994) and Denmark (Nielsen and Vedsmand 1997) have shown 
that POs play an important role in crisis management by increasing rule compliance, encouraging 
fishers to fish less and as an informative feedback channel to Government on experiences with 
regulations. Thus viewed, POs seem to act as a perfect foundation towards a policy of increased co-
management of EU fisheries (Young et al. 1996). However, POs' interests and concerns with stock 
management are disputed due to numerous structural and contextual issues (Phillipson 1999, Jentoft 
and Davis 1993). Externally, the complex EU regulatory context and a wider economic environment 
have caused the fish POs traditional marketing functions to erode. As follows, current reform of the 
CFP plans to gradually reduce and finally end with financial aid for withdrawing, considered 
unsustainable as it failed to solve the problem of overfishing.  
To respond to these challenges as well as to fluctuations in fish stocks, POs need to adapt, changing 
their production and marketing activities and internal structures to secure livelihoods for the long-term 
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(Berkes and Jolly 2001). The adaptability of fish POs to apparent changes in the fishery system 
depends, at least partly, on members’ behavior and adaptability. Conversely, a failure to understand 
how fishers perceive and make sense of their membership experience and what they learn from it may 
undermine PO performance. Furthermore, “dialogue” within the PO community is crucial to its capacity 
to learn and adapt in interaction with its environment.  
These issues may be better understood by drawing on insights from social learning literature. Social 
learning (Bandura 1977) has been recognized as a key dimension of adaptation (e.g. Lee 1993, 
Armitage and Plummer 2010, Johnson et al. 2012) and has become a prevalent approach to natural 
resources management (e.g. Schusler et al. 2003, Keen et al. 2005, Plummer 2006). However, there 
is no commonly accepted definition of the concept. Different interpretations of social learning may 
hamper its application. Responding to this call, Reed et al. (2010) characterize social learning as a 
change in understanding that goes beyond the individual, achieved through interactions between 
actors within the social group. In the same vein, Rodela (2011) identifies three social learning research 
perspectives: ‘individual-centric’, ‘network-centric’ and ‘system-centric’.  
For the context of POs a particularly relevant approach could be the ‘network-centric’ perspective, 
which emphasizes the potential of nurturing social learning within user groups or other network 
settings by experience shared between a community (fishers) around a specific practice (fishing) that 
is embedded within the learner context (fisheries) (Wenger 1998). Similar to this concept is 
Johannessen and Hahn’s (2012) spontaneous, self-organized and stable social learning as a result of 
‘professional day-to-day deliberations on the job’.  
The objectives of this study are to understand the potential and limitations of POs to foster social 
learning within their membership and their implications for POs adaptability to changes in the fishery 
system. To achieve this aim, fishers’ perceptions and interpretations of their experience as PO 
members are explored.  
 
The paper proceeds by setting out in a more detail the social learning analytical framework and our 
methodological choices. Section 3 provides a background of Portuguese purse seine POs, their 
relevance to fishery management and a short description of the case study – Propeixe PO. Section 4 
presents fishers ‘perceptions’ of their PO experience. Section 5 uses perceptions to unpack PO 
potential to foster social learning within its membership and discusses implications of these findings 
for POs adaptability to changes in the fishery system. Section 6 highlights the main conclusions and 
gives recommendations for practice.  
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5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
5.2.1 Analytical framework  
 
Our data collection and analysis followed an analytical framework (Figure 5-1), proposed earlier 
(Karadzic et al. 2013), based on work by Kolb (1984), Schusler et al. (2003), Reed et al. (2010), 
Rodela, (2011) and Johannesen and Hahn (2012).  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Social learning analytical framework 
  
This framework outlines what influences social learning (attributes) and what may be expected to 
change as a consequence of social learning (outcomes). The framework enables empirical 
identification of relevant attributes and explores relations between these attributes and outcomes.  
In order to understand POs potential to foster social learning it is critical to examine how PO members 
perceive their membership in relation to four issues (e.g. Young et al. 1996, Rodela 2011): i) PO 
membership incentives (for entering or exiting the PO); ii) satisfaction with PO membership experience 
(the effects on their fishing activity and business); iii) interactions within PO and relationships with 
other actors (the effects of PO membership experience on their mutual interaction and with other 
actors) and iv) dealing with everyday problems and opportunities, including the impact of PO 
membership in the generation of new knowledge. The first two issues represent the individual fishers’ 
perception of the ability of the collective organization to represent their needs, considered as key for 
the success of any management scheme (Young et al. 1996). The second two issues draw on ideas 
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about ‘network-centric’ social learning (Rodela 2011), which assume that learning within user groups 
is rooted in experience that is shared between other members. Table 5-1 outlines issues and 
examples of interview questions.   
Table 5-1: Example of interview questions 
Issues covered Example of questions Additional questions
Why did you become/remain a PO 
member?
Fishers asked to explain more in detail listed reasons
Why did you exit PO? Fishers with ‘double membership’ experience asked to 
explain reasons for exiting one PO
General PO performance; Fishery 
management; marketing of their 
products 
Satisfaction in general with the PO work and satisfaction in 
regard to the effects PO membership experience has on 
members fishing activity and fishing business, i.e. daily 
fishing limits, possibility of contracts, benefiting from the PO 
intervention mechanisms, i.e. withdrawal price and carry-over 
aid; fish price
Membership contact with the PO How many times / year you meet with other PO members at 
the PO offices; how these meetings look like? Do you think 
you are involved in PO decision-making process, i.e. rules 
design? What happens if some members disobey the rules? 
Mutual communication and 
relationships 
The effects of the PO membership experience on their 
mutual interaction and relationships and relationships with 
other actors: did your mutual interactions/relationships 
changed under the influence of PO? Did PO membership 
influenced change of relationship with other actors in the 
sector?
Relationship with other actors If yes, how it changed? If no, why you think this didn’t 
happen?   
iv) (Dealing with) everyday problems 
and opportunities
Fishers problem(s) framings, including 
the impact of PO membership on the 
generation of new knowledge
What problems you encounter on your everyday work: 
especially focusing on potential resource scarcity or market 
problems. What causes these problems? Where do you see 
solution? PO as a part of solution?  The effects of the PO 
membership experience on generation of new knowledge
i) PO membership incentives
ii) Satisfaction with PO membership 
experience
iii) Interactions within PO and 
relationships with other actors
 
 
5.2.2 Methodology 
 
Qualitative data was collected from semi-structured interviews (n=26), conducted between April 2011 
and February 2012. Interviews covered 15 of the 21 members of Propeixe (five of them are former 
members of Apropesca PO, Povoa de Varzim, Portugal) and two former Propeixe members (current 
members of Apara PO, Aveiro, Portugal). The interviewed fishers are ship-owners and ship-captains 
(e.g. father is a ship-owner; family relatives), aged 34 to 56. Most of them have long-standing 
experience in purse seine fishery, with a few exceptions of fishers who previously practiced small-
scale or coastal artisanal fishery. The Propeixe president and administrative officer were interviewed 
on several occasions to collect data on PO as well as to clarify certain issues raised during interviews 
with membership. In addition, management administration of Apropesca and Apara POs, one person 
from Anopcerco (Portuguese Association of Purse Seine Producer Organisations), and two 
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government representatives, were interviewed to understand the context of purse seine POs and their 
challenges. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.   
 
This sample size and interview format provided a rich data set, including detailed personal accounts 
and a meaningful perspective on PO membership experience. Interpretative analysis (Blaikie 2000) of 
interviews took place in three phases. Fishers’ accounts of their membership experience were first 
explored in relation to issues (Table 5-1). Within each issue, most relevant aspects were identified and 
presented - ‘perceptions’ (Results; Section 5.3). These aspects were not sought by the researcher but 
rather emerged as a predominant theme in response to questions (Table 5-1). We looked for accounts 
that were empirically based, i.e. differences in knowledge based on experience and age. Shared 
knowledge, e.g. observations shared by family (kinship) members, was also highlighted as valuable to 
the study. Excerpts from these accounts are included in the paper to help contextualize received 
information and observations.   
The second phase of analysis involved interpreting ‘perceptions’ in the context of social learning 
framework, by discussing them in terms of the potential social learning outcomes as well as the 
attributes that might lead to these outcomes (Figure 5-1). The aim was to infer what fishers learn from 
their PO membership experience and what has (not) changed as a result of this process - ‘social 
learning in PO’ (Discussion; subsection 5.4.1). The final stage of analysis involved understanding of 
how (lack of) learning through shared experience influence fishers’ collective ability to manage 
resources while adapting to pressures facing their livelihoods. To achieve this, ‘perceptions’ were 
analyzed in terms of opportunities and challenges they imply for ‘adaptability in POs’ (Discussion; 
subsection 5.4.2). 
 
The following section provides a brief explanation of the Portuguese purse seine fishery context and 
outlines the grounds for choosing Propeixe as a case study. 
 
5.2.3 Case study 
 
5.2.3.1 Portuguese purse seine fishery context 
There are currently 15 POs in Portugal, most of them founded around 1986, following Portugal’s 
adhesion to the European Community. From the 4653 licensed fishing vessels, 1525 (i.e.33%) belong 
to a PO, corresponding to 78% of the total landings at the national level20. Currently, 10 POs are 
involved in purse seine fishery (sardine, chub mackerel, horse mackerel and anchovy), as one of the 
key fishing activities in Portugal (Stratoudakis and Marçalo 2002). Sardine (Sardina pilchardus W.) is 
the main target species; approximately 98% of sardine and 85% of chub mackerel landings are carried 
                                                     
20 Personal conversation, with Manuela Duarte and Carlos Gonçalves, Direcção Geral das Pescas (DGPA; the 
Directorate General of Fishing), November 13, 2012.    
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out by vessels associated with POs (INE 2013).  
Sardine fishery is characterized by strong fluctuations, believed to be associated with environmental 
factors and climatic changes (Borges et al. 2003). Current knowledge is insufficient to fully understand 
or predict recruitment variability (MSC 2013), hence a precautionary approach is needed in relation to 
stock management (Almeida et al. 2013). The Atlanto-Iberian sardine stock is managed by Portugal 
and Spain through minimum landing size, maximum daily catch, limitations on fishing days and closed 
areas. In Portugal, POs involved in purse seine fishery are grouped in the Anopcerco (Portuguese 
Association of Purse Seine Producer Organisations), launched in 1993. Since 1997, landing limits 
have been set annually, and distributed among POs and a few non-associated vessels. Since 1999, 
POs in northern Portugal have voluntarily introduced daily landing limits on their vessels in an attempt 
to manage the annual quota of the PO as a function of local market-price fluctuations.   
In 2010, the purse-seine sardine fishery became the first Portuguese fishery to be considered a 
sustainable and well-managed fishery under the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification. In 
2012 the certification was suspended as the stock fell below the acceptable sustainable level. To 
tackle the suspension, a Sardine Commission made up of Anopcerco, Docapesca (regulating 
authority), the scientific body IPMA and the canned fish producers association ANCIP, chaired by the 
DGRM (government authority) became involved in the implementation of several measures including 
landing limits and a fishing ban during a period for each production region. An action plan for 2012-
2015 was adopted and the certification was reinstated in January 2013.  
 
5.2.3.2 Motivation for case selection  
Given the exploratory nature of our research, the Propeixe fish PO (further discussed in subsection 
3.3.) has been chosen as having strategic importance in testing the social learning idea within the 
theory of ‘how adaptability actually works’. Propeixe’s structure, i.e. small membership size and 
exclusive purse seine membership, enables in-depth exploration of learning processes (the objective 
of this paper) within a significant part of the organization. Due to ‘double’ membership experience of 
some fishers, the Propeixe case can reveal what may go wrong with the PO experience and how this 
relates to fishers' learning capacities. Finally, Propeixe can be considered as a representative example 
among purse seine POs in Portugal, due to its large production and grounded establishment.  
 
5.2.3.3 Propeixe PO  
The Propeixe fishers’ cooperative is located in the port of Matosinhos in the district of Oporto, north 
Portugal (Figure 5-2). 
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Figure 5-2: Location of the case study (Propeixe, Matosinhos) 
  
 
Historically, Matosinhos port is recognized for its organization (fishing rules) and good functioning of 
the fish auction system (diversity of buyers and competition among them).  
When Propeixe was formed in 1986 it had over 70 members. Currently it counts 21 members (ship 
owners), originating from Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde and Matosinhos. The urbanization of 
Matosinhos, combined with the abatement of vessels during the 1990s and lower profitability, led to 
the gradual disappearance of the fisher community. Propeixe membership further decreased due to 
the founding of new POs in neighboring ports, such as CentroLitoral in Figueira da Foz (formed in 
2000) and Apara in Aveiro (formed in 2010).  
Propeixe is well-known for its bylaws that refer to the practice allowed (exclusive purse seine) and 
vessel size (minimum 14m). Operational rules regulate fishing hours (fishery starts each day around 
midnight) and fish sale (one sale/day). Members are entitled to 190 fishing days/year. The main target 
species is sardine; other pelagic species, such as chub mackerel, horse mackerel and anchovy 
account for around 10 % of the total catch (Almeida et al. 2013). The crew includes between 21 and 
25 people and fishing takes place within the inner continental shelf off the mainland between landing 
ports Figueira da Foz and Viana do Castelo. The annual quota is managed through daily landing limits 
and a fishing ban that starts in the middle of February and can last until the end of March.  
Propeixe members’ production corresponds to 38% of the national sardine catch (Almeida et al. 2013); 
fish is sold through the fish auction system to processing industries and retailers (95,34%), or direct 
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sale contracts (4,66%)21. The main buyer is the canning industry: each day four members sell their fish 
through contracts with the industry. During the last decade, Propeixe has invested in land-based 
facilities. In 1996 it rented a fridge structure from Docapesca and started freezing, packaging and 
selling its own products. Other investments included a gasoline pump, fish transport forklifts and four 
vehicles (one with freezing storage). Propeixe is financed in a number of ways including entrance 
fees, landing levies and company earnings (freezing and packaging industry). It currently employs 10 
people working for the PO administration and 14 temporary workers in the freezing and packaging 
industry. Additionally, it introduced innovative services, creating a ‘Propeixe’ label, which is used for 
both canned and frozen fish.  
 
5.3 RESULTS: ‘PERCEPTIONS’  
 
As explained above, data analysis was performed in three main steps: 1) exploring fishers 
‘perceptions’ 2) inferring about ‘social learning’ from perceptions and 3) discussing implications for 
‘adaptability’ in PO. Findings are summarized in Table 5-2.  
 
5.3.1 PO membership incentives 
Economic power, common interests and need to belong 
First, Propeixe’s economic power was definitely the most dominant incentive for PO membership. All 
interviewed fishers recognized that the more assets a PO has the more beneficial it is to them. Fishery 
and commercialization benefits include: quota management, possibility of making contracts, use of 
intervention mechanisms, as well as providing better working conditions for its members. Conversely, 
lack of economic power, due to low captures or bad management, appears to be a prevailing reason 
for membership withdrawal. Fishers relate this to PO’s weak structural characteristics (e.g. lack of 
employed workers: the organization is usually managed by ship-owners who still exercise fishery, 
limiting their daily availability). One fisher with double membership experience commented on this in 
the following manner: ‘My father was a president of PO because of his experience as a fisher…he was 
almost illiterate…and he was never there because he was fishing. It can’t be like this. We need 
someone who is here all the time.’ Lack of capital additionally reflects absence of evolution and 
changing composition of the PO, which fishers themselves perceive as very negative as it fails to 
encompass their needs regarding fish marketing.  
Second, Propeixe’s (constitutional) rules on fishery type and vessel size brought together fishers with 
common interests. The homogenous nature of PO membership is perceived as important for fishery 
activity and business, as it facilitates PO management by increasing internal control amongst 
                                                     
21 Personal conversation, with Manuela Duarte and Carlos Gonçalves, Direcção Geral das Pescas (DGPA; the 
Directorate General of Fishing), November 13, 2012    
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members, summarized by one Propeixe member as: (‘It avoids conflict. There is no one to pull for his 
own art.’) Simultaneously, structural heterogeneity is seen to impede communication among members 
and implementation of common rules on resource use and may lead to members’ disunity. Fishers 
with double membership experience recalled how they felt about this internal dynamics: (‘When they 
(artisanal vessels) needed an organization we accepted them. We were sustaining that PO, but after a 
while they became the majority and in terms of voting they had more authority. The prey turned 
against the hunter! That’s why we agreed to leave and come here.’). Finally, conflicts of interest, 
experienced either as conflict with the leader or with other members, are likely to emerge as a reason 
to exit a PO, framed by one of the respondents as: (‘I left when interest of some members became 
more important than the rules of the PO.’) 
Finally, while economic incentives and common interest are listed as dominant reasons for 
membership, fishers ‘need for organization – to belong, to feel protected and secure’ remains an 
important background issue. (‘We are very aggressive when we go to the sea. But here...we don’t 
know how to defend ourselves.’). 
 
5.3.2 Satisfaction with PO membership experience  
Fishers expressed a high level of satisfaction with the effects POs have on their fishing activity and 
marketing practices and with contact from the PO to members.  
Rules, leadership and change 
PO bylaws on vessel size and fishery type increased members’ competition. Fishers view competition 
as vital for their activity and fish marketing as well as for organizational development – as one of them 
put it: ‘Competition is good for evolution.’ PO fishing rules (e.g. daily landing limits and fishing hours) 
brought changes in productive practices with the obvious market advantages for their members, 
currently perceived by all interviewed Propeixe members as: ‘The less fish I bring to land the more 
money I earn.’ Besides regulating offer and stabilizing fish price, members appreciate rules, as they 
increase internal discipline and trust in one another. (‘Here we are always controlled and this is good 
for us. Organization is like a police. Without a police there would be no respect and no understanding 
between fishers.’) Finally, satisfaction with rules relates to fishers ability to participate in rule design 
and enforcement. Younger Propeixe fishers commented on this issue in the following way: ‘Here, who 
decides on things are us. Because without the vessels Propeixe is nothing, and without Propeixe, 
vessels are still something!’ 
The current PO president is identified by all members as their principal leader and the main person 
responsible for internal discipline, demonstrated in the following statement: ‘If he wasn’t here I don’t 
know what would happen with us.’ His education and fishery experience make fishers trust his ability 
to communicate. They see the leader as someone who is necessary and crucial for both their jobs and 
their contact with the PO, articulated by one of the respondent as: ‘We will always need someone to 
lead us.’ Fishers highlight as very important their leader’s interest in, and capacity to, facilitate change, 
such as PO investments in freezing industry. This land-based facility enables improved use of 
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intervention mechanisms, perceived by fishers as beneficial for regulating the price of their products. 
Also, they acknowledge how he succeeded in transforming their mindset: from previously being 
reluctant to change and associated risks towards now appreciating organizational changes as being in 
their best interest. (‘Sometimes we don’t trust him...but when the time comes we see that he is right’).  
 
5.3.3 Interactions within PO and relationships with other actors   
Fishers articulated a quite consistent view of the effects of PO membership experience on their mutual 
interaction and with other actors. In sum, they argue that PO does not facilitate members’ mutual 
interactions, summarized by Propeixe eldest fisher as ‘There are no friendships in fisheries!’, nor 
substantially changes relationships with other actors in the sector.  
Subnetworks 
Twenty one Propeixe fishers are divided in five subnetworks or as they call them ‘marriages’. 
Members of one of these groups commented on this by saying that ‘People fall in love with a 
woman…here it is the same.’. ‘Marriages’ are based on their origin and family bonds. Both at sea and 
on land they are used to working and interacting within these subnetworks and defending their 
interests. As part of a close social circle, members do interact on a daily, informal level: they eat 
together, play cards, tell jokes or share information on basic community issues. However, concrete 
experiences with regard to production and market activities between subnetworks remain unspoken 
and hidden. This is framed by one fisher as: ‘If I could catch fish alone, I wouldn’t tell anyone; but I 
can’t, so I have a partnership with 4 vessels, but then what I do only my group knows’.  
Conflicts among members and examples of non-compliance are resolved through discussion and 
voting during PO meetings. Yet, the entire membership rarely meets. Contact with the PO is based on 
fishers informal communication with the leader who serves as a ‘listener’ and mediator of everyday 
problems, as demonstrated by following statement: ‘when we need something we speak with our 
president.’. Propeixe leader explained further how this communication strategy benefits PO 
performance: ‘Fishers are individualists…well, this creates difficulties in bringing them together…but 
their competition is what pulls Propeixe forward.’ Some fishers articulated that the direction of 
Propeixe is currently experiencing difficulties with internal discipline. (‘Now, we are 21 and if 15 want 
something and 6 do not, they say: ‘ok, if it is like this, then we are going’…and PO can’t do 
anything…it is a bad sign when you lose members.’)  
 
Mentality, history and tradition 
Elder fishers, with long-term membership, view the lack of interaction as a contemporary problem 
brought by the self-interest of their younger colleagues, expressed as: ‘young fishers have this idea of 
money: they want to earn everything today. Tomorrow is not important for them.’. Younger ones are 
also perceived as less respectful to their colleagues and to the resources, commented as ‘young 
fishers today think: ‘older ones…they didn’t know anything’…Ha! Everything we know today they 
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taught us! Young fishers know because they have technology…but this is only half of the way...older 
ones knew because of their experience, their way of dealing with nature…years they’ve lost to the 
sea, you could see these years…today it is very easy going at sea.’ Thus, they are often less adherent 
to collective actions, e.g. fishing hours and fishing ban. 
Conversely, according to PO membership, the past still conditions their relationships with other actors 
in the sector. The historical interdependency of actors is perceived as an important part of the social 
fabric of the Matosinhos community, demonstrated by the Propeixe leader comment: ‘we can’t live 
without each other’. There is a canning industry, which is an icon of the region, two dominant regional 
retailers (freezing and packaging industry), numerous smaller retailers and the regulating authority, 
Docapesca. Interdependency is maintained through PO market philosophy, ‘keeping well for 
everyone,’ where competition is nurtured within membership and others, i.e. the canning industry and 
retailers are seen as partners. PO members do complain about some ingredients of these 
relationships, i.e. the sardine price they pay through contracts with the canning industry. One of 
interviewed fisher perceived this issue as: ‘They are the most secure clients, but the price is not 
reasonable’. However, they doubt PO capacity to foster change on this issue, articulated by the other 
member as: ‘PO cannot give the orders to the industry.’ 
 
5.3.4 What has (not) been learned: problems and opportunities   
All interviewed fishers recognize radical change, recapped in the excerpt: ‘the less fish I bring–the 
more money I earn’, in both their fishery and marketing practices induced by the PO. Another issue 
they articulated as being obtained from their membership concerns their own increased appreciation 
of change as something beneficial both individually and collectively. 
This being said, fishers’ subnetworks have different views of the problems their fishery is facing, such 
as resource scarcity, sardine price, catch limits, price of gasoline, commercial sellers who 
generally dictate prices, lack of government support, lack of communication between purse seine POs, 
amongst others. However, from these, the two most relevant issues that arise are resource state and 
sardine price.  
 
Resource state 
Even though all fishers talk about resources, they lack agreement on resource state and the 
consequent need for resource management. There are two opposing views on this matter. About half 
of the interviewed PO members look at the resource as a never-ending asset: they do not perceive 
sardine scarcity, or see it as a temporary problem, caused by others.  These ‘non-concerned’ fishers 
support theories that temporary lack of sardine is a cyclical fluctuation caused by environmental 
factors and climatic changes. (‘They always evaluate stocks in periods when there is no sardine, when 
it is cold…fish also feel cold…’). Likewise, ‘non-concerned’ fishers respond to the ‘temporary’ decline 
by ‘looking for sardine more intensively’ and catching what is available. In the long term, certain 
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scarcity is viewed as positive for their business, illustrated by the following statement: ‘The less 
sardine there are, the more money it will give us’.  
The other half of the interviewed fishers, the ‘concerned’ ones, are continuously alert to apparent 
decline in sardine stock. In their own experience and memory the problem of sardine scarcity is 
caused by: i) weak implementation of the fishing ban: (‘When some POs stop, others work. (In the last 
5 years) we have stopped doing this and we are already paying for it’); ii) fishers self-interest / 
competition: (‘if I catch more than I can bring to land I will throw away the rest. I’m not giving to the 
others…if I give them I will earn less…I am against this, but I do the same’.); iii) non-PO members’ 
activity (‘It’s a crime how small vessels work. They fish close to the coast and they kill juvenile fish’); 
and iv) advanced technology (‘Arms are more deadly today, so our vessels are looking for something 
that before was very difficult to find’). For ‘concerned’ fishers catching what is available is part of an 
irreversible change they are afraid of, articulated by the eldest Propeixe member as: (‘if we depended 
only on sardines we would die’.) They argue that the entire purse seine fishery community should 
reduce or stop fishing entirely (during the fishing ban) in order to reduce the pressure on the fish stock 
and increase profitability. Benefits of the fishing ban are viewed in the following manner: (‘sometimes 
when we do not work we earn more than when we work’.) 
 
Sardine price 
Fishers’ subnetworks agree on this problem and perceive sardine price as low, especially the price 
they get from the canning industry. Most fishers perceive this as an ‘acceptable’ problem the PO 
cannot do anything about. (‘The price of our fish has been stagnating for a long time and it will stay 
like this.) They view price as a result of traditional interdependency between the fishers community 
and the canning industry. The continuous industry demand for high quantities of fish gives security to 
the PO, but requires low prices, commented by the Propeixe leader as: (‘low sardine prices give a 
certain stability to the entire sector.’)  
The issue of low price is further related to competition with other purse seine POs and with other 
dominant buyers in the region, as ‘sardine is everywhere, from north to south’. Finally, fishers label 
sardine price as a ‘psychological price’ that reflects established consumer habits and current 
willingness to pay for canned sardines, which is traditionally low. (‘If you, as a buyer, see a can of 
sardines in the supermarket that costs twice the usual, you will say: ‘what is this?’...and you will end 
up buying two steaks, because everyone is used to sardines being cheap. This can shake the canning 
industry, and us.’) 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
 
5.4.1 Social learning in PO 
As explained in subsection 2.2, fishers ‘perceptions’ are used to infer conditions leading to social 
learning and potential outcomes (Figure 5-1).   
5.4.1.1 Re-considered / changed learners’ attitude and behavior  
Social learning processes at a deeper level may (or may not) encourage a change in behavior (Reed 
et al. 2010). Learning may lead to behavioural change if there is an incentive for such change (van de 
Graaf and Grin 1999). Through (economically rewarded) PO experience fishers learned to think 
differently about their business and accordingly behave differently, ‘less fish I bring– more money I 
earn’. This confirms the assumption that learning within user groups is rooted in experiences and 
results from a change in how things are done (Rodela 2011). Other learning incentives are fishers 
subjective needs, ‘to belong, to feel protected and secure’, based on individual experience, mainly 
‘how it feels to work alone’. PO economic power and how leadership uses this power to satisfy fishers 
needs, creates member security and satisfaction with their jobs, which may increase their learning 
capacity. Gutierrez et al. (2011) identify strong leadership as the most important attribute contributing 
to success of fisheries. Our results verify that PO leadership personal characteristics, i.e. expertise 
(experience), competence (education), daily presence and communication skills are essential for 
shaping fishers’ attitudes towards work and day-to-day practice.  Moreover, leadership interest in PO 
structural change and consequent commercial benefits for fishers encouraged them to accept 
collective responsibilities and think in a collective manner about their livelihoods. This has resulted in 
‘shared wisdom’ on how much change is important for their activity as well as for PO adaptation to 
external pressures.   
 
5.4.1.2 Re-considered / changed learners’ relationships  
Social learning contributes to co-management by identification of common purpose and transformation 
of relationships to collaborative ones, i.e. strengthening good relationships, transforming adversarial 
ones and creating new relationships (Schusler et al. 2003). Our results demonstrate that fishing 
practice of PO community strengthens already good social networks in the region, providing the 
context through which community bonds, as found in other studies (Ross 2013). Our results also show 
that, internally, through its rules, Propeixe succeeded in transforming relationships among its 
members. PO rules brought together fishers with common interests, which enhanced membership 
interdependency. Members’ common interests facilitated (fishing) rules compliance and implied fewer 
management problems for the PO. Through experience over a long time and learning that others obey 
the rules, fishers learned to trust each other. Relations of trust, based on fishers’ self-commitment to 
follow the rules (Ostrom 1990) are prerequisite for their cooperation and social learning (Berkes 2009, 
Gilmour et al. 2013).  
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Yet, the study of Propeixe also indicates that there are issues on which no social learning, leading to 
common understanding has been achieved. Important differences remained within Propeixe regarding 
resource state and sardine prize. These two issues highlight that although trust exists among 
membership at the PO level, there are also smaller networks of fishers (subnetworks), with differing 
interests and influences, amongst whom there is even more trust. Subnetworks share family and 
kinship relations, found to be of vital importance in how the Portuguese live and work with one another 
(Solsten 1993). Trust within subnetworks works out and is maintained through family bonds, thus 
seemingly more a priori given, than an achievement, as was the case for the PO as a whole.   
As a result, the potential for social learning is undermined. Subnetworks competition, nurtured by the 
PO itself as good for fishers productive and marketing practices, negatively impacts their interaction 
and the development of relationships. Moreover, subnetworks relationships depend on membership 
size. Smaller POs may experience difficulties in introducing strict discipline, as the PO is afraid of 
losing members (Phillipson 1999). Our results confirm these findings. As perceived by some fishers, 
outnumbered groups might use this fact to influence the decision-making process or slightly ‘bend’ 
jointly agreed rules. Moreover, our findings indicate that PO policies are influenced by different 
economic capacities of subnetworks and the consequent power relations this might create. As 
Propeixe lives from its members’ production, those who fish more and bring more economic capital to 
the PO may gain more power in decision-making processes, reducing members’ interdependency and 
capacity for collective learning.  
One might think that lack of internal discipline could eventually lead to general distrust in PO, yet it 
does not happen due to leadership capacity to overcome these problems by reconciling subnetworks’ 
interests. Thus our findings confirm, in a way, Ison et al ‘s (2007: 508) claim that “cross-scale networks 
characterized by strong linkages and nesting hold the potential to create opportunities for actors 
operating at broader scales to mobilize knowledge and exert power over local resource users” - but 
adds as a key factor trust in leadership at these broader scales.  
 
5.4.1.3 Re-considered / shared problem understanding 
Social learning may promote the generation of new knowledge, e.g. problems and opportunities, areas 
of agreement and disagreement (Schusler et al. 2003). Users’ ability to agree on resource related 
problems and resource status is vital for their collective action in the scope of adaptive co-
management (Ostrom 2005, Gilmour 2013). Propeixe fishers’ diverse problem(s) formulations show 
that the PO hardly influenced knowledge sharing among members on problem(s) pertinent to their 
fishery. One might understand this as a reflection of the fact that the fisheries problem is an 
unstructured one: actors disagree as how precisely to define it as there is no certainty about relevant 
knowledge and no consensus on values at stake (Hoppe 2010). Resource state is especially relevant 
in this aspect. Opposite views on this problem and ways of dealing with it show that Propeixe fishers 
agreement on rules for managing the resources does not necessarily result in mutual learning on 
resource status. This may partly be explained by subnetworks dynamics within the PO. Subnetworks 
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who share family and kinship relationships communicate better and have similar knowledge; their 
reluctance to share these framings limits PO learning capacity.   
The second problem, the price of sardines for the canning industry, is a shared, unstructured problem 
among PO fishers. Prolonged sardine scarcity might lead to an increase in price. Instead of perceiving 
this as potentially beneficial for fish marketing, fishers react counter-intuitively: they fear this change 
because they doubt the adaptive response of the canning industry and the consumer. Moreover, they 
fear their own adaptability since they recall that purse seine vessels are structurally rigid (equipment, 
design), which makes the switch to another type of fishery hard to accomplish. Collective awareness 
of low sardine price creates the potential for building shared knowledge and finding solutions to the 
problem. In other words, fishers might learn from this problem.  
Still, variations in problem framing reveal fishers awareness on PO need to adapt to overfishing, 
environmental conditions and problems with market and regulations. The important question is then to 
what extent fishers with various problem understandings contribute to social learning. Bommel et al 
(2009) argue that one of the pre-conditions to be met for the social learning process is precisely a 
divergence of actors’ interests, with conflicting or competing claims. From this viewpoint, PO 
members’ different problem framings, as a ‘multiple source of knowledge’ (Schusler et al. 2003), might 
be essential for learning, and thus adaptability, by diversifying the possible responses to changes and 
uncertainties.   
 
5.4.2 Adaptability in PO 
Learning can be seen as a process of change in the way fishers perceive their world – their thoughts, 
feelings, relationships and actions. Social learning in PO implies that fishers share these perceptions 
and learn through shared experiences, which may diversify their responsiveness to changes in fishery 
system and increase their livelihood options.  
5.4.2.1 Opportunities  
Our findings suggest that social learning in PO occurs in layers. The first layer implies the level of the 
PO network as a whole, where learning is nurtured through members’ individual satisfaction with the 
PO’s work. Secure in their jobs and trusting each other to keep the rules going, members trust PO 
ability to collectively represent their needs in the sphere of fish production and commercialization. 
Extended engagement with the PO is pertinent in this aspect as both trust building and social learning, 
as key determinants in building adaptive capacity, are long-term concerns (Armitage and Plummer 
2010). By experiencing change, i.e. change in management practices and structural change of PO, 
fishers realized that although they do not control all the conditions that affect them they might change 
some of them. In short, they learned to sustain themselves through change via adaptation and 
occasional transformation.  
Furthermore, the framework used for data analysis revealed a positive feedback of outcomes on the 
attributes. For example, trust is actually increasing through a positive feedback of outcomes, such as 
90 
 
members’ security and confidence (including trust) on the conditions that promote social learning 
(Figure 5-1). This feedback loop is promising for the POs role over time and their adaptability to 
contemporary problems. 
 
5.4.2.2 Challenges 
The second layer reaches the PO membership. Our results suggest that in contemporary fisheries, the 
culture of the ‘self’ among fishers may increase over time as the ‘contemporary fisher’ lacks the 
interest to learn through shared experience. Furthermore, fishers’ compliance with rules seems to 
decrease amongst the younger generation of fishers, also found by Ballestro et al. (2013). Due to PO 
age structure this could be worrisome for PO adaptability in the future as elder fishers memory of past 
events, i.e. environmental fluctuations, might provide a basis for adaptability through modification of 
rules in periods of change and crisis (Berkes and Folke 2002). 
Our findings also reveal that ‘ensuring the best marketing conditions for their products’ is still by far the 
most important incentive for PO membership, as ‘learning together to manage together’ (Ridder et al. 
2005) sometimes works against their interest (‘might earn less’) and mentality (‘want to earn 
everything today’). This decreases members’ ability to agree and act collectively on resource related 
problems. Hence, it may be interpreted as evidence of weak PO adaptability. ‘Non-concerned’ fishers 
views on decline of sardine stocks, i.e. compensation with other species or increase of fishing effort 
are especially worrisome in this aspect. This type of reaction indicates signs of so-called ‘short-term 
positive’ fishers adaptation that may in the end force them out of business (Cinner et al. 2011). The 
2012 suspension of MSC certification for the Portuguese sardine fishery provides evidence for this 
concern.  
 
5.4.2.3 Why the positive outweighs the negative  
However, Pretty (2003) argues that this is a typical manner of thinking for fishing communities 
worldwide: they hardly appreciate that what they are doing might be harmful on a wider scale. That is 
why cooperation with other institutions is needed. Some signs of resource scarcity are potentially 
powerful attributes in stimulating users need to manage for the future (Ostrom 2009). The temporary 
crisis of the sardine stock that led to suspension of the MSC certification for the Portuguese sardine 
fishery triggered collaboration and collective actions within the purse seine fishing community. 
Learning in this process has been operationalized as a change in management practices at higher 
levels, e.g. policy, with interest in ecosystem responses, and finally as a certification reinstatement. 
Enabling legislation and commitment from higher order institutions is crucial to support knowledge co-
production for learning and adaptation (Armitage et al. 2011). PO might contribute to co-management 
of fisheries as a local institution that monitors and responds to environmental feedback (Olsson et al. 
2004) to assure appropriate follow-up of this collaboration and learning to deal with change. In other 
words, PO adaptability should be observed both within as well as in the context of its interactions with 
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other institutions. 
Table 5-2: Summary of findings  
Issues Aspects 
(emerged from 
interviews)
Attributes Outcomes Opportunitie
s
Challenges
Changes in practices
Economic and other 
incentives
Mutual interdependence
Constructive conflicts and 
facilitation
Identification of common 
purpose and enhanced 
membership interdependency; 
less management problems for 
the PO;
Increase of membership 
competition (b)
 
Power
Ownership
Change of practices
Experience (reflection on 
concrete experience)
Ownership 
Trust
Leadership Satisfaction and confidence in 
PO, appreciation and interest in 
change (a)
Change in practices
Constructive conflicts and 
facilitation
Internal discipline and enhanced 
trust;
Trust Dependence on leader for 
communication  (b)
Change of existing 
assumptions
Lack of interaction
Group dynamics
Trust; Power 
Divergence of actors’ 
interest –competing claims
Lack of reflection on 
concrete experience 
Leadership 
Lack of communication and 
knowledge sharing
‘money-driven’ young fishers 
mentality (a)
Lack of reflection on 
concrete experience
Less respect and less 
obedience (b)
Mutual interdependence
Challenging existing 
assumptions
Different problem 
formulations
Multiple source of 
knowledge
Lack of agreement on problems 
(c) X X
Multiple source of 
knowledge
Experience (reflection on 
concrete experience)
Crisis moments or issues of 
high concern
Knowledge sharing 
Mutual interdependence
No challenging of existing 
assumptions
Sardine price Shared problem among 
membership; uncertainty on 
issues at stake; acceptance of 
problem and fear of change (c)
X X
X
History and 
tradition
Security and stability; embedded 
problems, i.e. sardine price (b) X X
Problems & 
opportunities
Resource state Opposite views of the problem 
(c)
X
Leadership and 
change
X X
Interactions Subnetworks Strengthening of already good 
relationships, i.e. family bods 
and friendships; subnetworks 
competition, power of 
outnumbered subnetworks (b)
X
Mentality
X
Need to belong Fulfilment of subjective needs - 
protection and empowerment (a)
X
Satisfaction Rules Increase of internal discipline 
and control; enhanced trust in 
each other; enhanced members 
self-commitment to follow the 
rules (b)
X
1. PERCEPTIONS - PO 
EXPERIENCE
2. SOCIAL LEARNING IN PO  3. ADAPTABILITY IN PO
Incentives Economic power Security and satisfaction with the 
jobs, new job attitude - ‘less fish 
I bring– more money I earn’ (a)
X
Common interest
X
 
(a) Re-considered / changed learners' attitude and behavior; (b)  Re-considered / changed learners'  
relationships; (c ) Re-considered / shared problem understanding. 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In line with the exploratory nature of the study, the conclusion section explicitly presents findings as 
inputs for further research.  
POs may make a difference with regard to fishers' adaptability to changes in the fishery system by 
stimulating social learning. The following attributes are essential in this regard: change in practices, 
economic and other incentives, rules and trust in leadership. Moreover, POs add to a mere market 
structure the properties of network coordination: interdependency and trust as a basis for co-
operation. Trust between fishers is achieved through experience over a long time and learning that 
others obey the rules set by the PO. This brings members security for their livelihoods and further 
increases trust and confidence within the PO. Finally, trust within the PO is maintained through the 
confidence in the leader and his ability to communicate, enforce rules and foster change. Thus POs 
indeed represent the sort of arrangement which Ostrom and the co-management literature (e.g. 
Ostrom 1990, Berkes 2009) call for, as it may help promote the adaptability needed.  
However, limited interaction among members may limit the potential for social learning, making the PO 
less adaptive than it otherwise might have been. Our study indicates that even within a homogenous 
PO membership smaller subnetworks of fishers who are socially close to each other, e.g. through 
kinship relations or old ties between families, may occur. As trust within these subnetworks is much 
larger than trust between members from different subnetworks, this may hamper learning within the 
PO as a whole. In addition, different mentalities among the members, i.e. younger and older fishers, 
tend to limit proper interaction and knowledge sharing within the PO. This has resulted in a lack of 
agreement on problems pertinent to their fishery and eventual differences between subnetworks in 
how they deal with them.  
In order to play a more significant role for fishers’ adaptability through stimulating social learning, POs 
should serve their membership as much a possible through proper management and fulfillment of 
market responsibilities. They should provide members with the resources — daily support, commercial 
contracts and land-based facilities— to increase satisfaction and security in their jobs as fishers. 
Probably more important, though, is to promote interactions and communication between fishers so as 
to reduce the constraints to learning amongst them. To that end, POs leaders might for instance 
promote membership meetings on shared concerns and issues as they arise. This would create 
conditions for members to deliberately discuss and negotiate rules, power relations and marketing 
strategy. By improving conditions for membership collective learning, POs enhance their adaptive 
response to pressures in fisheries; furthermore they increase their capacity to learn with and from 
other actors in the sector, which is crucial for fisheries co-management. 
Further research should involve different examples of fish POs to understand how different contexts 
(e.g. ecological contexts, heterogeneous membership) and power dynamics influence the ability of 
POs to foster social learning and adaptability. It is important to validate the social learning model 
applicability to analyze how POs communicate with each other and how communication occurs across 
organizational levels. 
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CHAPTER 6 - DISCUSSION: THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS OF ADAPTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Caterpillar was the first to speak. 
'What size do you want to be?' it asked. 
'Oh, I'm not particular as to size,' Alice hastily replied; 'only one doesn't like changing so often, you 
know.' 
'I DON'T know,' said the Caterpillar. 
 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll, 1865  
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DISCUSSION: THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF ADAPTATION 
 
Many have claimed that complex problems of globalized society challenge its adaptive capacity (e.g. 
Folke et al. 2005, Hughes et al. 2007, Carpenter and Brock 2008). In this context, institutions that 
manage human –nature relationships must be transformed to better match the complexity and 
dynamics of the planet’s biophysical systems, while also dealing with humans’ capacities to overuse 
these systems (e.g. Folke et al. 1998b, Young et al. 2008, Deadlow et al. 2013). Nevertheless, there is 
widespread evidence that human adaptation in the Anthropocene is not on the path of social-
ecological resilience (e.g. Rockström et al. 2009, Gerst et al. 2014). As a result, a deeper 
understanding of how organizations in particular institutional contexts can improve social resilience 
(e.g. Boyd and Folke 2011, Hall and Lamont 2012) and how this contributes to overall social-
ecological resilience is required.  
This thesis explored this claim by focusing on adaptive resource users’ organizations contribution to 
resilience and by investigating four central questions:  
rq#1) how can we conceptualize adaptability of  resource users’ organizations?  
rq#2) what can we learn from cases of such organizations and the degree to which, and how,  
factors from our framework influence (enable or undermine) organizational adaptability? 
rq#3) how may organizational adaptability contribute to improving social resilience?  
rq#4) what are the challenges for adaptability - when and why may organizational adaptability 
fail as a social source of  resilience?   
In this Chapter, the research questions will be discussed through a reflection on the findings presented 
in Chapters III – V. 
To explore these issues, the Discussion chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a 
summary of the work developed with the fish POs from Portugal: it describes how organizational 
adaptability was analyzed, what are the main results and their interaction, which answers rq#1 and 
rq#2. Based on the case studies, the next section answers rq#3 by identifying three layers of social 
resilience and adaptability, and introduces several key ideas behind these layers that increase the 
organizational contribution to social resilience. This is followed by a section that discusses specific 
examples of situations where PO’s adaptation failed to contribute to social-ecological resilience, and a 
section which identifies reasons behind this, discussed as societal limits to adaptation and resilience. 
Together these two sections answer rq#4. The final chapter of the thesis then reflects on the 
implications of this set of observations for human and institutional capacity to deal with change.   
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6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
In Chapter III (Paper I) resilience and organizational literature formed the analytical basis to develop a 
framework to analyze organizational adaptability. Integration of these theories on the case of a specific 
PO (ArtesanalPesca, Sesimbra) allowed us respond to rq#1 and contributed to responding rq#2. 
Though SES literature provides initial frameworks to study SESs from a social science perspective 
(e.g. Ostrom 2009), this model was chosen as it focuses on organizational behaviour and explicitly 
includes organizational learning theories into resilience concepts. It was found that the key dimensions 
relevant when analyzing adaptability in resource users’ organizations are external (panarchy of 
contexts, long-term historical trends and evidence of crisis) and internal (organizational structure and 
processes). The framework also brought together, on the basis of the existing literatures, the various 
factors thought to influence organizational adaptability, including questions that enable their 
‘measuring’.  
Chapter III further discussed their relevance by exploring one specific PO case in these terms by 
triangulating various sources of data and factors included in the model. Empirical exploration of 
relative weight and the relations between these factors contributed to provide a first answer to rq #2. 
Main factors found to enable adaptability in this specific case were the ecological context (e.g. 
monopoly over the fish species), evidence of crisis, structural change, and above all, leadership 
capacity to foster learning and collective action essential to deal with crisis. Furthermore, the empirical 
work illustrated the ways in which PO adaptive response relates to its capacity to manage production 
and market demand and how it contributes to overall fisheries resilience (rq#1). The chapter 
concluded with the ideas on how this adaptability might be translated into resource management 
practices (i.e. ‘making sense’ of crisis, practicing adaptability through learning and planning 
transitions), which partly answered rq#3. Nevertheless, it remained ambiguous what was the exact 
weight of the ecological context in this case (e.g. the black scabbard fish monopoly) and how it 
simplified PO adaptive response.  
Hence, in order to further develop our answer to rq#2, we wanted to explore how different contextual 
(i.e. physical system; market institutions) settings impact PO adaptive response and if theoretical 
notions of adaptation (the same factors that influence adaptability) are also valid. To achieve this, in 
Chapter IV (Paper II) the same framework was applied to twelve cases of POs, each of which has 
been investigated on the basis of narrative interviews with key leaders in charge of POs. Comparisons 
of POs in terms of contexts, organizational structures, awareness of problematic trends and crisis and 
type of response contributed to clarifying different modes of adaptability amongst PO (anticipatory, 
maladaptive and reactively adaptive). Modes are found to be contingent to contexts (´convenient’ or 
‘bad’) and types of change or trends (e.g. ‘slow’ environmental change, market crisis, transformational 
change and inertia or resistance to change).  
Furthermore, this chapter made it possible to answer rq#2 by identifying key factors that explain 
different degrees of adaptability: prejudiced market regime, prevalence of specific fishery and market 
crisis as contextual conditions; and leadership, trust and perception of self-interest as agency features, 
whose impact depends on organizational processes such as learning and collaboration with the 
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demand side. On the one side, the study demonstrated that internal adaptation could improve POs’ 
contribution to fishery management and resilience (rq#1). On the other, however, it emphasized that 
continuous maladaptation practices of some POs point at a basic institutional problem (fish market 
regime), which clearly reduces system resilience as it promotes overfishing. Finally, the weight of 
agency, including subjective attitude towards adaptation, was revealed as crucial for organizational 
adaptability hence the initial framework was revised to include this dimension (contribution to rq#1).  
Consequently, Chapter V (Paper III) further explored the importance and nature of agency for internal 
adaptation by exploring this in one PO case (Propeixe, Matosinhos) in more detail. It was partly based 
on ethnographic research, as this suited that question. This chapter aimed to understand how 
individual fishers’ (PO members) behaviour and perceptions influence adaptability of organization, 
thus contributing to answer the rq#1. It was confirmed that the POs’ adaptability depends in part on 
the way fishers perceive their membership experience (i.e. membership incentives; satisfaction with 
membership experience; mutual interactions and relationships with others; and dealing with everyday 
problems, including the impact of PO on the generation of new knowledge), by means of perceptions’ 
direct impact on fishers’ behaviour and motivations to learn from each other. As a result, this chapter 
emphasized the learning dimension of adaptation, proposed earlier (Chapters III and IV), while 
zooming-in on the importance of ‘network-centric’ social learning (Rodela 2011 and Wenger 1998) - as 
a key strategy for organizational adaptation (contribution to rq#3). By studying perceptions in terms of 
social learning impact, this study found additional factors viewed to contribute to organizational 
adaptability such as changes in practices, economic and ‘need to belong’ incentives, rules and trust in 
leadership, which foster interdependency and trust (contribution to rq#2). Nevertheless, the study 
demonstrated that certain institutional aspects of fisheries exist, like incentives, social and cultural 
issues, etc. that limit fishers’ interaction and communication and hence their collective learning. As a 
result, even fishers (PO members) who share a common interest disagree on problems pertinent to 
their fishery (e.g. resource status) and on how to deal with them, which may inhibit their capacity to 
adapt to environmental changes.  
The framework for analyzing adaptability in resource users organizations has evolved throughout the 
empirical work, from context, crisis, structure and processes as basic framework elements (Chapter 
III), to a more in-depth exploration of the learning dimension of adaptability and recognizing the weight 
of individual agency (Chapter IV and V), to thinking about how types of crisis and associated risks 
impact adaptability in organizations (Chapter IV). The case studies reveal how each element of the 
organizational adaptability model, and most importantly, their mutual interactions, matter to 
organizational problem framing, understanding of change and consequent response. Analytically, the 
framework may inform an organization on how different agency, structure and processes may 
influence their adaptability to the specific contextual settings and changes within. 
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6.2 ADAPTABILITY AS A SOCIAL SOURCE OF SYSTEM RESILIENCE   
The above described work contributed to SES literature by paying attention to the dimension of 
societal resilience (e.g. Adger 2000, Hall and Lamont 2012) in the context of resource users’ 
organizations. Based on the case studies, this section identifies three layers below as layers of that 
issue and introduces key ideas institutions may employ to increase their social resilience (rq#3).  
This section also tentatively answers our main research question: how may social adaptability 
contribute to overall system resilience? Tentatively, because there are some limits to that answer, as 
we will discuss in the next section, thus answering rq#4 with some qualifications to answer to our main 
research question. 
1) adaptability -  accepting change and disturbances; 
Embedding in both resilience and complexity thinking is the management of social-ecological systems 
that implies embracing change, rather than focusing on the need to control nature and keep the 
system in some optimal state (e.g. Anderies et al. 2006, Rogers et al. 2013). Internal adaptation in the 
Propeixe PO case (Chapter V) illustrates how organizational openness to change contributes to both 
social and ecological resilience: 1) acceptance of system’s low stability (e.g. fluctuations in sardine 
productivity), 2) anticipation of consequences (e.g. irregular supply and price) and 3) thinking of ways 
to increase fishers’ resilience to environmental change and regulate fish production (e.g. changed 
institutional rules on fishery practices, or land-based facility to control supply). ArtesanalPesca’s 
reorganization and creativity in response to market crisis (Chapter III) further strengthens the idea of 
perceiving crisis as opportunities (e.g. Folke et al. 2010), as they ask for rapid changes in the way we 
understand the world and the way we behave, critical to deal with social-ecological complexity (e.g. 
Rogers et al. 2013).  
Adaptation as acceptance of change and complexity also calls attention to the networks that are part 
of institutional contexts, which requires re-thinking relationships – the effects that our actions 
(openness vs. resistance to change) have on others. POs that demonstrated the capacity to actively 
adapt to market or environmental change (Chapter IV) could not achieve this without support from 
their membership or through networks of relationships with other actors, perceived as partners in the 
adaptation process. Networking and building knowledge (e.g. Olsson et al. 2007) is particularly 
relevant for resource users capacity to deal with environmental surprises, framed by Gunderson et al. 
(1997) as Type II surprise - a collective action problem where individuals are not independent and 
need to act in concert.  
Conversely, cases of resistance and inertia amongst fishers (Chapters III and IV) to PO adaptation 
response (e.g. new market strategy) revealed a dominant reductionist mode of thinking: unlike 
incremental change, fishers resist to a transformation of market institutions due to the impacts and 
disturbances it may create (e.g. fishery practices, tension between group and self-interest, power 
relationships, etc.), which they cannot control and seem to be uneasy with. Institutional adaptability as 
accepting change and complexity help to enlarge what Rodgers et al. (2013) call the problem space – 
which again increases people’s ability to manage for resilience. In this context, if adaptability as an 
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organizational strategy changes the context (introduction of different kinds of change), organization 
(through its structures and mechanisms) needs to inform membership and help them recognize, 
beyond mental inertia, interconnectedness of things – e.g. in a context of POs how new market rules, 
which ask for collective responsibility, aid price stability (social resilience) hence decreasing fishery 
efforts (ecological resilience).  
2) adaptability – (individual and social) learning from change; 
In the scope of organizational literature, organizational learning, framed as deeper learning, i.e. double 
and triple-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978) implies collective environments where people reflect 
on problems and challenge their assumptions (Senge 1990) or even the whole frame of reference 
before acting (Raelin 2001). We can refer here to the ArtesanalPesca case (Chapter III), where active 
re-framing of the problem domains (Gunderson et al. 2006) and consequent experimentation with 
land-based facilities helped the organization to redefine market structure, adapt to fluctuations in 
market demand and increase its market power. In other words, the organization learned to think 
holistically about its role in terms of contribution to the resilience of the system in which it is operating. 
Propeixe study (Chapter V) reinforces the importance of social (experiential) learning as a key strategy 
for organizational adaptability. People learn socially (collaboratively) within the community of practice 
(fishers – PO members) around a specific practice (fishing) (Wenger 1998) – which is in fact the ‘glue’ 
for the co-evolutionary relationship between PO’s, industry, auctioneers, etc. on the one hand and fish 
stocks on the other.    
Adaptation as learning from change and mistakes calls for attention to the institutional context – how 
attributes of institutions, including organizations, might be designed and managed to nurture learning 
(Boyd and Folke 2011). 
Our work contributes to literature by revealing three concerns in this respect. First, several case 
studies indicate the problematic of fishers’ internal interaction and communication (e.g. Chapters IV 
and V), which seriously limits PO capacity to respond to change and crisis. Homogenous membership 
structure of Propeixe case (Chapter V) offers a rather pessimistic outlook on opportunities for learning 
within other POs, where different interests and practices might inhibit sharing of experience and 
reflecting on it. As demonstrated by our findings, the incentive structure matters to this problem: when 
the institutional embedment of a PO promotes competition and self-interest, this constrains fishers’ 
learning and cooperative action. To deal with this issue, resource users’ organizations need to 
elaborate mechanisms that match other incentives, i.e. ‘need to belong’ incentive (Chapter V), while 
enabling increase of membership sensation of protection, security and ownership. The same case 
also indicated how membership common interest increases organizational performance due to high 
competitiveness, but works in an opposite way for adaptability as it may reduce the likelihood of 
learning. To increase resilience by increasing diversity, which broadens the scope of a vision 
necessary to adapt to changes, bonding links from informal institutions (e.g. social ties between family 
or kinship members based on same fishery) need to be combined with bridging links to a 
heterogeneous web of resources (e.g. experimentation with other types of fishery) and associated 
opportunities (Newman and Dale 2005).   
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Third, and under the conditions given, the results of this research disclose that resource users’ 
individual and collective (experimental and experiential) learning, as a result of daily deliberations on 
the job, is rarely spontaneous, stable or self-organized, as claimed by e.g. Johannesen and Hahn 
(2012). As such, it requires facilitation as well as orientation. Leadership is found as a crucial learning 
facilitator (also found in Nykvist 2014) through fostering internal trust (Chapters IV and V) and mutual 
learning as ‘never-ending battle of explaining, convincing and listening’ (Chapter III). Especially 
important is the leadership´s own learning process - experimenting the best way to approach its 
membership and communicate vision, while dealing with old mental models, internal resistance and 
inertia.  
Nonetheless, an overall dependence on a single individual might be problematic for long-term 
organizational performance and resilience.  To increase social resilience through increasing capacity 
to collectively learn from complex problems and changes, resource users’ organizations require 
additional institutionalized communication and collaboration mechanisms and platforms. Besides 
supporting internal communication as well as collaboration with other actors and institutions, this 
substructure might store the ‘institutional memory’ (e.g. Dale et al. 1998) - organizational members’ 
experiences concerning episodes of resource scarcity, management practices and responses to crisis, 
which provide the context for social resilience to ecological disturbance (Olsson 2003). Thus, a 
change in leadership (current reservoir of institutional memory) or the young fishers’ visible lack of 
interest to learn from their elder colleagues’ experiences (e.g. Chapter V) would not imply a loss of 
collective memory on how to deal with changes in resource and social conditions. 
3) adaptability – acting and shaping change   
Humans ultimately respond to change through action, which should be a result of the learning 
process. Nykvist (2012) argues for the need to open up a self-organizational framing of adaptation 
(e.g. Folke et al. 2003, Olsson et al. 2004a) to be able to understand and learn how it is organized by 
real people. The research presented here contributes to this argument by highlighting the importance 
of adaptability with intent, as a part of an organizational management strategy. 
In this context, though different degrees of adaptability amongst POs (see Chapter IV) are contingent 
to contexts and partly shaped by PO’s position, as a formal structure, within the social networks, as 
informal structures (e.g. Prell et al. 2010), the work repeatedly shows the crucial importance of agency 
in achieving transformations for adaptability (e.g. Olsson et al. 2006). We refer here to leadership, 
fishers’ incentives, perceptions of self-interest, self-perception – how this influence fishers’ actions and 
the impact this has on their mutual trust and learning, found to be key aspects of adaptation (e.g. 
Armitage and Plummer 2010).  
In cases of proactively adaptive POs (Chapters III and IV) key individuals seem sufficient to leverage 
their organization to overcome the contextually embedded problems and eventually transform the 
context itself. Deeper understanding of the skills and capabilities of these agents enables a more 
complete understanding of how networks may improve their social capacity to respond to complex 
problems and heighten resilience (Moore and Westley 2011, Westley et al. 2013). Our work 
contributes to this respect by emphasizing skills and personal traits of proactive and adaptive PO 
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leaders that enhance fishers’ collective capacity to adapt (see Chapter IV). What seems particularly 
relevant for organizational adaptability is leadership ability to inspire and motivate by communicating 
his/her vision. Visionaries and inspirers / innovators and experimenters (Berkes et al. 2003), change 
agents (Crawford et al. 2006), transformative or visionary leaders (Westley 2002, Olsson et al. 2004a, 
2007) in PO cases frame problems in a backcasting manner (e.g. Vergragt and Jansen 1993, Quist 
and Vergragt 2006): from where they want to be towards the present. In pursuing their vision for the 
organizational future, these individuals demonstrate persistence to make this dream collective and 
patience to withstand others dissatisfaction, including inertia to change. Trust in leadership fosters 
membership collective action; otherwise, even as members of the same association they continue to 
feel and behave as individuals. 
The research presented in this thesis also confirms the role of informal structures, i.e. social networks 
in influencing individuals’ behaviours (e.g. Prell et al. 2010). For example, the relationship between 
leadership skills and the structural aspects of a network that mark leadership position is acknowledged 
as important (e.g. Westley et al. 2013). In this manner, as in large part of  purse-seine fishers 
community strategic relationships are already built (i.e. social networks interdependency) leaderships 
is more diplomatic and conservative (Chapters V and IV) – the main role of leaders is to connect and 
engage with others as networkers and facilitators / sense-makers  (Berkes et al. 2003)  or knowledge 
and resource brokers (Moore and Westley 2011). In ‘inconvenient contexts’ of problematic market 
share (Chapters III and IV) – a key leadership skill is what Moore and Westley (2011) frame as 
‘pattern recognition’ – agent’s recognition and understanding of the patterns causing the rigidity 
(system) trap. We can see this from ArtesanalPesca PO and cases of POs with reactive adaptation 
response (with or without cases of resistance) – leadership recognized so called rigidity trap within 
market institutions (Carpenter and Brock 2008) and realized that optimization of future choices 
depends precisely on the change of this pattern, which occurred through structural change and 
relationship building.  
In sum, strategies for adaptability in resource users’ organizations increase system resilience by 
improving its social capacity to deal with complex problems through accepting change and system 
complexity, encouraging learning from change and the capacity to act and shape change.  
 
6.3  CHALLENGES FOR ADAPTABILITY 
Nevertheless, this is not always the case. This section answers rq#4 by providing examples of 
situations where PO adaptive response to change failed to contribute to social-ecological resilience.  
Consider the aforementioned examples of anticipatory adaptive POs (see Chapter IV). Withdrawal 
mechanisms introduced by the POs made producers more resilient in the face of stock fluctuations 
and consequent market fluctuations of the fish price. However, adaptive strategies that led to social 
resilience did not reduce overfishing. Instead, subsidized fishery might have contributed to ecological 
vulnerability at the regional scale (see Chapter IV and V), while increasing resilience of the 
malfunctioning market regime. To a certain extent, this illustrates the supposition made by Gunderson 
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et al. (2006): communities rich in resources and monetary capital (e.g. purse-seine community), may 
fail to learn from mistakes they keep making because resources eventually provide them with 
solutions and learning can be replaced with organizational infrastructure. Likewise, some signs of 
resource scarcity may work as an incentive for resource users to manage better and adapt (Ostrom 
2009). 
Another example where human adaptation occurs at the cost of social-ecological vulnerability is found 
in the case of Propeixe members’ adaptation to temporary resource scarcity through an increase of 
fishery effort (see Chapter V). This example of ‘getting-by’ behaviour or short-term positive adaptation 
(Cinner et al. 2011) lacks collective action for the benefit of sustainable resource management. 
Moreover, fishers are unaware of the costs their actions have for the ecosystem and how 
interconnected their actions are (how many are doing the same thing and what this implies for fish 
stock). Instead, they all individually think that they are doing the right thing (adapting to secure their 
livelihoods), when they are in fact feeding each other in a negative activity that may in the end leave 
them out of work.  
Maladaptation is another form of ‘bad’ adaptability. One may also conceive it as a lack of adaptation 
(including us – Paper II). However, as we can see from the experiences of maladaptive POs, their 
members do adapt in a sense of adjusting (e.g. through illegal sale) to the persistence of the existing 
market regime, problematic in terms of adding to fish price uncertainty. As fish price determines their 
subsistence, maladaptation seems voluntary - and at costs – for both people and resources. And 
again, interconnectedness of many of these decisions and maladaptive behaviours (perfectly justified 
from the individual perspective) add up to the situation of low social and ecological resilience. 
Maladaptive fishers become more vulnerable to environmental surprises and at the mercy of actions of 
other agents, e.g. retailers.     
In sum, strategies for adaptation, perfectly desirable from a social perspective, might fail to contribute 
to social-ecological resilience (Walker et al. 2006). Very adaptive people may simultaneously deplete 
their natural resource base (e.g. Crona and Bodin 2011) and, thus, increase their own vulnerability.  
Finally, from the perspective of complexity thinking, it is interesting to discuss how these adaptive 
responses and actions are interconnected - how every change, even a positive one affects others’ 
actions and the system itself. The exiting the auction system in the case of reactively adaptive 
ArtesanalPesca (Chapter III), which is evidence of over-passing a system trap (e.g. transformation of 
the unjustified market context), as a response to crisis, brought upon rather negative consequences 
for the local fish market and its social dynamics (‘dying out’ of local fish auction; PO’s monopoly in fish 
supply). Likewise, the work and adaptability of some purse-seine POs increased community social 
capital and commercial interdependence (Chapter IV). Nevertheless, as clarified in Chapter V, social 
interdependence is based on industry demand for high quantities of fish. Though this gives financial 
security to the PO, it requires low prices - example of a system that is socially resilient but might 
degrade the environment as encouraging overuse of resources.  
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The following section contributes to answering rq#4 by discussing underlying reasons for these 
challenges, which are understood as rooted in institutional and historical limits to adaptation in the 
case of the Portuguese fisheries.  
 
6.4  LIMITS TO ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE 
The above described cases confirm the definitional nature of adaptation: adaptation is response to 
external change – conditions change and we adapt. As change often brings problems, adaptation, to a 
certain extent, transmits the idea – as long as we adapt we are fine. Nonetheless, the same cases 
clarify challenges for adaptability. Adaptability might be in fact a symptom of wicked system problems 
– we adapt as we have no other option. From this perspective, purse seine POs’ adaptation through 
withdrawal mechanisms is a consequence of the subsidized regime of EU fisheries, which does not 
solve the wicked problem of overfishing. The lack of precise knowledge and scientific certainty with 
regards to fish stock is partly a source of fishers’ ‘getting-by’ practices; the prejudiced market regime 
motivates Portuguese fishers’ maladaptation. In other words, adaptation does not actually solve the 
problem, but keeps feeding it. From a complex system perspective, we all produce results in the 
system that we do not want, and we do it out of rational response to constraints the system impose on 
us (Meadows 2008).  
The reasons underlying these challenges might be understood as limits to adaptation that contribute to 
system resilience. Limits to adaptation are endogenous to society and contingent on culture, 
knowledge, perceptions, power structures and attitudes to risks (Adger et al. 2009). Integration of 
results from our case studies strengthens this argument while identifying four crucial barriers to 
adaptation in the case of Portuguese POs, thus also contributing to answering rq#2.  
First, what we may call the institutional rigidity (Gunderson and Holling 2002) and inertia (Grin et al. 
2010) of the national fisheries (e.g. market institutions) is the most obvious reason why POs’ internal 
adaptation is not a panacea for fisheries social-ecological resilience (see Chapter IV). Over time, 
social structures or institutions, including environmental regimes22, become more homogeneous and 
more resistant to change (Giddens 1979). Besides influencing individuals' behaviours, social 
structures shape the way actors relate to each other (e.g. Prell et al. 2010), which can hinder or 
encourage adaptation (e.g. Winsvold et al. 2009). 
How rigid market institutions motivate maladaptive practices is clearly evident in landing ports with 
lower nominal catches. On the one hand, forces of power (e.g. market rules, government laws) add to 
fish price uncertainty. On the other hand, few and very well organized forces of profit (e.g. retailers) 
manipulate and further decrease the price, which undermines the advantages of the competitive 
                                                     
22 Environmental and resource regimes are systematically interconnected sets of elements (i.e. rights, rules and 
decision-making procedures), organized around functions or purposes and differentiable from their environments 
(which may include other institutions) (Meadows 2008). Although they change continuously, they can remain in 
place even they have lost their effectiveness in terms of mismatching biophysical and socioeconomic settings; in 
other words they have become ill-adaptive to the environment with which they interact (Young 2010). Keessen et 
al. (2013) frame this as negative resilience when applied to social systems. 
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market. Connection and mutual reinforcement of power and profit create a rigidity trap or a persistent 
maladaptive state (Gunderson and Holling 2002, Carpenter and Brock 2008). Price and the dominant 
position of retailers are key signs of actors' coordination, so called market mode of coordination 
(Thompson et al. 1991). As a result, fishers lack connectedness; POs lack focus, financial resources 
or proactive leadership that would bring solutions to the problem so they stick to maladaptive 
practices.   
As for the case of purse-seine fishers, ill-adaptation of market regime to their needs is not quite 
apparent. On the contrary, market rules and withdrawal mechanism seem to facilitate their jobs: 
commercialization of large quantities of fish sold relatively fast to established partners (canning 
industry) and other retailers. As such, some purse-seine POs (e.g. Chapter V) are an example of a 
network mode of governance (Thompson et al. 1991) where the PO itself seems to actively participate 
in fisheries and market governance. However, views of fishers (‘they (industry) are the most secure 
clients, but the price is not reasonable’, ‘PO cannot give the orders to the industry’) reveal that mutual 
reinforcement of forces of profit (industry, retailers) and political power that traditionally supports this 
type of fishery, partly due to the profits it brings – is based precisely on low price, which confirms the 
regime trap (in the long term) for both fisheries and fishers.  
Second, institutional limits relate to PO internal structure, i.e. incentives and informal social 
institutions. For example ‘getting-by’ behaviour in Propeixe case seems to occur in part because of PO 
market incentives. Another reason is existence of close social (bonding) ties between family or kinship 
members that discourage collective learning of resource status on the level of PO as a whole. The 
problematic of bonding social capital for networks’ resilience and adaptation is described in Newman 
and Dale (2005): bonding ties create strong, but localized trust, impose strict social norms that might 
inspire group homophily, which tends to reduce diversity. In this context, on one hand, the very close 
social network of purse-seine community (fishers, PO, canning industry, retailers, fishers’ wives, etc.) 
develops resilience (also found in Tompkins and Adger 2004) through interdependency, trust and 
collaboration. On the other hand, however, its lack of diversity might impede long-term adaptation to 
environmental change.  
Hence, while institutions permit a high level of societal self-organization (e.g. Gunderson and Holling 
2002), they can also inhibit humans ability to interpret problematic trends and deal with change. To be 
motivated to initiate or support change people must be able to “see” the system traps, embedded in 
rules, resources and power authority; this is very challenging for individuals or groups whose ability to 
affect change has been traditionally impeded by these institutions (Moore and Westley 2011). 
Moreover, sticky ill-adaptive institutions (Young 2010) shape and co-create collective memory of 
society and individual perceptions. Both are crucial for interpretation and ‘sense making’ of problems 
and this research shows how both add to inertia of national fishery regime.  
Social memory, supported by social context and structures, captures collective experience of societies 
or groups about their living past (e.g. Mcintosh 2000, Climo and Catell 2002). It is transmitted and 
revived as a legacy or a shared history among people through participation, communication, imitation 
of others’ practices, reviving and re-inventing them (Wenger 1998). As such, collective remembering 
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plays an important role in the self-organization process and is acknowledged as a social source of 
resilience in times of crisis and change (e.g. Folke et al. 2003, Barthel et al. 2010). However, in our 
work (e.g. maladaptive practices, acceptance of low sardine price) the collective memory might act as 
third limit to fishers’ adaptability. The Portuguese fishers’ collective memory is partly developed 
through the experience with the i) the oppressive Salazar political regime (1934-74); ii) the post-
revolutionary regime and iii) the Europeanization, after 1986 (see Chapter I, page 9-11). Throughout 
these periods, fisheries lost political interest, economic support, and to a certain extent social interest, 
which is in contradiction with the fact that the Portuguese eat more fish per capita than any other 
country in the EU and rank third in the world (Almeida et al. 2014, forthcoming, co-authored paper). 
While nowadays national interests are changing, we can say that institutional inheritance (Healey 
1998) of fishery regime in many ways shaped fishers’ collective history, as being revived through 
mechanisms of coordination and personal expectations as explained above – how regime shape the 
way actors relate to each other and how these power-profit relations inhibit institutional change, 
despite its inadequacy. Social memory also affects Portuguese fishers’ mindset and the story they are 
telling themselves about themselves - (‘we are not able to sell our fish’; ‘we cannot do anything, we 
could never do anything’) – history – which may not be true – and which additionally disarms fishers.  
Thus, the final limit to adaptation concerns the individual level: fishers’ self-perceptions that directly 
impact the way they perceive the problems facing their livelihoods and how they respond to them, 
examined in Chapter IV and V. In this context, in landing ports with a market mode of coordination, 
disempowered fishers and their complaining leadership pessimistically interpret their surroundings – 
defend their problems instead of proactively seeking solutions. Due to their low self-esteem they are 
inactive and do little to adapt. In a certain way, fishers seem incapable of ‘unlearning the old invalid 
thinking processes’ (Rodgers et al. 2013), embedded in context and revived/remembered through 
social interaction. In other words, adaptation is not a well thought organizational strategy, but an old 
way of getting-away with problematic trends and relationships from which no new knowledge is 
produced.    
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CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate and illustrate the ways in which social adaptability 
contributes to the resilience of socio-ecological systems. To explore this, the thesis focused on 
adaptability in resource users’ organization. A case study approach was combined with grounded 
theory on the case of fish POs from Portugal. This resulted in the production of three ‘Matryoshka 
mode’ inter-related research papers that contributed to answering the main research question and 
related research sub-questions (see Chapter I, page 11).  
 
7.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
With regards to first question, the thesis adds to SES literature by focusing on the contribution of 
organizational adaptability to system resilience. Combination of organizational and resilience literature 
provides a good framework for thinking about this matter: a) what dimensions are the basis for 
organizational performance and adaptability (contexts, structure and processes); b) what are possible 
sources of change (social-ecological system (SES) dynamics, evidence of trends and crisis); c)  what 
(factors) within these dimensions might influence adaptability in organizations (i.e. fishery type, land-
based facilities, membership nature, leadership, trust, rules, collaboration with the demand side, etc.) 
and d) how to measure this influence. 
Secondly, empirical evidence in this thesis clarifies that although an organization naturally co-evolves 
with its contextual settings, and in part as a response to a particular type of trend or crisis (slow 
resource change or ‘tipping over’ of market crisis), the importance of agency (capacity of actors to act 
otherwise to structural conditions) is vital for its adaptive response to a changing environment. Hence, 
adaptation is rarely a spontaneous, self-organized process. Instead, it is very reliant on proactive, 
visionary leaders, maintained and reproduced trust by agents’ actions and agents’ perceptions in 
regard to self, practices, experiences, expectations, problems and the future options.  
Third, the thesis adds to SES literature by conceiving organizational adaptability processes as layered 
processes, interdependent on each other. Among - accepting change and complexity, - learning from 
change and - acting, while shaping change, the most important for organizational contribution to social 
resilience is the learning layer. Without it, the strategies for adaptation lack consciousness and 
intention and seem to further promote persistence of institutional inertia and maladaptive practices.   
Finally, the thesis identifies the main reasons for these challenges for adaptation, which are, in the 
specific context of the Portuguese fisheries, rooted in ill-adaptive institutions, history and associated 
self-perceptions of individuals.  
 
7.2 BEYOND ADAPTABILITY: INSTITUTIONAL AND AGENCY CHANGE  
So, what are the implications of this set of observations for social (e.g. resource users’ organizations) 
capacity to deal with change? 
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On the one hand, adaptive organizations (through the impact of agency and some structural changes) 
enable resource users’ response to market changes and resource scarcity and help in the fulfillment of 
social needs. In other words, society (e.g. resource users) is able through adapting institutions to 
improve its capacity to manage natural resources and add to overall system resilience.  
On the other hand, findings in this thesis confirm evidence in the existing literature (e.g. Walker et al. 
2006, Crona and Bodin 2011) that social adaptation is not a panacea and may, in some cases, 
increase system vulnerability to change. Continuous maladaptation of some Portuguese POs points at 
a basic institutional problem (fish market regime), which clearly reduces fisheries resilience as it 
promotes overfishing. Hence, transformation of fish market institutions in Portugal, which have been 
experiencing difficulties for several decades, could increase both ecological and social resilience. 
Besides reconciliation of market and ecosystems to promote sustainable fisheries, institutional change 
includes fostering change in a way people perceive and accept change, and learning how to shape it 
(layers of social resilience), which may ensure adaptability in management practice.  In these terms, 
though research in this thesis supports the claim that the attributes of institutions must adapt to the 
dynamics of the Earth’s biophysical systems (e.g. Folke et al. 1998b, Young et al. 2008), it 
emphasizes the social aspect of institutions - the same attributes must find ways to better respond to 
the needs and incentives of people whose behaviour they shape, which is expected to increase social 
resilience. In the context of fisheries, Grafton and Kompas (2014) frame this as offering incentives that 
link individual with collective interest, offering long-term incentives that matter for fishers to increase 
their responsibility and aligning them with the sustainability of fisheries. In other words, through 
institutional adaptation and change fishers might wish to behave differently in regard to resource use.  
This leads us to the second important conclusion. As evident from the empirical research, structural 
change may not be sufficient to address other barriers to adaptation, which add to institutional inertia 
and maladaptive practices of Portuguese fishers, such as collective memory and problematic self-
perceptions. The agency also needs to change. Briefly, individual change implies thinking in systems 
about human-nature problems (e.g. Meadows 2008); self-critical reflection on oneself and confronting 
not only the self-induced problems (e.g. overuse of resources, illegal sale), but also the structures that 
frames one’s practices, so called ‘second-order reflexivity’ (Voß & Kemp 2006). Based on the findings, 
organizational agency (i.e. leadership), including institutionalized communication and collaboration 
mechanisms could facilitate members’ collective re-thinking and recognition of system traps and 
opportunities for change.   
In the scope of resource users’ organizations, thinking in systems and reflexivity implies asking: ‘how 
do I (we) contribute to the resilience of the system in which I am (we are) operating, in particular 
ecological resilience?’ and ‘what eventually needs to change, other than my own practices, to increase 
my contribution to sustainability?’ Thereby, more freedom in thinking about future options - visioning 
(e.g. Meadows 2008) is a third part of individual change: designing our future instead of  merely 
adapting to it (e.g. Newman and Daly 2005); planning ahead for institutional changes (e.g. Young 
2010), reaching for other narratives (and memories) than the ones that are familiar to us (e.g. 
Eisenstein 2011).  
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 Insights of institutional and individual change are discussed in the next two sections as reflections for 
policy (PO design and Portuguese fisheries management) and for further research.  
 
7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The study presented in this thesis is small in size and in order to draw more extensive conclusions 
about PO’s contribution to fishery management more research is needed. This being said, this thesis 
provides insights that have policy implications that are particularly important for the national context, 
and which could prove useful elsewhere in the EU. They concern fisheries managers, professionals 
involved in the fishery regime and fishers community.  
New CFP reform and its main objective of preserving fish stocks through decentralized fishery 
management, rules on maximum sustainable yield, transferable fishing concessions and banning 
discards will certainly bring different dynamics for managing EU fisheries. In the context of the 
reformed CFP, the social objectives and market policy predict changes to PO role, i.e. empowering 
POs with new production and marketing objectives and supporting them financially to implement 
discard ban and handle landed catches; increasing the bargaining power of producers through market 
measures, incentives and premiums for sustainable practices, etc.  Considering these challenges, the 
first set of policy implications concerns the formal design of POs, including their link with the larger 
institutional arrangement (e.g.COM) of which they are a part. In regard to institutional structure, to 
increase their contribution to fisheries management, PO should adopt more stringent rules to penalize 
membership responsible for overfishing. Also, to decrease membership self-interest, PO should create 
incentives and mechanisms for recurrent membership interaction and discussion of market strategies, 
rules and power relations. This is expected to increase fishers’ sense of protection, security and 
ownership thereby stimulating collective action. Through intensifying internal membership 
communication, PO might increase not only internal adaptive capacity, but the capacity to learn and 
collaborate with other actors in the sector, thus increasing its involvement in fisheries co-management.  
Finally, in the specific national context, the current criteria for PO recognition should be re-evaluated 
and adapted to national fisheries context, which would increase participation of multispecies small 
scale vessels.  Bearing in mind a planned decrease of withdrawal funds, the internal structure of some 
purse-seine POs (e.g. by-laws on membership nature, norms of behaviour) should be re-evaluated to 
promote diversity and transform the situations of locked-in family sub-networks to networks based on 
diverse fisheries that may increase overall adaptability.  Also, evidence in both the literature and this 
thesis point to the benefits of POs’ participation in scientific projects that concern fisheries as they 
have information of practical relevance in regard to production and marketing that could be difficult to 
find otherwise.  
The second set of policy implications concerns the need for change of national fisheries market 
institutions. Below we summarize alternatives to an official market model, based on interviews with 
POs and other actors in the sector, which were not included in Chapters 3-5. 
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• Delegate responsibility for auctions management to POs; the idea was already offered to POs 
in 2010, following a period of serious financial problems for Docapesca, the official regulating 
authority responsible for the management of fish auctions in Portugal. Only a few POs, mainly 
those in big landing ports, accepted this proposal. By contrast, POs working in ports with lower 
nominal catches did not want to take on this responsibility as auctions in these ports are 
difficult to manage (e.g. bad infrastructural conditions, financial debits, etc.). Docapesca 
managed to recover from financial deficit and the current management strategy (2012-2015) is 
based on various types of investments, including investments in port infrastructure;  
• Change the auction type: from decreasing to increasing auction type. Especially in ports with 
lower nominal catches, decreasing auctions23 are perceived to facilitate the combination of 
price between retailers. At present, Docapesca is planning to experiment with increasing 
auctions in two ports. The project has been delayed as few landing ports demonstrated their 
interest to be a trial case. Main concerns for implementation of increasing auctions are of 
speculative type, i.e. auction process would become slower hence this would complicate the 
overall commercialization process;  
• Open auction to wider public to increase competition; in this alternative, though the fish would 
always pass through the auction system as the system of fish first sale, the producer would 
have an option to leave a certain criterion about the price (e.g. minimum price). If the fish price 
at the auction reaches the price below this minimum price, the auction would be open for the 
wider public. In this way, retailers would have market advantage, but there would be additional 
competition with the general public, which would increase the price of the product. 
• Reduce number of auctions; closing down small auctions or aligning them into fewer, bigger 
ones, which would facilitate concentration of production and encourage retailers’ competition. 
The importance of having the auction close to the landing port might be addressed through 
PO’s land-based facilities (e.g. vehicles, vehicles with freezing storage) that may rapidly 
transport production between neighbouring ports;  
• Introduce other regime of fish first sale other than auctions; one PO leader suggested the 
Spanish fish market model as an example: instead of a state regulating authority, fish is sold 
to an intermediary with a particular interest in specific product who looks for further buyers 
(‘more fish he sells (and better), more he earns’). This implies radically different market 
dynamics from the Portuguese setting, where ‘Docapesca always wins!’ through charging 
fees.  
 
                                                     
23 According to auction theory (e.g. Klemperer 2004) deceasing Dutch model of auctions make sense if there is a 
high quantity of the product that needs to be sold down quickly (e.g. flower market, market of cigarettes, etc), 
which provides an additional argument to why in landing ports with lower nominal catches Dutch auctions are not 
the most appropriate mechanisms for fish commercialization (our reflection, shared with interviewees)  
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7.4  FURTHER RESEARCH   
‘Perhaps in the 20th century we have tried to change the world too quickly (as following the famous 
Marxist formula: ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world, the time is to change it!’). The time is to 
interpret again, to start thinking’ (Slavoj Zizek24). 
First, although the results of this research are contextually dependent, it has covered the specific 
steps – process (i.e. framework) taken to produce evidence of organizational and institutional 
adaptability, social learning and (sub) networks dynamics. Hence, it would be important to verify the 
usefulness of such an analytical framework to estimate adaptive capacity of POs in other EU countries 
as well as in other resource users’ organizations or local communities. Second, more effort should be 
made to understand institutional adaptability and transformability processes at the regional or at the 
national level of the fishery management considering the perspective of adaptive governance and 
collaborative adaptive management within the SES literature (e.g. Berkley 2013, Fabricius and Cundill 
2014).  
Third research direction concerns exploring attitudes and perceptions towards other policy 
instruments. For instance, an interesting research topic would be the upcoming implementation of 
discard ban. Research would aim to identify ongoing practices of fish discards in Portugal (and in the 
EU) and contribute to clarification of the main causes of discards (e.g. Catchpole and Gray 2010, 
Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). Empirically, it would focus on fishers’ / managers’ / policy makers’ 
perceptions and insights of discards problem, i.e. main barriers for the upcoming implementation of 
this measure and the most appropriate (contextually adapted) incentives for discard mitigation in 
Portugal.   
Finally, much is written on building institutional capacity to break the institutional inheritance by means 
of creative agency (Healey 1998, Healey et al. 2002). Ideally, individual change and institutional 
change reinforce each other: through self-reflexivity agency is able to realize that institutional change 
is required, how external changes affects institutions and appreciate what kind of opportunities these 
changes, including the consequences of their own actions, are bringing for change of structures (e.g. 
González and Healey 2005, Grin et al. 2010). In line with this theory, future research aims to study 
these processes. While emphasizing an analysis based on governance of fisheries in Portugal, adding 
a comparative perspective using insights from other EU countries would be interesting. It would be 
focused, on the one hand, on the evaluation of institutions - structures and policies (e.g. fisheries 
management in Portugal) to identify main external forces that drive institutional change (i.e. 
Europeanization, globalization, etc.) and national level institutional barriers to change, and on the 
other hand, it would explore the role of agency (e.g. people involved in structures and in practices): 
what and how institutional change and agency change build and add to one another.    
                                                     
24 Slavoj Zizek, interview for Big Think, 2012, available online: http://bigthink.com/users/slavoj-zizek   
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